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Lobkowitz p. 291 *life for h. species*

But, Hess continued, if the individual does not live for the species but only for himself, using the species as a means, he inevitably creates for himself a "perverted world." At the level of theory, this perverted world is Christianity; at the level of practical life, money.

Q activity
Lobkowitz p. 291

Developing an idea already advanced in his article "Philosophie der That," namely, that life is activity, Hess now argued that "life is the exchange of productive life activity." As Hess explained, this meant that cooperation both in production and in consumption was the medium and life element in which human individuals reached their completion. Indeed, it was the "true essence" of individual men, so much so that the individual had to be understood as a means of the "species," and that any social order in which



R. Jakobson → in the Hegel. category

Lobkowitz p. 296

For Engels' article suggested two things to him: first, that the asocial character of the present originated from the division of labor into living and congealed labor, into labor and capital; secondly, that all categories of the political economy had to be reduced to anthropological ones, just as Feuerbach had done with religion and Hess with money; and that when this was done, classical political economy turned out to be a conscious or unconscious apologia of the wretchedness of the present world order.

Hess had given to Marx the idea that money ought to be treated in terms of Feuerbach's concept of alienation. Engels' article, in turn, suggested to Marx the idea of transferring this scheme from monetary matters to the economically most important phenomenon of the time -- the separation of labor and capital, which, being the cause of society's division into capitalists and proletarians, had to be the ultimate root of the "social atomism" of the present.

Salvation

Lobkowitz p. 295

In short, Marx's sudden interest in economics was entirely a result of his discovery that the economic order was the fundamental sphere of wretchedness of the present world order. From about 1842 he knew that the problem of salvation consisted in freeing man from the fetters of civil society without thereby escaping into political abstractions.



individuals used the "species" as a means for the satisfaction of their private needs had to be considered "perverse."²

- 1/ Einundzwanzig Bogen 309 ff. In this article activity is still described in Fichte's sense as a self-positing and a self-determination of the ego.
- 2/ Hess, Moses, Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837-1850; ed. A. Cornu and W. Mönke. Berlin (East) 1961.

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Lobkowitz p. 297

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"The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-alienation."² Why Marx nevertheless applied the scheme of alienation to the worker alone will become obvious when we discuss Marx's notion of labor.

- 1/ Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff), I, 3, 206;; tr. Dixon, 51.

Lobkowitz p. 298

Unfortunately, however, we shall have to argue that Hook's own analysis has contributed to the said "extraordinary amount" rather than checking it. Hook mentions as an instance of the "nonsense" in question E. Fromm's claim that Marx's thought is closely related to that of Zen-Buddhism; without doubt Hook is correct in referring to this association as the "ultimate in absurdity." From his review of Tucker's Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx¹ it would seem permissible to impute to Hook a basic readiness to extend

the same criticism to Tucker's psychoanalysis of Marx. Again, one would basically have to agree with him, at least as far as Tucker's ultimate conclusions are concerned. However, Hook's own tendency to associate Marx with Dewey, especially with reference to his claim made in 1940 that Dewey is the most "outstanding" and legitimate heir of Marxism,^{2/} quite probably would have to be condemned in terms of the same criticism.

1/ Cf. the review in Survey 3 (1962) 552 ff.

2/ Cf. S. Hook, Reason, Social Myth and Democracy (New York, 1940) 132.

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Lobkowitz p. 309

Marx then proceeds to distinguish four different aspects of this alienation. First, there is the alienation of products to the producer which we have just described. Secondly, the very act of labor is alienated from the worker; it is something external to him, something in which he denies himself rather than affirming himself, an activity in terms of which he does not feel content but unhappy, "does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind." This is most obvious from the fact that as soon as no compulsion, be it

the master's whip or the worker's hunger, exists, "labor is shunned like the plague." Thirdly, man is alienated from the "human species." For as neither the products nor the very act of labor are truly his, man considers all collaboration and, in general, social life as a limitation rather than as a fulfilment of his humanity and uses his being social only as a means of satisfying his private needs. Finally, there is an alienation of man from man. For "every relationship in which man stands to himself ultimately is realized and expressed in the relationship in which man stands to other men." Indeed,

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if the product of his labor does not belong to the worker, it only can belong to a "man outside the worker";, if it does not satisfy the worker's needs, it necessarily satisfies the needs of another whom sooner or later the worker begins to hate. For in spite of all misery and alienation the worker undoubtedly produces, creates wealth.

1/ Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov.



and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt) 1927 ff), I, 3, 85 ff; tr. Milligan, 72 ff.

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Lobkowicz p. 310

... "that though private property appears to be the source, the cause of alienated labor, it is really its consequence, just as the gods in the beginning are not the cause but the effect of man's intellectual confusion," and only much later does this relationship become reciprocal.

1/ Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff), I, 3, 91ff; tr. Milligan, 80.

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Lobkowicz p. 311

For if it is true that private property is generated by the alienation of labor, this alienation should be describable without reference to the labor's being owned by another, that is, without reference to private property. In that case, however, what remains of the phenomenon of alienation is merely a psychological fact which would seem to be socially relevant only in a very remote way, namely, the worker's uneasiness about and dissatisfaction with his labor. In spite of that, however, Marx could not possibly argue

that private property was the cause of alienated labor. For in this case he would not have succeeded in actualizing his fundamental aim, namely, to reduce economic categories to human categories.

