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The Mutual Influences in the Development of Ego and Id. Symposium held at the seventeenth congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, Amsterdam, Holland, August 8, 1951. Reported in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. 7, 1952, International Universities Press.

There are two papers presented in this symposium, one by Hartmann and one by W. Hofer. Then, Anna Freud has a paper which is an introduction to the general discussion which follows. The discussants are Melanie Klein, S. Nacht, Clifford M. Scott, and H. G. Van Der Waals. I did not find that these papers contain much that I have not already ~~reviewed~~ summarized from other papers dealing with ego psychology. One of the discussants, however, S. Nacht, takes issue with the particular kind of emphasis on ego psychology that Hartmann is espousing (see excerpts below), as well as questioning the value of Hartmann's theories when the problem of application to therapy is considered.

Heinz Hartmann. The mutual influences in the development of ego and id. pp. 9-30. He points out that the concept of an ego is found in Freud's physiological psychology of 1895, but it was only in the 1920s that ego psychology was explicitly defined as a legitimate area in psychoanalysis. "The ego evolves as one system of personality, clearly set apart from the functions of the id and of the superego...Freud outlined an ego which is infinitely richer in importance, dimensions, and specificity of functions, in comparison with his earlier formulations" (9-10).

"To approach more closely the ego-id problems under discussion today, we may say that this growing in stature of the ego's role in Freud's thinking can be seen: structurally, in its description as a partly independent unit of personality; dynamically, in Freud's warnings against a simplifying generalization he had noticed in the work of some analysts, which tended to underrate the ego's strength vis-à-vis the id (see also A. Freud, 1936); economically, in the hypothesis of its being fed by a mode of energy different from that of the drives. The independent aspect of the ego is even more conspicuously stressed in one of Freud's later propositions, suggesting the hereditary nature of some of its elements" (no reference given, but I believe he is referring to Analysis Terminable and Interminable, 1937) (10).

"To emphasize only one partial concept of the ego, at the expense of other aspects, may be a question of expediency vis-à-vis specific problems. But we shall remember that the reality ego, the defensive ego, the organizing, the rational, the social ego; the ego that leads a shadowy existence between the great powers, the id and the superego; the ego evolving under the pressure of anxiety situations, are not 'the ego' in the sense of analytic psychology. These are partial concepts to be distinguished from Freud's general ego concept" (10). Freud aimed at a general psychology which would encompass normal phenomena as well as pathological ones. "Secondly, the dealing with these developmental problems also often transcends what is directly accessible to the psychoanalytic method. I am speaking of the child's growth and development up to the end of the preverbal stage." (11). The introduction of direct observation into analytic child psychology is an auspicious development. This can be helpful in checking genetic hypotheses against observational data. It has become apparent "...that to speak of the ego in a ~~summarizing~~ summarizing way as, let us say, threatened by the id or helpless vis-à-vis the id, as is often done, is no longer a sufficient description of developmental reality even in those early stages. It is not always advisable to conceive of these relations between ego and id as if they were just two opposing camps (Freud, The problem of anxiety). The object of research is the great variety of developing ego functions, in their antagonistic but often also synergistic interdependence with the id, and their differential ~~and~~ consideration (intrasystemic approach, Hartmann)" (12).

"In speaking of the mutual influences in the development of ego and id, we are used to considering the former, more often, the dependent, the latter, more often, the independent variable. We are impressed by the flexibility, by the learning capacities of at least parts of the ego, and, on the other hand, by the stubborn opposition to change of the instinctual drives. Still, there are those changes in the



id that are brought about by the growth or development of the instinctual drives through all their subsequent phases; also, the ego can take a measure of influence by draining the instinctual energies of the id or damming them up; there are those modifications that, via the ego, analysis can induce in the id; there is, although it may not be fully understood yet, the id aspect of the outcome of repression. Freud (the problem of anxiety) felt that his originally general assumption that repressed impulses remain unchanged in the id might be in need of revision. This might not be the only possible outcome of repression. Two cases would have to be considered: 'mere repression and the true disappearance of an old desire or impulse.' Repressed instinctual tendencies may lose their cathexes, which could then be used in different ways. In the case of the breakdown of the oedipus complex, according to Freud, they are sublimated and used in the resulting identifications. In other cases one may think of a kind of displacement of these energies that might help to promote the next step in instinctual development..." (12). "I think that in ~~some~~ some cases the characteristics both of the instinctual tendencies and of the attitudes of the ego may have a common origin in the undifferentiated phase. Of giving, getting, etc., we can assume that they are modeled after instinctual patterns. A partial modeling after instinctual patterns we may also assume in the case of some defense mechanisms, ~~to describe ego formation only in terms of its dependence on instinctual development as for instance, in identification and projection.~~ But to describe ego formation only in terms of its dependence on instinctual development is to give only part of the picture" (13).

