



## Erich Fromm and Albert Camus Similarities and Differences in Their Analysis of Psycho-Social Illness and its Treatment

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*„.... It is man's fate that his existence is beset by contradictions which he is called on to deal with, without ever solving them. When he has overcome the primitive state of human sacrifice, be it in the ritualistic form of the human sacrifices of the Aztecs or in the secular form of war, when he has been able to regulate his relationship with nature reasonably instead of blindly, when things have truly become his servants rather than his idols, he will be confronted with the truly human conflicts and problems; he will have to be adventuresome, courageous, imaginative, capable of suffering and of joy, but his powers will be in the service of life, not in the service of death. The new phase of human history, if it comes to pass, will be a new beginning, not an end.”*

(E. Fromm, „The Present Human Condition” (1955c), in: *The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays* (1963a), pp. 103-104.)

*Accept existence as it is - a sign of strength? No, that is servitude. Accept existence as it was. For the present - struggle.* (Albert Camus, 1951b)

*Every wall is a door.* (Ralph Waldo Emerson (quoted by Albert Camus, 1951 or 1952, p. 33)

Dear Colleagues and Friends:

My name is Douglas Puccini and I invite you to consider informally with us this afternoon certain aspects of mental disturbances in and among people as well as certain responses to psycho-social distress. The subject matter of our talk is centered around two topics which Erich Fromm and Albert Camus dealt with extensively in their writings: human destructiveness and human freedom.

Our colleague Norman Elrod will begin our presentation by making you acquainted with a few of his reflections on how Erich

Fromm and Albert Camus viewed psycho-social illness, human destructiveness and human freedom, emphasizing at the same time that he considers his ideas to be tentative, indicative of a wish to go into the subject in much greater detail.

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If we recall when Fromm and Camus lived - Erich Fromm was born in 1900 and died in 1980, Albert Camus was born in 1913 and died in 1960 -, it is not surprising that both of them, being as they were, very highly aware, took human beings seriously in their destructive activ-



ity and in their striving to be free. Fromm's summary of what took place in the 20th century until 1945 reads as follows:

„[The First World War,] in which millions died for the territorial ambitions of the European powers, although under the illusion of fighting for peace and democracy, was the beginning of that development which tended in a relatively short time to destroy a two-thousand-year-old Western tradition of hope and to transform it into a mood of despair.

The moral callousness of the First World War was only the beginning. Other events followed: the betrayal of the socialist hopes by Stalin's reactionary state capitalism; the severe economic crisis at the end of the twenties; the victory of barbarism in one of the oldest centers of culture in the world - Germany; the insanity of Stalinist terror during the thirties; the Second World War, in which all the fighting nations lost some of the moral considerations which had still existed in the First World War; the unlimited destruction of civilian populations, started by Hitler and continued by the even more complete destruction of cities such as Hamburg and Dresden and Tokyo, and eventually by the use of atomic bombs against Japan." (E. Fromm, „Afterword," in George Orwell, '1984' (1961c), New York: The New American Library of World Literature 1961, pp. 258-259.)

Fromm responded in various ways to these events and developments. One of his responses was the formulation of a concept of character which he set forth in the first part of his work *Man for Himself* (Fromm, 1947a). Another response to the problem of *man against himself* was the study of specific individuals who wrought havoc against others. I am thinking of his analyses of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin and Heinrich Himmler (E. Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, 1973a).

Camus's reaction to human destructiveness as he encountered it in the 1930s and later was in essence similar to Fromm's. The results of his studies did not, however, reach the reading public in a social scientific form as was the case

with Fromm. He clothed his ideas in literature, for example in novels like *The Stranger* (Camus, 1942a) and *The Plague* (Camus, 1947), as well as in plays like *Caligula* (Camus, 1941). And Camus expressed his ideas on the nature of human beings and their psycho-social illness in poetic analyses, for example in *The Myth of Sisyphus* (Camus, 1942b) and *The Rebel* (Camus, 1951a).