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Lobkowitz, p. 311

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The only way out of this difficulty was a thorough reinterpretation of "alienation." Contrary to what is often believed, Marx continued to use the expression 'Entfremdung' even after 1844; in the first volume of Das Kapital it appears at least three times.¹⁷ Nor is Hook right in claiming²⁷ that the only abiding sense in which Marx believed that human beings were "self-alienated" is expressed in the section on the "fetishism of commodities" in the first volume of Das Kapital. The Fichtean idea of a "lost freedom" to be regained always remained one of

the implicit premises of Marx's thought. However, after the German Ideology Marx describes this idea in a way which, as opposed to the notion of alienated labor in the Manuscripts, is perfectly "nonmystical" (which, however, does not preclude that the Aufhebung, even of this more realistic kind of "alienation," remains both gnostic and Utopian).

1/ Cf. Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, Werke (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961 ff) XXIII, 455, 596, 674; tr. Aveling-Moore, I, 432, 570, 645.

2/ Hook, S. From Hegel to Marx. Studies in the

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Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, 2nd ed. Ann Arbor, 1962, 4.

x - Man; Self Creation

Lobkowitz p. 313/314

He [Marx] explicitly praises Hegel's Phenomenology for having shown that the emergence of man's humanity is a process of human self-procreation¹ and that all previous history must be taken to be a history of man, not as a given subject, but as "man's act of procreation," the story of man's coming to be.² In this respect there would seem to be only two disagreements between Hegel and Marx: whereas Hegel's Phenomenology views human self-procreation mainly as a speculative act, Marx views it as the result



of "material" labor; and whereas Hegel views the present as the time of man's definitive emergence, for Marx this emergence still lies in the future. In connection with this last point Marx stresses the provisional character of all previous history more emphatically than Hegel.

1/ Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from Vol. 3.) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff.), I, 3 156: tr. Milligan, 151.

2/ Ibid. 153: tr. Milligan, 146

Solv.

Lobkowicz p. 314

Finally, in the Manuscripts he explicitly states that all previous history was only "preparatory history," the prehistory of man's truly human needs and thus of man's full humanity. In short, Marx unambiguously rejects the idea of an unchanging and transhistorical human nature; developing ideas found in Hegel's Phenomenology, he is even inclined to doubt whether the "animal" of the presalvific era deserves at all the title 'man.'



1/ K. Marx-E. Engels, Historisch-
kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov
and (from Vol. 3) V. Adoratskij
(Frankfurt, 1927 ff.), I, 3, 123;
tr. Milligan ill.

AJ (59)
Lobkowitz p. 314/5

For the basic connotation of 'alienation'
is that something which is his opposes man
as if it were an alien and independent
being. For example, Marx's statement that
under capitalism the products of man's labor
are "alienated" from man presupposes the
"idea" that man produces in order to satisfy
his needs, and "the need of a thing is the
most obvious and irrefutable proof of this
thing's belonging to my essence, of its being
for me.. of its being a proper characteristic
(Eigentumlichkeit) of my essence." 1/



1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische
Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from
Vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff)
I, 3, 537

Ⓛ Lobkowitz p. 315. (60)

On the other hand, however, neither Hegel nor Marx measures man's "alienated state" either against a transhistorical human nature or against a "logically predetermined" future. Rather, they measure it against a human potentiality revealed by the very phenomenon of alienation -- against a human potentiality which, though at first it emerges in an alienated state, allows one to envisage a previously unknown possibility of ultimate human self-actualization.

Ⓛ Lobkowitz p. 316 (61)

It is extremely important to see this fundamental ambivalence of the notion of alienation both in German Idealism and in Marx. Both consistently view alienation as something negative, which, though it is highly undesirable taken by itself, is desirable as the only gate to ultimate completion. If alienation sometimes has the connotation of something wrong and perverse, of a "sin," it has at the same time the connotation of a felix culpa, of a sin which is glorious, not because it talem ac tantum meruit habere redeptorem - as

Catholic liturgy, remembering that Adam's Fall was the occasion for Incarnation, sings on the eve of Easter -- but rather because it is a necessary premise of man's ultimate self-completion.

Lobkowitz p. 317

*Fichte: no. Beten last of which
a reason.*

Fichte, like Schiller, described history as a gradual liberation from instincts and their replacement by autonomous reason. In the beginning, he argued, reason governed man through his instincts alone; the human race was living in a state of perfect innocence. But soon these instincts were codified and transformed into an "exterior coercive authority"; the age of sin began. Eventually there came the epoch of liberation from all authority -- Fichte's own time. Man had liberated himself from all instinct and



and authority, but thereby also from all reason. This is the age of disorder, of dissolution and dissoluteness, the "state of accomplished sinfulness." But at the same time this total disorder contains the germs of a future superior order. Man will learn, and through Fichte already learns, to love reason, thus to enter into an era of justification. Eventually he will rebuild himself to a perfect embodiment of reason, and history will culminate in an epoch of "accomplished justification and sanctification."^{1/} We may add that Fichte's description of the age of "accomplished sinfulness" anticipates Hegel's (and Marx's)

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analysis of "civil society." Abandoned by his instincts and still not having reached Knowledge (Wissenschaft) man is reduced to "mere naked individuality," and the species, "the only thing which truly exists," degenerates into an empty abstraction.^{2/} With reason qua instinct having withered away and autonomous self-conscious reason still not being within man's reach, "there remains nothing but mere individual, personal life." No wonder, then, that the "present age" knows only one virtue, "shrewdness (Klugheit) in pursuing one's personal advantage."^{3/}