"In recent years the impact of incomplete or empty relationships with the mother on ego development has been emphasized repeatedly. While these findings are valuable and no doubt valid, the danger of overemphasis and oversimplifying this side has not always been avoided. The fact that the mother has 'rejected' her child in one way or another is frequently, in unilinear causal relation and rather indiscriminately, made responsible for nearly all varieties of later pathological developments and particularly of ego disturbances. That the ego needs, in order properly to function and to develop, a secure relation not only to the drives but also to the objects, is obviously true. But ego development and object relationships are correlated in more complex ways than some recent works would let us believe--which we could already expect on theoretical grounds." (15). "Of all the manifold relationships between ego and id, the one of conflict, the one in which the instinctual drives come to be considered as a danger--in which case the anxiety signal induces defense of the ego--is the one by far the most familiar in analysis.... Thus most of our clinical knowledge on the interaction of ego and id we owe to the study of conflict. However, we also speak of collaboration of ego and id and in doing so

~~seem to point to a variety of processes: The ego may serve the aims of the id; or the energy of the id is available for the aims of the ego; there may be substitution of ego aims for id aims, or neutralization of instinctual energy. The two-last mentioned processes often go together but may also vary partly independently, 'as is the case in sexualization" (15-16).~~

"Earliest stages of ego development can be described as a process of differentiation that leads to a more complete demarcation of ego and id and of self and outer reality; as a process that leads from the pleasure to the reality ego; as the development of the reality principle; as the way leading from primary narcissism to object relationships; from the point of view of the sequence of danger situations; as the development of the secondary process, etc.... In the earliest postnatal stage it is difficult to disentangle the nuclei of functions that will later serve the ego from those that we shall attribute to the id. Also, it is often hard to decide what part of it could already be described in terms of mental functioning. Neither is there at that stage any differentiation of the self from the world outside. That there is no ego in the sense we use the term for later stages, seems clear; what the stage of the id is at that level is unknown. This stage we may term the undifferentiated stage (Hartmann, 1939, H, K, & L 1946). This conception of the earliest postnatal stage seems to be in agreement with Freud's later thoughts. At least once, in the 'Outline' (1939),



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he speaks of '....the id, or rather, the undifferentiated ego-id'" (17). See my comments in a previous summary regarding this quote from Freud. Hartmann, et al, take this to mean that Freud was implying an undifferentiated phase and it has since been interpreted in this manner. However, a more likely interpretation, in view of the specificity with which Freud described the ego and the id in the Outline, is that Freud was simply referring to the stage of id before the ego developed out of it. The implication in Hartmann's conception is that the id, too, also develops out of this id+ego undifferentiated phase, although he never seems to make this explicit, and, of course, this view of the id would be about as far from Freud's conception as one can get.

"Generally speaking, the apparatus serving perception, motility, and others that underlie ego functions, seem, in the infant, to be activated by instinctual needs. Their use ~~is~~ independent of immediate needs, and in a more differentiated relation with external stimuli, is already part of the development of the reality ego. But they are not created by the needs. These apparatus, as well as those that account for the phenomena of memory, are partly inborn; they cannot be traced, in the individual, to the influence of the instincts and of reality, and their maturation follows certain laws which are also part of our inheritance. They will gradually come under the control of the ego; on the other hand, they act on the ego and its subsequent phases of development. They can also be considered as one factor among those to which the ego-id differentiation can be traced. Here, then, is one of the points where phylogenetic ~~is~~ hypotheses have to be clearly set apart from ontogenetic ones, if we want to avoid misunderstandings. The differentiation of ego and id, developed by whatever process of evolution through hundreds of thousands of years, is, in the form of a disposition, in part an innate character in man. That is, this ~~is~~ differentiation does not start from scratch in every newborn child. It is tempting to view this aspect of ego development in a way analogous in principle, though not in extent, to that which we have long since accepted in accounting for the libidinal phases. In tracing their significance we are used to considering the anatomical and physiological growth processes underlying them.....the fact that I emphasize (maturation) should not be misconstrued as any underrating of the specific importance of learning processes for the development of the ego." (18-19).

"The consideration of maturational processes also on the side of ego development seems natural enough if we keep in mind that the ego aspect of development is no less 'biological' than its id aspect. It seems hard to call nonbiological the functions of adaptation and of synthesis, or integration, or organization (that is, the centralization of functional control), both of which we attribute to the ego.... As to the physiological aspect of the problem, Freud always maintained that in some future time physiological data and concepts would be substituted for the psychological ones, referring to all mental functions and not only to those of the id. I may add that analysts as well as physiologists have, I think correctly, emphasized that it is particularly the study of the ego functions which might facilitate a meeting between the psychoanalytic and the physiological, especially the brain-physiological, approach. In the ego's relationship with the body, we can now describe three aspects: the ~~apparatus~~ postulated physiological processes underlying activities of the ego; the apparatus that gradually come under the control of the ego and which in turn influence the timing, intensity, and direction of ego development; and, third, but not necessarily independent of the two others, those special structures that underlie what we call the body ego. In his last years Freud thought that some aspects of the defense mechanisms may have a hereditary core. At the time he wrote The Ego and the Id he did not think that ego functions could be inherited the same way as he assumed that certain characteristics of the instinctual drives were. However, he states in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937): 'We have no reason to dispute the existence and importance of primal, congenital ego-variations,' and 'It does not imply a mystical overestimation of heredity if we think it creditable that, even before the ego exists, its subsequent lines of development, tendencies, and reactions are already determined.' I think that these formulations of Freud's we should not fail to consider in this discussion" (19-20). As I have