As all of us who are familiar with these two men and their works know, they did not resign themselves to fate as dictated by destructive human beings. If, for example, Hitler's and Stalin's doctrines of salvation were seductive, concealing a wolf in sheep's clothing, were there other doctrines which are definitely affirmative of life? Analysis of alternatives was needed! And so Fromm explored psychoanalysis, orthodox Judaism, Christianity and Zen Buddhism. Camus undertook a thorough study of socialism, communism and Catholicism. Both of them came to the conclusion that doctrines of salvation, regardless of their origin, cannot be trusted. Doubt, as Fromm put it, not irrational, but rational doubt is called for under these circumstances:

„Historically, rational doubt is one of the mainsprings of modern thought, and through it modern philosophy, as well as science, received their most fruitful impulses. Here too, as in personal development, the rise of rational doubt was linked with the growing emancipation from authority, that of the church and the state." (E. Fromm, *Man for Himself* (1947a), p. 201; cf. pp. 199-200.)

Camus came up with no therapy whatsoever for the psycho-social illness of mankind. But like Henri Balzac, who wrote an important novel about a country doctor (Balzac, 1833), not to mention Franz Kafka and his „Country Doctor" (Kafka, Winter 1916/1917), as well as Arthur Schnitzler, whose study of a city doctor is full of profound meaning (Schnitzler, 1918), and Boris Pasternak, the author of an extremely important novel dealing with the challenges of life facing a sensitive doctor in the Soviet Union (Pasternak, 1957), Camus realized that among people who no longer believe in supernatural forces it is understandable that they turn to the doctor for



their rescue, expecting him or her, in Kafka's words, „to solve everything with his tender surgical hand” (Kafka, Winter 1916/1917, p. 130). But Camus's Dr. Rieux does not set out to solve all problems. Solving things in this sense means salvation. This is not Dr. Rieux' calling. His calling is to heal earthly illness. He sees himself involved in a „never ending defeat” (Camus quoted in Heinz Politzer, 1959, p. 10). Camus (1951a) wrote: „Even by his greatest effort man can only propose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering of the world will remain” (p. 303). Creation, being and destruction are a trioka human beings cannot escape from.

In his novel *The Plague*, published in 1947, Camus analyzed human destructiveness and psycho-social illness. In the description of the individual life histories of the people exposed to a plague epidemic in the Algerian port of Oran - Camus's place of birth - many forms of human action and reaction are presented, e.g. fear, denial, indifference, courage, love of one's neighbor and solidarity with threatened and discriminated persons. Critics took the plague to be a symbol of the psycho-social illness caused by the Nazis. Camus himself wrote in his diary that with his symbol of the plague he was thinking about the Second World War as a specific period in human history, but the plague was also intended to be a paradigm for human existence as such (Camus, 1942, 1943, 1944 or 1945, pp. 164-165; cf. Politzer, 1959, pp. 11-12; Carol Petersen, 1961, pp. 61, 64).

Did Camus understand human destructiveness as a matter of fate when he chose rats as the carriers of the plague, meaning, perhaps, psycho-social illness? Yes, human destructiveness is with us and will stay with us. There is no getting around it. But what is really important, Camus thought, are the attitudes and activities that are possible within a destructive situation. Not all of us must become „rhinoceroses”, to speak with Eugène Ionesco, but „each of us ... must keep endless watch on ourselves” (Camus, 1946, p. 224). For Camus everything depends on this „endless watch” - „watch” meaning here observation of what is real and control of destructive activity in the interest of life. As Camus (1951a) wrote in *The Rebel*: „We all carry within

us our places of exile, our crimes and our ravages. But our task is not to unleash them on the world; it is to fight them in ourselves and in others” (p. 301).

But in this fight a sense of grim humor can be cultivated: „Upon his arrival in Buchenwald a small Frenchman requests a talk in private with the official who receives him, who is also a prisoner: 'Just between you and me I'm a special case - I'm innocent'.” (Camus, 1989, p. 59).