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- 1/ Fichte, J. G. Werke; ed. F. Medicus,
IV, Leipzig, 1922, p. 403ff.
 - 2/ Ibid. 420.
 - 3/ Ibid. 460.
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Lobkowitz, p. 318. (62)

"The harmony which, as something natural, we contemplate in children has to become the result of the labor and self-shaping (Bildung) of spirit. Christ says: if you do not become like children, ...; but this does not mean that we should remain children. The first men were prohibited from "knowing" because the consciousness of being for oneself as against other things, the separation of the subject from the object which is characteristic of all knowing, is the very essence of evil. "To be evil means to be abstract, to isolate oneself;



evil is isolation, to be separated from the universal which is the rational... But through this separation also emerges... the universally spiritual. 2/ Only by being "sinfully opposed to truth, removed from it, alienated from it," can man enter the Intellectualwelt, the "intellectual world which opens to acknowledge God's nature, his determinations and ways of acting." 3/ Of course, as Hegel says in the Phenomenology, the negative will turn into sheer vanity if man does not succeed in grasping its positive dimension. 4/ Nevertheless, it is this negativity, "evil," "sin," separation, and alienation which is the

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ultimate principle of all true development. Even God's own life would degenerate into a devotional insipidity if "the seriousness, the pain, the patience, and the labor of the negative" were missing from it. 5/

1/ Hegel, G.W.F. Sämtliche Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe); ed. H. Glockner VIII. Stuttgart, 1932 ff. 94.

2/ Hegel, XVI, 264; tr. Speirs-Sanderson, III, 53.

3/ Hegel, XV, 35; tr. Speirs-Sanderson, I, 17.

4/ Hegel, II, 55; tr. Baillie, 117 ff.

5/ Ibid. 23; tr. Baillie, 81.

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Lobkowitz p. 319

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All this indicates that alienation, as viewed by German Idealists and later by Marx, has little if anything to do with an "aberration of human behavior" from a norm either agreed upon or identical with man's natural essence. To some extent, this widespread misunderstanding may be due to the psychopathological connotation of the English expression 'alienation' which, however, is all but completely absent from the German 'Entfremdung.' More fundamentally, this misunderstanding probably can be traced back to an overestimation of Feuerbach's influence upon Marx (particularly

if this overestimation is combined with a superficial knowledge of Hegel). For, contrary to both Hegel and Marx, Feuerbach did indeed use the expression 'Entfremdung' to refer to an aberration of man's thought from his natural essence: viewing man's biological existence as the ever perfect and "divine" essence of man, Feuerbach always tended to describe religion as well as speculative philosophy as a sort of sick, aberrant self-awareness. But as we have already seen, neither Hegel nor Marx ever believed in the existence of such an ahistorical human nature. Or rather, they never considered man's

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prehistorical biological existence as the "true essence of man." Accordingly, what Hegel as well as Marx have in mind whenever they speak of alienation is not an aberration but rather a phase in the process of man's self-development which, on the one hand, is essential to the achievement of full "humanity;" and, on the other hand, is experienced by man as a radical frustration of his aspirations for self-completion.

Lobkowitz p. 319/320

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This amounts to saying that alienation must not be mistaken for a loss of something which either originally belonged to man or else always ought to have belonged to him because of his very nature. Rather, it has to be viewed as a stage in the development of man's potentialities during which man experiences as his what in fact still is not his. Fichte's "Lost products of freedom," Hegel's "absence of a mastery over the world of culture," as well as Marx's "alienation of labor," are experienced by man as a sort of loss. But, strictly

speaking, man did not lose anything; he has only reached a stage in which he realizes that something on which he has no hold and on which he never had a hold originates from himself and thus is something on which he should have a hold. If this were not what German Idealists and Marx meant, their claims that man can reach his completion only by passing through a state of alienation and that this alienation itself is the germ of ultimate completion would have to be considered as pure mythology and a rather preposterous mythology at that. Only if one assumes that alienation

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is a phase of human self-development in which man realizes what an ultimate completion might amount to and nevertheless still cannot achieve it, does it become meaningful to say that alienation is a fundamental premise of, and by itself leads to, the ultimate emergence of the homo vere humanus.

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Lobkowitz p. 322/3

(65)

For what Marx wants to say is that Hegel's description of the movement of self-consciousness is an adulterated description of the historical movement of laboring humanity. Hegel's Phenomenology assumes that consciousness grasps its true essence only by externalising itself into a world of objects and then in turn transcending this externalization; externalization and transcendence of externalization are both the motive power and the fundamental scheme of consciousness' movement toward its ultimate completion,

each other. "We are excluded from real property because our property excludes another man." 1/

... "Had we produced qua men, each of us would have affirmed (bejaht) in his production both himself and the other." For each of us, by actualizing his individual human potentialities, by objectifying himself, would have satisfied others; self-actualization would have been an act of kindness to another. Thus each of us constantly would have mediated between ourselves and all other men; between individual men and the human community. Those whose needs we would have satisfied by satisfying his own productive

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and creative needs would have recognized in us a completion of their essence, just as we would have seen ourselves sanctioned in their thought and love. In short, by strictly individual activities each of us would have actualized the ultimate essence of all of us, the "species essence"; and our products and eventually the whole of nature would have been "so many mirrors out of which our essence would shine forth." 2/

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische



Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 545.