drives, may gradually take over a host of other functions in the framework of the ego. That, under certain conditions, the ego's achievements can be reversible, we see in neurosis, psychosis, in the dream, in analysis. Beyond this, we may say that ego functions, if activated, often tend to ~~to~~ exert an appeal, sometimes more, sometimes less marked, on their unconscious genetic determinants; also that an attraction from the latter to the former takes place; and there is no doubt that some of this we find also in the normal waking life of what we would call healthy people. But there are relevant differences in the degree to which ego functions maintain ~~their~~ stability, their freedom from those potential regressions to their genetic antecedents. At any rate, in the healthy adult this partial reversibility is not incisive enough to create serious trouble. The degree of secondary autonomy, as I have called this resistivity of ego functions against regression, is a problem equally relevant for our clinical, theoretical, and technical work. It is closely linked up with what we call ego strength and probably is the best way to assess it. The problem of secondary autonomy obviously also overlaps with the problem of mental health and has to be studied in normal development as well as from the angle of pathology...I may add that occasional regressions in the service of the ego can be tolerated by the adult ego if its functions are unimpaired. We also know that the healthy ego, for certain purposes, has to be able to abandon itself to the id (as in sleep, as in intercourse). There are other less well-studied situations in which the ego itself induces a temporary discarding of some of its most highly differentiated functions. To do this, not only without impairment of normal function but even to its benefit, is an achievement that has to be learned. The child up to a certain age is not capable of using this mechanism, or feels threatened by its attempted use. I think that this is probably one reason why the child fails vis-à-vis the demand of free association" (25-26).

W. Hoffer. The mutual influence in the development of ego and id: earliest stages. PP. 31-41.

The emphasis in this paper is on the earliest differentiation of ego and id. The developmental aspect of the id: "If the id can be conceived as rather immutable in its core, the nearer it comes to its cortical layer, the more does it appear plastic, colored by its objects, beset with the consequences of functional changes, cathexes and anticathexes. And here also near its surface is the sphere where the developmental changes which we can safely attribute to the id manifest themselves. I mean of course the expression of the drives in terms of oral, anal, sado-masochistic, phallic and genital organization, and you will notice that whenever possible I shall speak of instinctual drives, implying the fusion of aggressive and erotic instincts...It is in accordance with contemporary psychoanalytic usage to say that the developmental aspect of the id does not reach beyond that of the development from pregenitality to genitality" (32).

The body as an object of the id drives: "The developmental aspect of the drives expressed in their progress through the different stages of pregenitality to genitality has steered us to a new mental structure, the body ego. According to Freud's description the body has to be conceived of as the instincts' object and at the same time as a device for discharge closest to the source of the instinct" (32).

Internal Milieu (internal environment): "The ontogenesis of the ego is, as we know, one of the darkest chapters in psychoanalysis. In our ignorance of the origin of the instincts we have to resort to biology and biochemistry. We may say with Nunberg that the id has created its ego, but we still would like to know how it has done so. We can, however, see a little light if we conceive the body as the first object in which and through which an instinct not only seeks gratification, but which lends itself in an instinct-regulating manner to this function" (33). "The more one thinks of young infants, their earthquake-like reactions ~~to~~ pain which upsets the state of primary narcissism and defies primary identification, and of their initial indifference to stimulation from outside (before this becomes the source of pleasure) the more one is inclined to assume that 'self' and 'me' experiences are called upon to operate: they tend either to preservation or, if lost (in an attack of pain),



to restoration of the inner equilibrium. The only mechanisms achieving this which I can conceive at this stage are those of negative and positive hallucination" (34).

The problem of hallucination in early infancy: "The concept of negative hallucination ~~was~~ was mentioned on a few occasions by Freud, mainly descriptively, but in one instance he seemed to accord it a high theoretical value. 'Any attempt to explain hallucination,' he said, 'would have to be made from the starting-point of a negative hallucination, rather than from a positive one' (metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams, 1916). Positive hallucination has been readily accepted by psychoanalysts, including Freud himself, in explaining the infant's first attempts at need fulfillment, but the negative has not. Negative hallucination we can conceive of as a kind of sensory and affect deafness. It may at first be in operation against the disturbing influence of inner stimuli α and it raises the physiological threshold of stimulation... Negative hallucinations means that a stimulus does not reach the sensory system. Perhaps it is not more than an effect of mobile energy which just balances the stimulus" (34-35). "Negative and positive hallucinations work in the service of instinct gratification and for the acquiescence of the self therein. Both forms of hallucination restore for a while, at least, the internal equilibrium, homeostasis. In positive hallucination, the absent part-object of the instinct has definitely undergone a change--temporarily of course--as if it were there and gave satisfaction. But this is hardly conceivable without postulating some kind of memory traces. And this refers to the element of truth, in this case physical truth, reality, which according to Freud is generally operative in delusions. Positive hallucinations can be conceived of only in an infant who had already experienced physically gratifications of the kind which are now hallucinated. As they are related to memory traces, some kind of functioning ego has to be in operation as well" (36). Compare this later part with the addendum to my paper in which I point to Holt's opinion that "hallucination could probably not antedate the capacity for language, which is a precursively ~~primary~~ form of the secondary process," the secondary process, of course, being part of the ego. Hoffer is saying that there must be memory traces present in order for positive hallucination to occur (which would be seen as part of the primary process), and he, too, suggests that some kind of ego functioning has to be in operation.

Oral primacy and object: "The progressive cathexis of the body is brought about in two ways, leading to a form of oral primacy: first, by intensified oral stimulation; and second, by progressive differentiation of the oral-intestinal apparatus followed by improving oral mastery of needs encroaching on the self (development of the body ego). By intensified oral stimulation can be meant nothing else than the effect of motherly care. It is not solely the consequence of the α mother's acceptance of her child. It is rooted in the child's need for more food, more attention, in consequence of its fast-growing, demanding body, and therefore in consequence of the lesser need for sleep. Here factors of maturation enter the picture" (36).