Fromm, as we know, was also in favor of a thorough study of human destructiveness. He made a distinction between biological adaptive aggression common to animals and human beings and biological nonadaptive, malicious aggression unique to human beings. The former is reactive to specific threats to one's vital interests. It is a part of our phylogenetic program for survival. It cannot be wiped-out. Malicious aggression is of a different nature. It is present in all of us, not as a drive but as a potential form of reaction to human intercourse. When it is realized, i. e. turned into an actual state through human action, it is both biologically and socially destructive. But since it is not inborn, it is capable of being changed, transformed, indeed, under specific circumstances even extirpated (Fromm, 1973a, p. 187). For this to take place, much depends on the „character structure” or „character system” of the individual under study (Rainer Funk, 1989, p. 436) and on the „social character” of the society in which this person lives (Fromm, 1941a). Fromm - and probably Camus as well -, thought conditions such as lovelessness and absence of pleasure in a child's surroundings further feelings of helplessness and emptiness, preconditions for acts of non-adaptive, malicious aggression. Of course, if exploitation and a lack of hope are noticeably present in society, the individual's productive powers will be frustrated and destructive reactions can be expected. If these destructive actions become the dominant characteristic of a person's behavior then Fromm spoke of necrophilia. He (1973a) defined necrophilia in the characterological sense as „the passionate attraction to all that is dead, decayed, putrid, sickly; it is the passion to transform that which is alive into something unalive; to destroy for the sake of destruction; the exclusive interest in all that is purely mechanical.



It is the passion 'to tear apart living structures'." (E. Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, p. 366.)

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I myself, Douglas Puccini, would like to say the following about psycho-social illness, human destructiveness and human freedom. The freedom or captivity and enslavement of human beings are central themes in Fromm's and Camus's works. Camus as a son of poor immigrants urged to leave the French state, became an immediate eyewitness to the enslavement of fellow human beings in his native country, Algeria. On the other hand, he and his family being French, belonged to the class of the foreign rulers. Camus discussed the conditions among masters and slaves at a point in time, when the topic „North Africa under occupation" was as yet hardly manifest in the public consciousness. He perhaps viewed people as being exposed primarily to the danger of radicalism in their striving for freedom and justice. Therefore, Camus urged „moderation", not ordering people to be indifferent, though, but calling them to action. Still, good deeds are not enough for Camus. In *The Plague*, he made Dr. Rieux say that acting against the plague first requires reflection, but he also views knowledge and truth as necessary results of action; and he assumes that psycho-social illness originates from and flourishes on the ground of ignorance. Dr. Rieux says: „The evil that is in the world always comes from ignorance, and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding" (Camus, 1949, p. 126). Camus proposed that man oppose slavery by being moderate and by confronting open questions, living with them, and yet experiencing the joy of life, if possible. He advocated recognition, knowledge, action, honesty and love. In the novel *The Plague* Dr. Rieux says: „There was not one of their [the afflicted's] anxieties in which he did not share, no predicament of theirs that was not his" (p. 278). Camus depicted Dr. Rieux as a physician identifying himself with those struck down by the illness and declaring his solidarity with them. For us, this attitude is vital in all human relations.

As I understand it, Fromm took the same

approach to mankind's enslavement, and he also emphasized that people contribute much to their own bondage. In the course of individual development man breaks free from oneness with others, according to Fromm. The freedom and independence that he can arrive at by means of this development, render him fearful and helpless. For fear of being isolated and losing his security, being unable to endure being alone, he will perhaps succumb to new dependencies. Fromm stated in *Escape from Freedom*: „Religion and nationalism, as well as any custom and any belief however absurd and degrading, if it only connects the individual with others, are refuges from what man most dreads: isolation" (1941a, p. 20). Thereby, Fromm pointed out, the person destroys his freedom and integrity as an individual. The oneness with others as a free man is replaced by being similar to others.