2/ Ibid. 547. For a slightly different analysis see Popitz, H. Der entfremdete Mensch. Zeitkritik und Geschichtsphilosophie des jungen Marx. Philosophische Forschungen Neue Folge, 2. Basel, 1953, 152 ff.

↳ activity

Lobkowitz p. 355

Man is both an "active natural being" and a "passive, conditioned, and limited creature."¹ Still, if he is passive at all in the proper sense of the term, his dependence upon external objects as well as his need of them must be an integral aspect of his existence.

"But man is not merely a natural being; he is a human natural being." According to Marx this means that man is a being whose dependence upon and need of nature develop, for neither nature outside himself nor his own nature is "directly given in a form

adequate to the human being." 2/

- 1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 160; tr. Milligan, 156.
2/ Ibid. 162; tr. Milligan, 158.
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Lobkowicz p. 356

/// Marx, on the contrary, views the development from the biological entity "man" to a truly human being as an articulation and change in direction of man's needs, not as their Aufhebung in contemplation. Primitive man desires and needs things of nature; the more he develops the more all his needs of things are transformed into and embraced by one central need -- the need for another human being. The whole of history is a prehistory of the gradual emergence of truly human needs.



and the entelechy of this development is a man who experiences another man, precisely qua man, as the object which he needs most of all. 1/

1/ Cf. K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 123ff; tr. Milligan, 111 ff.

Sol.

Lobkowicz p. 358

As G.M.M. Cottier has convincingly shown, the basic ideas contained in this conception had an important influence upon Hegel, who, playing moreover on the processual connotation of the German expression 'Menschwerdung' ('incarnation'), extended the Lutheran interpretation of Christ's humanity to mankind as a whole and eventually described History as a processual kenotic incarnation, that is, as a process in which God's attributes are step by step given up by God and communicated to humanity. 1/

1/ Cottier, G. M-M. L'athéisme du jeune Marx et ses origines Hégéliennes. Paris, 1959. 27 ff.

7 *Marx Religion (as)*
Lobkowitz p. 313

In the last section we saw Sidney Hook's opposition to the recent emphasis on Marx's ~~the~~ theory of self-alienation on the ground that the notion of alienation is originally and ~~is~~ primarily religious in nature. (and thus, Hook implies, incompatible with the atheism characteristic of Marx's thought.)

Species essence & cooperation.

Lobkowitz, p. 360.

In an article "On the socialist movement in Germany," which was written in the early summer of 1844 and published in K. Grun's Neue Anekdoten in 1845, he described Feuerbach's version of the notion of Gattungswesen as "rather mystical" and argued that, adequately understood, it means an "acting together (Zusammenwirken) of individuals." Identifying selfishness with animality, he spelled out what also underlies Marx's notion of "species essence," namely, that social collaboration, cooperation in



all respects, is the ultimate fulfilment of man's human potentialities. 1/

1/ In the German Ideology, the expression 'species essence' is no longer used; but the core of the meaning of this expression is present. For example, when Marx explains the meaning of the expression 'gesellschaftliches Verhältnis,' he speaks of a Zusammenwirken mehrerer Individuen, a cooperation of several individuals. Cf. Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, Werke (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961 ff) 3, 29ff; tr. Pascal, 30

Species Essence.

Lobkowitz, p. 360/1

He would have added, as Hess in fact did add, that man's true essence is social, that is, "an acting together of different individuals for one and the same end," that true humanism is a "doctrine of human socialization (Gesellschaftung)," in short, that "anthropology is socialism." 1/

1/ Hess, Moses. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837-1850; ed. A. Cornu and W. Mönke. Berlin (East) 1961, p. 292 ff.

Species Essence.

Lobkowitz p. 361

Self-consciousness is man's equality with himself in pure thought. Equality is man's consciousness of himself in the element of praxis, that is, therefore, man's consciousness of other men as his equals and man's relation to other men as his equals. Equality is the French expression for the unity of human essence, for man's species consciousness and species attitude, for the practical identity of man with man, that is, for the social or human relation of man to man. 1/

11/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 207; tr. Dixon, 55 ff.

Man kind as sole + individual

Lobkowicz p. 362

In short, the important point cannot be that men be equal, but rather that they be equally human. And this is possible only if everyone desires for everyone else the fullest actualization of his human potentialities, a condition which in turn presupposes that one's self-objectification does not exclude the self-objectification of other men, in short, the conscious collaboration of all. In other words, man's ultimate completion emerges in a society in which every single individual acts as the



representative of mankind as a whole as well as for the sake of mankind as a whole.

Species essence.

Lobkowitz p. 361

Marx's notion of "species essence" differs from Hess' conception only in that Marx is constantly trying to reach the rational and even empirical core of such quasi-mythical ideas. This, of course, does not mean that from the Manuscripts one can extract something like a "doctrine of the Gattungswesen" which is both truly articulate and consistent; in fact, Marx's final rationalization of the notion of "species essence" consists in abandoning it.

Self completion / man.

Lobkowitz p. 363.

...like Schiller or Hegel, Marx views history as a process in which man articulates his potentialities in a way which seems contradictory to his very nature and eventually reintegrates these potentialities in a synthesis which is a sort of "man's nature regained," though obviously at a level infinitely exceeding the starting point.