Sleep and wakefulness: "The infant's object relationship, once in being, is annulled and recreated again psychologically and physically in rhythmic periods indicated by sleep and wakefulness. Perhaps the mental experiences associated with awakening have, in our earliest, unconscious experiences, as important a place as the feeding and nursing experiences. Psychologically the acts leading to awakening must be considered as body-self experiences. Paul Federn has elaborated this aspect. Bodily sensations in the state of awaking are 'me-experiences.' They ~~ensue~~ ensue after the gratifying need to sleep has been fulfilled" (37).

Self and object: "I believe..that as a consequence of our knowledge of the effects of deprivation in early infancy we have at present approached a stage in our applied child psychology where we interpret, one-sidedly the infant's growing inner need to establish an object relationship. The emptying of the preconscious and ~~the~~ unconscious of its cathexes--object, self, body--is of course not confined to the biologic rhythms of sleep; it operates for instance in fainting, in convulsions and above all, in the infant's state of psychological helplessness. Such states are more characteristic for the undifferentiated state of the id-ego relationship than for any later stage of ego development. They may occur without the noisy concomitants



of the traumatic events of birth or of later traumas suffered by the active child; they may be 'silent traumas.' (38).

Conclusions: "Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein's formulations of an undifferentiated phase allow now for a better explanation of the basic properties of the ego and the id. It deserves special emphasis that today Hartmann has put forward all evidence available at this juncture for assuming that the basic functions of the ego (control of perception, motility, memory, experience and learning) are not created by the needs, they are only developed under their influence; in fact they are inborn and their development, as he says, follows 'certain laws, which are also part of our inheritance.' From what he said I can deduce that psychic reality primarily results from the interaction of the drives with the inherited apparatus, secondarily from the interaction of both with the outer world. What I myself have to add is that the processes leading to the ego-id differentiation originate in the infant's body and that no environment exists until the self as a 'me-experience' has come into existence" (39).

Anna Freud. The mutual influences in the development of ego and id: introduction to the discussion. Pp. 42-50.

Development toward object relationship: Hoffer helps in the explanation of such development "...by his differentiation between a stage when the object, though it belongs to the environment, is treated as part of the milieu interne, serves the satisfaction of the infant's inner needs in the same manner in which these needs are served by the infant's own body, and has no existence for the child apart from these needs. Hoffer's line of demarcation between this primitive form of object relationship and the relationship to a later 'psychological' object is built on the distinction that the former is included in the narcissistic processes of libido cathexis whereas an object reaches ~~xxx~~ the status of 'psychological object' when it entices cathexis away from the body, thereby changing narcissistic libido into true object libido. In H. Hartmann's exposition the same two stages of object relationship appear as the relationship to a 'need-satisfying' object and the status of 'object constancy' respectively. According to him, it is characteristic for the need-satisfying object that it is dropped, ceases to exist, loses its role, when no instinctive need is felt; it becomes reinstated with the reawakening of needs. Hartmann, assumes, very similarly to Hoffer, that the transition from the primitive form of intermittent object relationship to object constancy is accomplished by changes in the quality of object cathexis. But where Hoffer describes a transformation of narcissistic into object libido, Hartmann makes the more far-reaching assumption of a change from instinctive to neutralized cathexis. It is this transformation of instinctive into neutralized energy to which he attributes the child's newly developing ability to maintain constant relations with objects, regardless of the state of need. This is in accordance with Hartmann's view that neutralization of energy is the basis of most of the individual's advances from the state of a primitive being, dominated by his instinctive urges, to an adult human personality under reasonable ego control" (43). "The present writer's views on the same subject lean toward a quantitative rather than qualitative explanation. When studying a group of infants in situations of extreme need after separation from their mothers, I developed the idea that the step from the first to the second stage of object relationship--from the milieu interne to the psychological object (Hoffer), from the need-satisfying object to object constancy (Hartmann), from part-objects to whole objects (Melanie Klein)--is determined by a decrease in the urgency of the drives themselves" (44).

Partial ego concepts: "In discussing in general the scope of psychoanalytic ego psychology, Hartmann speaks of the different facets of the ego, as they have been worked out by different analysts. He realizes that 'to emphasize one particular concept of the ego only, at the expense of other aspects, may be a question of expediency vis-à-vis specific problems' but he cautions at the same time against a one-sided view of the ego which results when studies are pursued in one direction only...I should like to illustrate this warning by reference to the 'defensive' ego. I know from personal experience that, while studying the defensive mechanisms of



the ego, the investigator runs the risk of stressing one-sidedly the hostility between ego and id, at the expense of the co-operation which exists between them. While observing the utter helplessness of an ego which is overrun by id desires, swamped by an anxiety attack, or which defends itself with infinite resourcefulness against id charges (as for instance in an obsessional neurosis), one is apt to forget the original basic unity between the two powers, i.e., that the ego was evolved out of the id as a helpmate, to locate the best possibilities for need satisfaction and object attachment, and to safeguard wish fulfillment amid the hazards and dangers of the environment. The ego's role as an ally of the id precedes that of an agent designed to slow up and obstruct satisfaction. Moreover, the ego retains the former beneficial role toward the id in all those instances where the id drives pursue permitted, i.e., ego syntonic aims" (45-46).