Both Fromm and Camus pointed to the necessity of cooperation in order to ensure common survival, which takes place, according to Fromm, on the basis of advancing „to the full realization of positive freedom that is based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man" (1941a, p. 8). And like Camus, Fromm viewed spontaneous love and productive cooperation as the proper alternative to the striving for conformity and similarity and as the chance to overcome the state of separateness.

Fromm's „endurance of isolation" is matched by Camus's „carrying on". By the end of the plague, Dr. Rieux states that life goes on, that one must carry on, endure despite the death of his friends and his wife. It is exactly in this interhuman realm that Fromm pointed to the great temptation of seeking refuge in symbiotic, narcissistic, masochistic, and sadistic relations that indicate the individual's failure in the face of pressure to conform to the masses, even though Fromm was full of hope and trust in the sound and productive powers within man and despite his appreciation of man's capacity to love and bond. He wrote: „Alcoholism and drug addiction are forms which the individual chooses in a nonorgiastic culture. [Elsewhere, he adds compulsive sexuality and suicide.] While people try to escape from separateness by taking refuge in alcohol or drugs, they feel all the more separate after the orgiastic experience is over,



and thus are driven to have recourse to it with increasing frequency and intensity” (E. Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (1956a), p. 12). Abuse of this addiction manifests itself in this respect, as an expression of symbiotic-masochistic relational needs, by which the individual relinquishes his freedom.

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Both of us, Puccini and I, meet people time and again who seem to be addicted to their illness, people who suffer from anxiety and insecurity and who are at the same time looking for a way out of their addiction to illness. We try to empathize with these people, try to understand their sufferings, their unique life histories and the social conditions under which they became psychically disturbed. We frequently, we assume, discover powers at work or on call that would be greatly helpful in support of the psychoanalysis. Of course, we also come up against forces which oblige the patient to remain more or less as he or she is. These latter forces can be imbedded in actual, historical interpersonal relations. Frequently these social-psychological factors are allied intrapsychically with super-ego demands for a continuation of the *status quo*. In such cases it is obvious that our support of the ego must be twofold: on the one hand strengthening the ego at the expense of the super-ego and on the other hand helping the ego in its efforts to organize the self more effectively in dealings with the social world.

Puccini and I agree on what has just been said. It appears that Fromm and Camus were sometimes not in agreement as to what might contribute to healing, Fromm, for his part, offered the individual more concrete alternatives than Camus. Fromm’s hope that genuine love could develop in relations that are marked by giving and taking was not shared by Camus to the same extent. Camus, not at all certain about his own capacity to love in a way understandable to most people, could never have written a book like *The Art of Loving*. And so it is no surprise that the last two sentences in his diary of 1959 - he died tragically near the beginning of January 1960 - read as follows: „From time to time I accuse myself of being unable to love

someone. And this may be true, but I was capable of *choosing* a few persons whom I cherished in my heart as best I could, regardless of what they did” (Camus, 1959, p. 353).

Camus’s literary figures are frequently faced with decision making. They can change their ways if they choose to do so. Indeed, Camus perceived chances for responsible, authentic behavior, but he could neither promise „pie in the sky when you die” nor „bread on earth for everyone”. If achievement and satisfaction are attained, that is wonderful, but both are just for the moment. Life is an open book, but it is a story about the „wholly human origin of all that is human” (Camus, 1942, p. 99). On the basis of this consistent humanism Camus could argue with conviction against capital punishment:

„The age of enlightenment, as people say, wanted to suppress the death penalty on the pretext that man was naturally good. Of course, he is not (he is worse or better). After twenty years of our magnificent history we are well aware of this. But precisely because he is not, no one among us can pose as an absolute judge and pronounce the definitive elimination of the worst among the guilty, because no one of us can lay claim to absolute innocence. Capital punishment upsets the only indisputable human solidarity - our solidarity against death - and it can be legitimized only by a truth or a principle that is superior to man (Camus, 1957, pp. 157-158).