Man's final completion

Lobkowitz, p. 363

All this amounts to saying that man's final self-fulfilment, the emergence of man as a species being, coincides with the emergence of communism. For communism is

the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; the complete return of man to himself as a social, that is, human being - a return become conscious and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism and, as fully



Absolute Knowledge. This according to Marx is a coded description of the real circumstance that the motive power as well as the fundamental scheme of humanity's history is man's self-alienation in and through labor and the eventual transcendence of this alienation.

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Lobkowitz p. 326

Hegel discusses the problem of labor at some length four times: in two of his early writings of which Marx did not know and in the Phenomenology of Mind and the Philosophy of Right. Though each of these writings puts the accent in a slightly different way, they all seem to agree as to four main characteristics of labor. First, labor is an activity in terms of which man appropriates nature, that is, destroys its irrational independence and thus asserts his own metaphysical right of a "subject" over a world of "objects." Secondly, labor mediates between man's needs and the

corresponding means of satisfying them and thus is a prolongation and sublimation of biological functions such as eating and drinking. Thirdly, labor is an activity by which man extricates himself from his biological existence, thus gradually leaving the animal kingdom. Finally, labor is in a very fundamental sense social, that is, while it extricates man from his animal existence, it leads him into society, in which both man and his labor find their ultimate completion.

D Lobkowitz p. 333/4 (66)

As Hegel puts it, ^{1/} both mortal fear and labor are necessary for the humanization of man. For without fear the shaping of the world would never be more than mere caprice. If his labor was not forced labor, man's labor would only nibble at reality. To put it in Marxist terms, man would never be more than a reformer. To revolutionize the world, to change the condition humaine, he has to experience the "mortal terror of his absolute master," be this master death, God, another man, or nature. It is hardly necessary to add that

it is by reading this passage that Marx came to the conclusion that although both the capitalist and the proletarian, both the master and the slave, are in a stage of alienation, only the proletarian's alienation really counts.

1/ Hegel, G.W.F., Sämtliche Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe); ed. H. Glockner, II, Stuttgart, 1932 ff. 157; tr. Baillie, 239.

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Lobkowitz p. 336

Freedom v. Law

Indeed Hegel even goes a step further: he explicitly describes the increasing "socialization" of modern man as a process of "liberation." To him the idea that primitive presocial man had more freedom than modern socialized man is simply false. For according to Hegel the alleged freedom of the presocial savage was in fact only a thorough dependence upon nature, both within and outside man, and thus an ultimately irrational arbitrariness characteristic of all "external necessity." Modern social man, it is true, is also bound

by necessity. But it is a necessity imposed upon him by other men and thus ultimately selbstgemachte Nothwendigkeit, a self-imposed restraint which is only an aspect of true freedom. 1/

1// Hegel, G.W.F., Sämtliche Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe); ed. H. Glockner, VII, Stuttgart, 1932 ff. 275; tr. Knox, 128.

z. Lehr

Lobkowitz p. 340

This does not mean of course that there is no difference between Hegel's and Marx's treatment of labor. But the difference lies in the role ascribed to labor rather than in the very notion of labor; what at first looks like a disagreement as to how labor should be described may be reduced to, or at least can be understood in terms of, a disagreement about the role of labor within the whole of man's potentialities. In other words, what Hegel and Marx disagree about is the relation between the speculative and the "bodily"

mastering of the world, between speculative transfiguration and "material" transformation, between contemplation and labor, not the notion of labor taken as such. More precisely the difference consists in Hegel viewing the transformation effected by bodily labor as a premise and a subordinate form of the ultimate, reconciling transfiguration achieved by speculative thought, while Marx is and increasingly will be inclined to see in all theoretical activities only an epiphenomenon of labor and practice in general.

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Lobkowitz, p. 340/1

Aristotle philosophizes out of "wonder," out of an intellectual curiosity which is half awe, half the desire to adjust man's existence to the order of being, the cosmos. Both Hegel and Marx, on the contrary, philosophize out of unhappiness and dissatisfaction, out of the "experience" that the world is not as it ought to be. Accordingly, while Aristotle primarily aims at understanding, at discovering structures and laws to which man's thought and actions have to adjust, Hegel and Marx aim at "reconciling" and/or "revolutionizing." In



Aristotle nothing is or even can be wrong as it is in its natural state. The problem for Aristotle does not consist in correcting the universe or in making it rational; it consists in discovering its inherent order and rationality and in adjusting oneself to it. In Hegel and Marx almost everything is wrong and consequently has to be aufgehoben, transfigured, transformed, revolutionized. In this respect the only truly important difference between Hegel and Marx is that Hegel is still enough committed to the Greek philosophical tradition to believe it possible to reconcile man with the universe by teaching him adequately to

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understand it, while Marx, disappointed with Hegel's speculative transfiguration, has lost all faith in the healing and reconciling power of mere thought.

D. . .

(68)

Lobkowitz p. 342/3

On the one hand, contrary to what superficial readers sometimes believe, Marx quite obviously does not want to say that the externalization entailed by labor is by itself alienation. For this is precisely of what he accuses Hegel: a confusion of objectification and alienation, objectivity and being alien. Marx repeatedly stresses that man is a being to which it is essential to be in need of independent objects: without such objects and a need for them man would be something "unnatural," a monster. "A being which does not have its

nature outside itself is not a natural being.. A being which has no objects outside itself is not an objective being... An unobjective being is an unbeing (Unwesen),^{1/} On the other hand, however, it is equally obvious that Marx wants to say that alienation is a character intrinsic to objectification at one of the stages of its development. Sometimes Marx even seems to say that up to now all externalization in terms of labor has been alienation. At one point he even goes as far as to intimate that labor is by its very essence alienation: "labor is only an expression of human activity within alienation, of expressing one's life by

alienating it (Lebensausserung als Lebens-
entausserung).^{2//}

- ^{1/} K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff). I, 3, 161; tr. Milligan, 157
^{2/} Ibid, 139;; tr. Milligan, 129.