The concepts of an undifferentiated id-ego: "When discussing the initial unity between id and ego, Hartmann reminds us of the concept of an 'undifferentiated ego-id' (Footnote reference is to Freud's Outline) from which the id-ego differentiation arises on the basis of inner and outer perception, motility, preconscious memory traces, experience and learning. This concept can be helpful to our thinking in various ways. If the ego arises out of the same undifferentiated matter as the id, it becomes comprehensible that it partakes in the hereditary factors which we recognize as operative in the development of the drives. Hartmann suggests that we can trace in the development of the ego laws of maturation which are as much a part of our biological inheritance as the laws of maturation which govern the well-known sequence of libidinal development (oral, anal, phallic), or the less well-studied phases of aggressive development. An assumption of this kind can only be based on the conception of a nondifferentiated id-ego phase. When it is followed up, in the direction suggested in Hartmann's paper, it goes a long way toward solving a major misconception in the field of ego psychology: namely, that it is one of the basic differences between id and ego that the id contents, the drives, develop according to innate laws, while the ego develops wholly under the impact of environmental, reality, factors, i.e., as the result of 'learning.' Through environmental influence, against which the id is immune, plays a major part for the ego, the assumption of a primary nondifferentiated ego-id brings the two main agencies in the personality structure nearer to each other again and leaves room in the ego for innate, hereditary factors" (46).

Primary ego autonomy: "Hartmann speaks of those elements in the ego which originate in the hereditary core and which enter ego development 'as an independent variable' as the 'autonomous factors in ego development (primary autonomy).' He differentiates in this respect between the functions, such as adaptation, synthesis, or even self-preservation (to which he ascribes biological origin), and the apparatus serving perception, memory, motility which are indispensable for the exercising of these functions. Though, especially in the infant, the action of these apparatus seems to be prompted by instinctual needs, Hartmann stresses his conviction that they are not created by these needs, that they too are, at least partly, inborn and that their maturation is subject to inherited laws. It is important, according to him, that the working of these apparatus is brought gradually under the control of the ego; on the other hand he shows it to be of equal importance to recognize how far ego development itself is tied to the maturational stages in the motor and sensory apparatus and takes its cue from them. He describes the apparatus as being activated by instinctual energy (libidinal and aggressive) which becomes increasingly neutralized in those functions which serve exclusive reality aims, regardless of instinctual need. With this threefold concept of an independent apparatus, activated by energy borrowed from the drives and gradually brought under the control of the ego, Hartmann offers us a first opportunity to shed light on some areas of child development which are governed at present by confusing and contradictory hypotheses. There seems little doubt that academic psychologists err on the side of conceiving of the various apparatus serving motor and sensory development as too independent of the drives, whereas psychoanalysts err in the opposite direction in attributing every failure in the proper functioning of the apparatus to a disorder on the side of the instinctual drives and their distribution (object relationship). On the basis of Hartmann's



theoretical setup, we can arrive now at the following clinical considerations: When a child's ego is retarded in its development, this may happen for three different reasons: (i) because of an inborn, or acquired, defect in the motor or sensory apparatus themselves; (ii) because of some failure in the normal development of the drives, as a result of which the apparatus receive insufficient activation or overstimulation; (iii) because of failure to bring the various apparatus under ego control, which points to a serious hold-up in the child's reality sense.....There are two profitable methods of teaching backward or retarded children which seem to bear out Hartmann's theories. The first one consists of using for teaching purposes only such images and concepts which have a ~~z~~ direct bearing on the child's emotions (big animals, scenes of violence,.....). Instinctive energy (libidinal or aggressive) will overflow from the drives to these images and activate the intellectual apparatus (defective or normal, as it may happen to be) to a larger degree. We can call this device an enforced 'sublimation' or, viewed from the other side, a 'sexualization' (cathexis with aggressive energy). The second method consists of improving the object relationships of mentally defective children" (47-48). Quotes Iowa studies where mentally defective children were removed from the institution and placed in favorable emotional conditions in family surroundings, with the result that their IQs on retesting showed considerable improvement.

Secondary ego autonomy: "My final point is concerned with what Hartmann calls the 'resistivity,' or 'irreversibility,' or the 'secondary autonomy' of the ego. Under these headings he discusses the problem of how far ego interests, qualities and attitudes become independent of the instinctual tendencies, or the defense mechanisms against instinctual tendencies, from which they have arisen. Hartmann shows that we know from the observation of dreams, neuroses and psychoses that ego achievements can be reversed and regress to their genetic antecedents. On the other hand, we know from experience that ego interests which originate in narcissistic, exhibitionistic, aggressive, etc., tendencies may persist a lifetime as valuable 'sublimations,' regardless of the fate of the original part instincts which gave rise to them. In Hartmann's words 'reactive character formation, originating in the defense against the drives, may gradually take over a host of other functions in the ego' and continue to exist long after its function as a defense mechanism has ceased to be important. Hartmann points out further that even where a repressed drive has been emptied of cathexis, as ~~in the case~~ it occurs in the course of instinctual development, this may serve merely to strengthen the stability of the ego formation which has been built on it. Hartmann calls this 'secondary autonomy' of the ego its real 'strength,' regards it as highly important for the stability of our personalities, and, as a concept, as relevant for our clinical, theoretical and technical work. Analytic observers of child development will agree with Hartmann that the increasing ability of the ego to stand firm in the face of upheaval outside its own realm is one of the significant steps on the way to maturity" (48-49). "That the immature ego cannot maintain its achievements under all circumstances seems to me to have a direct bearing on the difference between adult and infantile neuroses. In the adult neurotic the pathogenic conflict arises between an instinctual drive which has regressed to an early primitive level and an ego which has remained intact. The outcome is rigid symptom formation as a compromise between two internal forces which are incompatible with each other. This takes a different course in the immature personality in those cases where the ego does not stand firm under the pressure of instinctual regression, but regresses simultaneously. The gap between the two internal agencies is lessened in the event of such 'total regression,' i.e., the regressed ego becomes compliant toward the regressed id demands. This avoids the intensity of internal conflict for the child, but produces instead the multitude of abnormalities, hold-ups in development, infantilisms, failures in adaptation which we group together vaguely as 'emotional disturbances of childhood development.' It is in line with this statement that the few circumscribed and rigid neuroses which we find in early life occur in children whose ego development is unusually good and even premature (as it is in obsessional children), i.e., where the secondary autonomy of the ego has been established at an early date. The children of our generation ^{are} brought up more leniently than before and, consequently, seem to take longer before they establish a firm ego structure. This may account for the fact that the less well-defined and