At the end of *The Artist at Work* Camus’s protagonist painter dies in his attic room, leaving behind an almost completely blank canvas on which he has been working for a long time. Only at the center of the canvas is there a word written in extremely small letters. It can be deciphered, but it is not certain if the word should be read „solitary” or „solidary”. „To be or not to be?” was not Camus’s question. His was: „To go it alone or to go it with others?” „Solitaire” or „Solidaire”? Time and again he treated this subject (Camus, 1951-1954, pp. 44, 68,85).

Camus thought he recognized life’s challenge, but he confessed that for him the *striving* for life, liberty and companionship as well as for justice, truth and beauty is the main thing. If du-



ration is to exist as a category of thought, then let it be seen in this striving; Camus thought this „struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart” (Camus, 1942, p. 99). At the end of his speech of acceptance, upon the award of the Nobel Prize for Literature, delivered in Stockholm, 10 December 1957, Camus summarized his position as follows:

„Truth is mysterious, elusive, ever to be won anew. Liberty is dangerous, as hard to live with as it is exciting. We must progress towards those two objectives, painfully but resolutely, sure in advance that we shall weaken and flinch on such a long road. Consequently, what writer would dare, with a clear conscience, to become a preacher of virtue? As for me, I must say once more that I am far from all that. I have never been able to forget the sunlight, the delight in life, the freedom in which I grew up. But although that nostalgia explains many of my mistakes and shortcomings, it doubtless helped me to understand my calling, and it still helps me to stand implicitly beside all those silent men who, throughout the world, endure the life that has been made for them only because they remember or fleetingly re-experience free moments of happiness.

Reduced in this way to what I am in reality, to my limits, to my liabilities, as to my difficult faith, I feel freer to show you in conclusion the extent and generosity of the distinction you have just granted me, freer likewise to tell you that I should like to receive it as a tribute paid to all those who, sharing the same fight, have received no reward, but on the contrary have known only woe and persecution. It remains for me then to thank you from the bottom of my heart and to make you publicly, as a personal token of gratitude, the same age-old promise of allegiance that every true artist, every day, makes to himself, in silence.” (p. 198.)

Fromm, as we understand him, seemed to believe that he had a clear idea about how things stand, about what is right and what is wrong. He wrote: „To help the analysand to get aware

of his alternatives is part of analyzing him. It is not expressing value judgments; this is just stating - in fact I can state them in any other field - these are the forces, and if you go this way this will happen; if you go that way that will happen” (Fromm, 1994, p. 110). Fromm seems to have thought that he could have the patient’s total life situation in mind. Camus would have perhaps thought this was self-deception. Can the analyst, Camus might have asked, really attain a bird’s-eye view of the patient’s total situation? What about accident, fate? Fromm went on: „To speak of analysis I consider it a very important task of the analyst to show the person whom he analyzes the real alternatives, very drastically and not pussyfooting, and maybe to put it in careful terms so that one says and doesn’t say it” (Fromm, 1994, p. 109). We think Camus would have questioned Fromm’s assumption that he saw all of the „real alternatives”. Camus might have mentioned „surprise” as a helpful category in psychoanalytic thinking. And probably „accident”. „fate” and „luck” would have come to his mind. „Certainty” in matters dealing with human volition would have been unacceptable, but he might have accepted „probability” as a useful term in psychoanalysis, agreeing basically with Alexander Pope (1733), who wrote:

Say first, of God above, or man below,  
 What can we reason, but from what we know?  
 Of Man, what see we but his station here,  
 From which to reason, or to which refer?  
 Thro’ worlds unnumber’d tho’ the God be  
 known,