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Lobkowicz p. 344

To state this more precisely, Hegel did not believe that the course of history could be understood and the ultimate reconciliation achieved in terms of a "making" or "doing," in term of praxis. Of course, as we have tried to indicate, he was well aware that labor has its share in the humanization of mankind. But he always considered labor a tool subordinated to man's most proper means of achieving his completion -- rational insight, speculative thought.

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Lobkowicz, p. 347/8

However, to have no control over its products is not a character intrinsic to the very essence of praxis. This stigma obviously cannot be abolished in terms of a speculative transformation; it can only be overcome by a further development of labor, that is, by a progress of production. Marx believes that there must come a moment after which production will amount to a thorough control over all products. When this point is reached, the most basic of all alienation is overcome -- man's self-objectification has become a

thorough control over nature both within and outside himself. Objectification has become pure self-expression. Thereby all labor has lost its character of a burden. In a sense it even has ceased to be labor properly speaking and has become pure self-contained creativity.

~D
Lobkowitz, p. 349/350

(71)

If alienation consists in a lack of control over those things to which man communicates his "life" and in which he actualizes his human potentialities, why is it that alienation becomes increasingly severe as man's productive transformation of nature develops? How can Marx say that the "increase in the quantity of objects," that is, of human products, is "accompanied by an extension of the realm of alien powers which subjugate man"? 1/ Actually it would seem that in the beginning of its career humanity had little or no control

over what it produced but that this control improved as humanity's transformation of nature through labor became more embracing and thorough. In fact, this is how Engels sometimes describes the situation: alienation is a lack of technological mastery both of nature and of society. Yet Marx quite obviously intends to say that there was little or no alienation at the beginning of history. Alienation emerged, and then grew like a slow fever as history developed, and presently, under the conditions dealt with by the political economy of Smith and Ricardo, is about to reach a last climax, soon to be followed by a

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millenium in which all alienation will irrevocably belong to the past.

1/ K. Marx-E. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 127; tr. Milligan, 115.

D (72)
Lobkowitz, p. 350

In other words, when he is speaking of "alienation," Marx does not primarily have in mind the fact that things escape man's control at the technological level, for example, because they become too complex to be easily mastered or because they are too mechanical to reflect the human qualities of their producers. As far as he notices such aspects of "alienation" at all, he reduces them to something more fundamental, namely, to the fact that consequent to the progress of production there emerges a



peculiar kind of socioeconomic interrelation which hinders the producer from maintaining properly "human" relations both to their products and to nature.

Ultimate completion of individual.

Lobkowitz, p. 362/3

Once this social essence of man is recognized, once it is acknowledged - in praxi, that is, not only in man's mind -- that man's ultimate completion entails and in fact is the ultimate completion of each and every human being, society also becomes "the consummated. essential oneness of nature and man, the true resurrection of nature, the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to fulfilment." 1/ For what separates man from nature even after he has mastered it at the level of technology is his separation from



other men. As long as his mastery of nature is not a social one, whatever he produces and transforms always reflects alien beings -- either men from whom he is separated or himself as separated from mankind. Only when I produce as a man - that is, socially -- only when my labor is an objectification of the human species as a whole, does nature become a mirror which reflects Man.

^{MFEA}
1/ K. Marx-E. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927-66) I, 3, 116; tr. Milligan, 104.

2 *Lohn*
Lobkowicz p. 321

However, in order to be able to fathom Marx's conception of labor, we have once more to return to Hegel, and this for a very simple reason. Marx never hid his admiration for Hegel's analysis of labor. He explicitly acknowledges that "Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political economy," since Hegel grasps labor "as man's essence in the act of proving itself (das sich bewahrende Wesen des Menschen)," and he hails the Phenomenology for having shown that man, "true because real," is the outcome of his own labor.^{1/} Yet his

ensuing criticism of Hegel's "dialectic" conceals an important fact, namely, that almost everything which Marx says about labor can be traced back to Hegel. It has to be admitted that Marx never denied this. But the way in which he dissociates himself from Hegel easily misleads one into believing that Marx objects to Hegel's notion of labor, while in reality he only objects to Hegel's dialectic of self-consciousness.

I/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 156; tr. Milligan, 151.

- D alienation,
Lobkowicz p. 315/6

This may be illustrated by referring once more to Hegel's analysis of "spirit alienated from itself." In the very first sentences of this section Hegel suggests that before man realized that the universe of culture was his own work, there was properly speaking no "alienation." The world of culture still did not have the connotation of something shut out from man; man viewed it as something belonging to the very order of "being" - like the laws of nature, for example. Eventually, however, man became aware of the fact that the world

of culture was produced by him and thus was a part of himself. Yet in spite of this insight the world of cultural products remained as independent as ever; although man knew now that it was his work, he still had no hold on it. In fact, it was only now that man's own products appeared alien and inimical to him. He recognized them as being "his," and still they were not "his." At the same time, however, man now could envisage a completion previously unknown to him -- the possibility of identifying himself with his world, of recognizing himself in the surrounding world as in a

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mirror, of achieving his self-actualization beyond his limited ego in the whole universe.