fluctuating developmental disorders are on the increase at the expense of the real infantile neurosis which was more frequently recorded and treated by the analytic workers of the past" (50).

The mutual influences in the development of ego and id: discussants. (Melanie Klein, S. Nacht, W. Clifford M. Scott, & H. G. Van Der Waals). Pp. 51-68.

Melanie Klein: "I differ from Freud in that I put forward the hypothesis that the primary cause of anxiety is the fear of annihilation, of death, arising from the working of the death instinct within. The struggle between life and death instincts emanates from the id and involves the ego. The primordial fear of being annihilated forces the ego into action and engenders the first defenses. The ultimate source of these ego activities lies in the operation of the life instincts." (51). "I believe that fantasies operate from the outset, as do the instincts, and are the mental expression of both the life and death instincts. Fantasy activity underlies the mechanisms of introjection and projection, which enable the ego to perform one of the basic functions mentioned above, namely, to establish object relations. By projection, by turning outward libido and aggression and imbuing the object with them, the infant's first object relation comes about. This is the process which, in my opinion, underlies the cathexis of objects. Owing to the process of introjection this first object is simultaneously taken into the self. From the outset the relations to external and internal objects interact.... The specific system of fantasies centering on the infant's internal world is of supreme importance for the development of the ego. The internalized objects are felt by the young infant to have a life of their own, harmonizing or conflicting with each other and with the ego, according to the infant's emotions and experiences. When the infant feels he contains good objects, he experiences trust, confidence and security. When he feels he contains bad objects he experiences persecution and suspicion. The infant's good and bad relation to internal objects develops concurrently with that to external objects and perpetually influences its course. On the other hand, the relation to internal objects is from the outset influenced by the frustration and gratifications which form part of the infant's everyday life. There is thus a constant interaction between the internal object world, which reflects in a fantastic way the impressions gained from without, and the external world which is decisively influenced by projection" (52-53). "Because the perpetual interaction between the life and death instincts and the conflict arising from their antithesis (fusion and defusion) govern mental life there is in the unconscious an ever-changing flow of interacting events, of fluctuating emotions and anxieties. I have attempted to give an indication of the multitude of processes, focusing on the relation to internal and external objects which from the earliest stage onward exist in the unconscious, and I shall now draw some conclusions: (1) The hypothesis which I have broadly outlined here represents a much wider view of early unconscious processes ~~which~~ than was implied in Freud's concept of the structure of the mind. (2) If we assume that the superego develops out of these early unconscious processes which also mold the ego, determine its functions, and shape its relation to the external world, the foundations of ego development, as well as of superego formation, need to be re-examined. (3) My hypothesis would thus lead to a reassessment of the nature and scope of the superego and of the ego, as well as of the interrelation between the parts of the mind which make up the self. I shall end by restating a well-known fact--one of which, however, we become more and more convinced the deeper we penetrate into the mind. It is the recognition that the unconscious is at the root of all mental processes, determines the whole of mental life, and therefore that only by exploring the unconscious in depth and width are we able to analyze the total personality" (53).

S. Nacht: "Ever since I presented a paper on ego functions at the First Franco-British Reunion of Psychoanalysis in Paris in June, 1939, I have been reproached with oversimplification by some of those who in the meantime have pressed forward very far with their investigations of this problem. If I may judge from the publications of the last few years, the opposite tendency undoubtedly has prevailed since. These works precisely illustrate an aspect of the development of our science whose