‘Tis ours to trace him, only in our own.  
 He, who thro’ vast immensity can pierce,  
 See worlds on worlds compose one universe,  
 Observe how system into system runs,  
 What other planets circle other suns,  
 What vary’d being peoples ev’ry star,  
 May tell, why Heav’n has made us as we are.  
 But of this frame the bearings, and the ties,  
 The strong connections, nice dependencies,  
 Gradations just, has thy pervading soul  
 Look’d thro’? or can a part contain the whole?  
 (Epistle 1, 17-32)

The criticism Camus might have made of Fromm



would be as follows: „'Tis but a part we see, and not a whole.” (60)

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In conclusion I would now like to describe an area of my former clinical activity, where, in my opinion, the ideas of Fromm and Camus discussed here apply. For some 15 years I carried out psychotherapeutic work with adolescents and young adults in a counseling center and in psychiatric clinics. This included 6 ½ years of directing a long-term therapy station for drug addicts. I saw these people involved in conflicts between desires and reality. They tried for a long time to feel at ease in our everyday culture and to establish basic relations of a meaningful nature within this everyday culture as well as to fulfill their desires and satisfy their wants from what this culture had to offer. But their real experiences with people may have led to a sadistic superego developing within them, to which their self-destructive acts are traced back, so that they turned away from the everyday culture that had promised them justice, work, neighborly love, fellowship and happiness as a reward for their adaptation and submission, and created an anti-culture around the drug in search of alternatives. They were drawn to people who they felt were suffering in a similar way. From them they hoped to find security and understanding and simply to feel at ease, and they reinforced that feeling by the pain-relieving effect of the drug.

Yet sooner or later they were compelled to realize that the safety, security, and understanding were largely based on an illusion, a self-deception, and now they continued to consume drugs in order to suppress this renewed pain and disillusionment. Much as in the everyday culture, there were alienated relationships, alienated work organized according to strict economic laws, dishonesty, personal offense, and a lack of possibilities of satisfaction and sublimation in the anti-culture.

It appeared to me that their criticisms of the everyday culture were justified, and their reasons for dropping out understandable. That their aggressiveness against others turned into an aggressiveness against themselves can be ex-

plained by a theory of internalizing individual, collective and societal compulsions. With respect to their drug consumption, one can speak of an internalized external determination.

However, the extent of self-destruction in these people may be explained, in my opinion, only on the grounds of a severe superego pathology accompanied by an omnipresent feeling of guilt. What I said in my discussion of Camus and especially of Fromm, who described the fear of freedom and the inclination towards renewed slavery, is confirmed here.

In therapeutic activity I was always facing the question of what real alternative to drug consumption I might offer the drug addict. It was not always the most difficult task to lead them back into everyday culture, because they were often pursued by the police, and in most cases they were threatened with imprisonment. But as soon as they abandoned drugs, the feelings of guilt resurfaced, and along with these the tendencies to subject themselves to the everyday culture once more in the hope of being lovingly reinstated and accepted. It was much more difficult to establish a basic relationship with them. The original distrust of living human objects that had led them to cultivate a relationship with the lifeless object „drug” that they falsely thought they could manipulate was still there. Whatever I could offer as an alternative to drug consumption and the drug scene, namely real relations and the human environment, was nothing but what they were originally running away from in everyday culture, even though I understood my offer to be of a different nature. I had to leave open the question of what was right and meaningful, and, in a well-meaning way and considering the personal injuries they had experienced, I had to communicate to the drug addicts what possibilities and probabilities I saw connected with their return to everyday culture. In the end it always remained open whether the renewed attempt to feel well in the everyday culture and establish loving and productive relationships within it was the right and necessary thing, or rather the secure distance to the sickening environment established by continued drug consumption.