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Lobkowitz p. 348

This is perhaps the most puzzling feature of Marx's treatment of labor both in the Manuscripts and in the German Ideology: on the one hand, Marx describes labor as man's "life activity" and, on the other hand, he argues that the consummation of history will abolish labor. H. Arendt has argued that Marx contradicts himself and tried to trace back this contradiction to Marx's failure to distinguish between two quite distinct human activities, Arbeit and Herstellen, the "labor of our body" and the "work of our hands," to use Locke's words.¹ However it does not seem

necessary to accuse Marx of a confusion. What he wants to say is in fact quite simple: the labor of our body can achieve so radical a transformation of man and his world that it ceases to be a burden and becomes a full expression of man's freedom. "Labor is man's coming-to-be for himself within alienation, or as alienated man",^{2/} it transforms man's condition to the extent that eventually man will no longer have to labor in order to satisfy his needs. As far as I can see, Marx never intimated how this might happen. But one has only to imagine that one day man will produce machines which service and even reproduce themselves to acknowledge that this

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idea is far from being wildly Utopian.

1// Arendt, H. *The Human Condition*. Anchor Paperback, 1958, 90.

2// K. Marx-F. Engels, *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 157; tr. Milligan, 152

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Lobkowitz p. 351/2

Instead of recognizing in the other a needy human being, a man who needs me, I see only a thing which I desire to have and with respect to which the human character of its producer and owner are perfectly incidental. In other words, the social consequences of labor do not tie us to each other; they tie us to things, while they isolate us from other men. "Our mutual value is for us the value of our mutual objects. That is, we mutually consider man as having no value."^{1/}

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 546.

fol. 352 alien. Consumption.

"In a society, in whose products belong to us, even though we do not need them, we inevitably produce things that exclude our relationship to each other. We are excluded from their property because our property excludes another man."

permissum omni.

Lobkowitz, 353

Reform criticism / p.p. will have to start from its most painful expression, if the fact of poverty, misery."

MEBA I, 3, 207 v. fixm.

5 man-woman

Lobkowitz p. 356/7

This is why Marx, in this respect following Feuerbach, several times argues that the relation of man to woman is an almost empirical criterion of the degree of man's having become human; for the sexual relationship, in its immediacy, naturalness, and necessity, is a paradigmatic instance of needs which aim at another human being -- either as at the "spoils and handmaid.. of lust" or at a human being. "From this relationship one can... judge man's whole level of development." 1/ For man is human to



the extent to which "another man as man has become a need for him." 2/ The first premise of Marx's early humanism is probably best expressed in a sentence by Count Holbach, whom Marx quotes in the Holy Family: -de-tous les êtres le plus nécessaire à l'homme c'est l'homme. 2/

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt, 1927 ff) I, 3, 113; tr. Milligan, 101. On this point see the analyses by G. Fessard in Marx and the Western World, ed. N. Lobkowitz (Notre Dame, 1967) 337-370.

2.

2/ Ibid. cf. 124; tr. Milligan, 101, cf. 112
3/ Ibid. 309; tr. Dixon, 179.

Lobkowitz p. 352

But this means nothing less than that we have come into the power and possession of our products. We no longer own them; they own us. And they own us because we have failed to produce them socially, that is, for each other, not because in some mythical way they become disobedient. In fact it is we ourselves who produce this power of our products over ourselves. For as we produce under the conditions of private property -- that is, in a society in which products belong to us, even though we do not need them -- we inevitably produce things which control our relations to

developed humanism, equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man -- the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution. 1/

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927 ff) I, 3, 114; tr. Milligan, 102.

AP.

Lobkowitz, p. 364

Marx's emphasis on this point is so strong that at one point he even goes so far as to say that as it is the negation of a negation, communism must not be understood as the ultimate actualization of man. 1/ In another passage he distinguishes several kinds of communism, and only the last one, which is no longer mediated by a negation, is said to be the ultimate unfolding of man's potentialities. 2/ This has a special application to atheism, for atheism (the militant atheism of the Left Hegelians as

well as of Feuerbach, that is) postulates man's dignity by rejecting God -- and "socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such a mediation. 3/ But it also applies to the abolition of private property: Although private property obviously must be abolished if communism is to emerge, communism itself is something quite different from a society "which wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed by all," for example, talents. 4/

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische

2.

Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927 ff) I, 3, 134; tr. Milligan, 124.

2/ Ibid. 111 ff; tr. Milligan, 99ff.

3/ Cf. ibid. 125 ff.; tr. Milligan, 114.

4/ Cf. ibid. 111 ff.; tr. Milligan, 99 ff.

A D.

Lobkowicz, p. 364

The mediation between primitive man and communism, a mediation which Marx analyses in terms of the concept of alienation, is a "necessary premise" of communism. 1/ As communism is "no returning in poverty to unnatural, undeveloped simplicity," it is possible only as the result of a history whose wealth could not have emerged without alienation. 2/

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from

vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927 ff) I, 3, 167; tr. Milligan, 164.

2/ Ibid. Notice the peculiar use of 'unnatural.' 'Natural,' in this context, means 'human' or even 'humanistic,' not 'pre-cultural' as in Hegel and in fact in other passages in Marx.