alarming possible consequences I wish to emphasize. As an example, let us take the highly thoughtful and persevering studies of Hartmann, which are almost entirely devoted to the problem of the ego and in which the author develops some very personal views on the question. If I understand his conception correctly, the ego would not consist exclusively in a differentiation of the id ~~in~~ under the influence of the reality of the environment; partly, it would have an origin of its own--autonomous and independent of the id--and be endowed with equally autonomous functions and energetic sources. After referring to the theory advanced by Freud, according to which 'id and ego are originally ^{one}' and after he himself has stressed the fact that 'both the ego and the id have developed, as products of differentiation, out of the matrix of animal instinct,' Hartmann takes the unexpected line of declaring that a part of the ego is, nevertheless, of autonomous origin. At this point it becomes difficult for us to follow him; at least, as long as he fails to supply any facts to support this hypothesis. For this 'matrix of animal instinct,' which constitutes the common origin of both the id and the ego, cannot be anything else but the whole of the instinctual elements determining the child's life from its very first months. It is therefore not clear, for example, how we are to understand the following passage from Hartmann's 'Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego,' in which he states 'that the ego may be more--and very likely is more--than a developmental by-product of the influence of reality on instinctual drives; that it has a partly independent origin--apart from these formative influences which, of course, no analyst would want to underestimate; and that we may speak of an autonomous factor in ego development in the same way as we consider the instinctual drives autonomous agents of development. Of course, this is not to say that the ego as a definite psychic system is inborn; it rather stresses the point that the development of this system is traceable not only to the impact of reality and of the instinctual drives, but also to a set of factors that cannot be identified with either one of them.' Finally, in the paper presented by him at this Congress, Hartmann suggests the idea that this 'autonomous origin' might consist in hereditary factors, thereby contradicting a certain part of the text quoted above, in which he seems to admit that the ego 'as a definite psychic system' is not inborn." (54-55).

"If Hartmann believes that the instinctual elements ~~is~~ cannot by themselves account for the formation of the ego, and if, in his opinion other factors are involved, we might ask that he specify what they are. For it is not enough to mention the influence of learning, for instance, or of maturation, to prove anything whatever concerning an autonomous origin of the ego. Is not learning, which comes about due to the pressure of the outside world, already in itself the differentiation that a part of the id undergoes in the course of becoming the ego? As to maturation, Hartmann will not contradict me if I recall that from the psycho-affective point of view it indicates a stage in the development of the ego; that is to say, not a point of departure but a result. And even the physiological-somatic aspect of maturation, to which Hartmann at times seem to refer, represents merely a sum of anatomical and functional conditions that occur as successive steps in the course of development and unquestionably subsequent to the cleavage of ego and id. I am convinced that the only way in which we can avoid these confusions--these persistent and, to my mind, sterile discussions--is to remain strictly on the ground of biology and dynamics. In other words, the phenomena with which we are concerned must be considered by us on ~~the~~ the level of needs and of functions resulting from the latter. It is ~~essentially~~ essentially thanks to the study of ~~the~~ the psychic life from this dynamic and biological angle that psychoanalysis has proved so fruitful in discoveries permitting us a better understanding of human behavior. The attempt to raise psychoanalysis toward the heights of general psychology--as Hartmann, Odier and de Saussure, among others--would like to do, seems to me a sterilizing and regressive step, to say the least, if it is aimed at a change of our methodology. For is not psychoanalysis, in fact, the very basis of general psychology and must it not be credited with the latter's most profound and most valid insights?" (55).

"In reality, none of us has succeeded in detecting any psychic instances or entities. Our observations reveal the existence of psychic processes, which is a



very different matter. And this point needs to be stressed, I believe, in order to find our way out of the maze of subtleties in which we are becoming lost: There is no such thing as a psychic entity; there only exist psychic processes. What we call the ego is one of these processes. It is a process that is set in motion and becomes operative when the organism finds itself exposed to certain stimuli which we are able to observe and which have been defined by Freud (~~function~~.....: the vital needs, on the one hand, which with the aim of gratification induce energetic movements that we describe as instinctual drives; and, on the other hand, an environment containing the object designed to supply this gratification. These two sources of stimulation determine the processes which constitute the functions of the ego. These classical conceptions are known to us all; I mention them here because they are in danger of being consigned to a secondary place, whereas actually they are fundamental" (56).

"The interrelationship we can see here between the establishment of functions and the maturation of the physiological systems is a constant feature in itself. It remains to be determined, however, up to which point the physiological maturation proceeds independently of the adaptive processes that are attached, precisely, to the functions of the ego" (56-57).

"...whether we speak of voluntary motility, language, or any other phases of learning, we must not forget that the energetic sources in which they have their origin remains in the service of the needs of the organism. It would be a grave error to attribute to them any energetic or functional autonomy in relation to the drives. I do not know of any fact that would support this hypothesis, nor have I found anything in the literature to prove it. Loewenstien reports two cases ~~in~~ which in his view serve to illustrate this theory, but there is nothing contained in these observations which, in my opinion, would justify the conclusions he draws from them in favor of ego autonomy. On the contrary, everything in our daily observations shows that the energetic sources of the ego are consistently derived from the aggressive and sexual drives. In various studies on masochism, on the ego, and on aggression, I have called attention to this pre-eminently conflictual role of aggression. I have endeavored to demonstrate that the nonintegrated aggressive drive constitutes the disturbing element par excellence in relation to the ego functions. I am speaking intentionally of integration of this drive and not of neutralization of aggression--even if it were possible--would, in fact, deprive the human organism of one of its basic energetic sources" (57).