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We want to emphasize that Camus and Fromm, regardless of what reservations Camus might have had about some of Fromm's ideas, were brothers in spirit, colleagues in the study, diagnosis and treatment of psycho-social illness. This can be seen in Fromm's high regard for Camus. An example:

„To create life is to transcend one's status as a creature that is thrown into life as dice are thrown out of a cup. But to destroy life also means to transcend it and to escape the unbearable suffering of complete passivity. To create life requires certain qualities which the impotent person lacks. To destroy life requires only one quality - the use of force. The impotent man, if he has a pistol, a knife, or a strong arm, can transcend life by destroying it in others or in himself. He thus *takes revenge on life for negating itself to him*. Compensatory violence is precisely that violence which has its roots in and which compensates for impotence. The man who cannot create wants to destroy. In creating and in destroying he transcends his role as a mere creature. Camus expressed this idea succinctly when he had Caligula say: 'I live, I kill, I exercise the rapturous power of a destroyer, compared with which the power of a creator is merest child's play.' This is the violence of the cripple, of those to whom life has denied the capacity for any positive expression of their specifically human powers. They need to destroy precisely because they are human, since being human means transcending thing-ness." (E. Fromm, *The Heart of Man* (1964a), p. 14.)

In a later study Fromm returned to Camus's *Caligula* and wrote:

„Albert Camus's play, *Caligula*, provides an example of an extreme type of sadistic control which amounts to a desire for omnipotence. We see how Caligula, brought by circumstances to a position of unlimited power, gets ever-more deeply involved in the craving for power. He sleeps with the wives of the senators and enjoys their humiliation when they have to act like admir-

ing and fawning friends. He kills some of them, and those that remain still have to smile and joke. But even all this power does not satisfy him; he wants absolute power, he wants the impossible. As Camus has him say, 'I want the moon.'

It is easy enough to say that Caligula is mad, but his madness is a way of life; it is one solution of the Problem of human existence, because it serves the illusion of omnipotence, of transcending the frontiers of human existence. In the process of trying to win absolute power Caligula lost all contact with men. He became an outcast by casting them out; he had to become mad because, when the bid for omnipotence failed, he was left a lonely, impotent individual.

The case of Caligula is of course exceptional. Few people ever have the chance to attain so much power that they can seduce themselves into the delusion that it might be absolute. But some have existed throughout history, up to our time; if they remain victorious, they are celebrated as great statesmen or generals; if they are defeated, they are considered madmen or criminals." (E. Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973a), p. 289.)

Emerson's „Every wall is a door" is cited in one of Camus's diaries. We have discovered that Camus relied on this idea in closing an address he delivered at the University of Upsala in December 1957. We assume Camus's position as stated here would have been accepted by Fromm:

„It is said that Nietzsche after the break with Lou Salomé, in a period of complete solitude, crushed and uplifted at the same time by the perspective of the huge work he had to carry on without any help, used to walk at night on the mountains overlooking the gulf of Genoa and light great bonfires of leaves and branches which he would watch as they burned up. I have often dreamed of these fires and have occasionally imagined certain men and certain works in front of those fires, as a way of testing men and works. Well, our era is one of those fires whose unbearable heat will





doubtless reduce many a work to ashes! But as for those that remain, their metal will be intact and, looking at them, we shall be able to indulge without restraint in the supreme joy of the intelligence which we call 'admiration'.

One may long, as I do, for a gentler flame, a respite, a pause for musing. But perhaps there is no other peace for the artist than what he finds in the heat of combat. 'Every wall is a door', Emerson correctly said. Let us not look for the door, and the way out, anywhere but in the wall against which we are living. Instead, let us seek the respite where it is - in the very thick of the battle. For in my opinion, and this is where I

shall close, it *is* there. Great ideas, it has been said, come into the world as gently as doves. Perhaps then, if we listen attentively, we shall hear, amidst the uproar of empires and nations, a faint flutter of wings, the gentle stirring of life and hope. Some will say that this hope lies in a nation; others, in a man. I believe rather that it is awakened, revived, nourished by millions of solitary individuals whose deeds and works every day negate frontiers and the crudest implications of history. As a result there shines forth fleetingly the ever-threatened truth that each and every man, on the foundation of his own sufferings and joys, builds for all." (Camus, 1957, pp, 190-191.)

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