"I consider it indispensable to call attention to certain dangers of 'byzantinism' which threaten our psychoanalytic thinking. Without wishing in the least to deny the intrinsic value of certain current works, one cannot but note with regret their purely speculative aspects. Psychoanalysis has nothing to gain from these exegetic elaborations in which the letter always takes precedence of the spirit: Our essential task is not to push always further in our investigations or to produce something new at any price, but rather, and more simply, to try to see more correctly and more clearly. The way in which we approach the problems that concern us must ultimately be determined from the point of view of effectiveness. And however interesting Hartmann's considerations as to the intersystemic and intrasystemic complexities may be, it is difficult to see what value they can have in application. The same might be said of the proposal to revise our conception of reality by shading it according to a given environment or period, according to cultural and social conditions and to their influence, in particular, on the functions of the ego. All this is perfectly valid in principle, but when one sees the complete dissipation of fundamental psychoanalytic concepts to which such tendencies have led, for example, in the works of Karen Horney, one wonders what benefits could result from it. Thus one arrives at the conclusion that it is at best useless to burden the idea of reality with the diverse forms under which ~~and associations~~ and that is sufficient--I should say even say, preferable--to conceive of it in the classic sense, i.e., as a principle. The rest concerns the sociologists, just as the innumerable and complex forms



by which the ego expresses itself in the personality concern the psychologists. (I am referring here to sociologists and psychologists who are trained in the psychoanalytic methods and who apply them in their work.) As for us, we shall take the best course if we continue, as in the past, to further sociology and general psychology by providing them with firm foundations. But do not let us trespass upon domains where we can only lose our way or squander our strength. Our field of action will be quite vast enough if we abide by what should be our primary task: to seek and to grasp whatever essentially underlies the manifold forms and conditions, and thus to attain to the very heart of their motive principle" (59).

W. Clifford M. Scott: "Summary: In trying to write more clearly about ego structure and function we have to clarify our way of talking about instincts and about reality. We have continued to talk of the ego as the structure between instincts and reality. We talk of ego functions as those which make contacts between instinct and reality. I think we should reduce the terms we use to the smallest number possible. When different terms are used it is often unclear as to whether the author is trying to make a distinction or not. We say the ego functions (a) by organizing, synthesizing or integrating (is not synthesis the best term); (b) by dominating, controlling with strength or weakness, (1) movement in regard to all inside and outside the body boundary, and (2) perception of the inner and outer world; (c) by developing defenses against excessive stimuli from within or without by inhibition or by delay; (d) by developing danger signals (in connection with delay and signal formation impulse progressively becomes 'wish,' 'hope,' 'wonder if,' etc., all these being degrees of postponement); and (e) by obtaining gratification, testing reality, developing realization, methods of insight, judgement, etc., and by developing criteria of objective knowledge. In clarifying the details of such concepts we will clarify the basic concepts of metapsychology. We will do much to stimulate general psychology--both genetic and systematic. We will stimulate therapeutic and preventative measures and we will stimulate our relations with many other disciplines" (65).

H. G. Van Der Waals: "Lack of sufficient ^{empirical} material, as pointed out by both speakers [Hartmann and Hoffer], caused them to keep their treating of the problem to a great extent at least, at a theoretical-speculative level, deducing as they were from psychoanalytic theory. When reading Hartmann's and Hoffer's contributions, I become aware of the fact that I am viewing the significance of psychoanalytic theory in a light that seems to be slightly different from their way of thinking. I am by no means inclined to deny the value of psychoanalytic theory in its principal traits, but nevertheless I feel often bound to point out that psychoanalysis as an empirical method is richer and provides us with a deeper insight into human reality than the psychoanalytic theory sometimes would let us suspect" (66).

"In my opinion Hartmann is right in stating--following up a remark of Freud's--that in the early part of psychic life, we are not dealing with an id, but with an undifferentiated ego-id; consequently he speaks of the 'undifferentiated phase' preceding ego differentiation. The primary process is obviously ^{the} primitive way of psychic functioning of this archaic forerunner of the psychic personality, the undifferentiated ego-id. When asking ourselves to which of the two aspects of this undifferentiated phase the primary process belongs, to the id aspect or to the ego aspect, it seems probable that the primary process is the way of psychic functioning, characterizing the ego aspect of the undifferentiated phase. Does the ego really originate from the id, is it created by the id? I cannot see that these questions are very important. I for my part am convinced that the foundations of the ego have been given in the undifferentiated ego-id from the outset, the principal features of its development have been established from the beginning. What Hartmann describes as primary autonomy seems quite right in my opinion. If my view is correct, the undifferentiated ego-id phase controlling the early part of psychic life, does not become psychologically significant to us until the child experiences something in it" (66-67).



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"Both speakers have been very brief on the development of the id. Hoffer holds that the developmental aspect of the id does not reach beyond that of the development from pregenitality to genitality. Hartmann points out that ego development follows in several respects the lead of the drives. I cannot fully agree with the limited version of Hoffer as regards the fundamental problems of the id, although I may use the term 'development' in a slightly different sense. For the first years' of the child's development result in the coming into existence of that portion of the id, which is called the 'repressed' one, almost the only part of the id that we know fairly well. The introduction of the concept of 'id' may have ~~been~~ had the drawback that the cardinal significance of the repressed unconscious was slightly overshadowed. As regards the repressed unconscious, the relationship between id and ego is the reverse of the one commonly accepted. Nunberg says that the id has created its ego, but one might state, with an even greater certainty, that the repressed unconscious is created by the ego in its successive developmental stages. Conversely, it is of course quite certain that the repressed unconscious is of paramount importance for the course of ego development" (67).

"...Many years ago Alexander already considered the possibility whether part of the conflicts usually described as id-ego conflicts could be formulated more accurately as conflicts between the actual ego and primitive strongly narcissistic ego nuclei. This consideration of Alexander's I have always kept in mind and I am of the opinion that experiences corroborates rather than refutes it. But then we are forced to take a further step. We would have to conclude that the repressed portion of the id is not pure id, but an ego id, just like the undifferentiated phase in the early part of psychic life" (68).