Lobkowitz, p. 365

Marx himself has noticed this. After having stated that Feuerbach is the only Hegelian "who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectics and who has made genuine discoveries in this field," he enumerates three of Feuerbach's "great achievements": first, Feuerbach showed that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into rational thought and that it has likewise to be condemned as another form of the "alienation of the human essence"; secondly, that Feuerbach established "true materialism



and real science" by making the social relationship of man to man the basic principle of his theory; and finally that he opposed to Hegel's negation of the negation "the self-supporting positive, positively grounded in itself." 1/

1/ K. Marx-E. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927 ff) I, 3, 152;; tr. Milligan, 145

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Lobkowicz, p. 365//6

(67)

Feuerbach's anthropocentric humanism is a "return" as well, but it is a return which makes good something almost exclusively negative and which restores a human nature that has never been truly absent. As we saw earlier, this basically ahistorical conception (ahistorical, since only nature, not history, explains the presence of True Man) is due to the fact that Feuerbach viewed all alienation as an error rather than as an event of the political, social, and economic order. Marx, on the contrary, who is far

from viewing alienation as a mere mistake in interpretation but rather, following Hegel, considers it a happening in rerum natura, interprets alienation as a "deviation" with eventually salvific consequences, indeed as a development which is absolutely necessary to the emergence of true humanity.

Lobkowitz, p. 366 *SP*

What Marx seems to want to say, and what later he will say quite explicitly, is this: the human wealth both material and spiritual, which communism presupposes could develop only under the conditions of private property but once this wealth has emerged and private property has been abolished, communism stands on its own feet -- it is no longer mediated either by private property or by its abolition -- except in the sense that without such a past communism could not possibly have emerged. In other words, the

mastery of nature and the high degree of productivity which communism presupposes could develop only in terms of the recklessness of human (or rather "animal") selfishness and the resulting competition. But once nature has been subdued to the extent that mankind produces enough to be able to satisfy fully the needs of each and every individual, a collaboration becomes possible which, even though it is built on a Golgotha of past inhumanities, develops on its own and can regard its past as something external to it, as an animalistic prehistory which communism presupposes only "historically,"

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not "logically."

Just as through the movement of private property, of its wealth as well as its poverty -- or its material and spiritual wealth and poverty -- the budding (werdende) society finds at hand all the material for its development; so established (gewordne) society produces man in this entire richness of his being.. as its enduring result. 1/

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische



Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from
vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927 ff)
I, 3, 121; tr. Milligan, 109.

pp.

Lobkowitz, p. 367

In other words, truly human property is the immediate availability of those objects, both products of human labor and things of nature, of which man has a genuine need. In another text Marx describes this truly human property as an "inner property." 1/ This expression refers back to Hegel, who in the Philosophy of Right 2/ describes as "inner property" human skills acquired through education, study, habit, and so on, which are basically inalienable, even though a particular use of it may be alienated for



a limited period of time. ^{3/} Moses Hess seems to have made use of this notion when in 1843 he described man's activity of producing as his "actual property" and opposed it to things as "material property."⁴ Marx, however, contrary both to Hegel and Hess, describes as such "inner property" everything of which man has a true need:
"for the need of a thing is the most obvious and irrefutable proof that this thing belongs to my nature, that its being is a being for me... that it is a characteristic property (Eigentümlichkeit) of my essence."^{5/}

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- 1/ Marx-Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, Ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927 ff) I, 3, 537.
- 2/ Hegel, G.W.F., Sämtliche Werke (Jubilaumsausgabe); ed. H. Glockner, VII, Stuttgart, 1932 ff., 97; tr. Knox, 41.
- 3/ Ibid. 123 ff.; tr. Knox, 54. On Hegel's notion of property see the excellent article by J. Ritter, Marxismusstudien IV 196-218, especially 212 ff.
- 4/ Einundzwanzig Bogen 322; cf. Bockmühl,

K.E. Leiblichkeit und Gesellschaft.
Studien zur Religionskritik im Frühwerk
von L. Feuerbach und K. Marx, Forschungen
zur system. Theologie und Religions-
philosophie, 7. Göttingen, 1961, 245.
5/ Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, l.c.
537.

pp.
Lobkowitz, p. 367/8

But man quite obviously is in need of the products of the labor of others as well. Consequently the products of others and in the end also their labor, their skill, and their whole human existence are a part of my nature no less than my own labor and skill. Yet this means that where there is private property, a part of my nature is not my own. Is it not obvious, then, that society has to be restructured in such a way that everything which is "a characteristic property of my essence" becomes available to

me, indeed mine? Is it not obvious that "truly human property" as just described is the "positive essence of private property,"¹ its true meaning, ²// the "essential relationship to objects" of which even owners of private property implicitly are aware? ³/
Indeed, is it not obvious that "communism" as the Aufhebung of private property, is the vindication of real human life as man's property"? ⁴//

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927 ff)

2.

- I, 3, 114; tr. Milligan, 102.
²// Ibid. 145; tr. Milligan, 137.
³// Ibid. 537 ff.
⁴// Ibid. 166; tr. Milligan, 163 ff.

pp.
Lobkowitz, p. 370.

Marx's objection to private property, then, moves at the level which Marx considers the most fundamental level of human existence: at the level of Hegel's "system of wants," which is the subject of political economy. Man is a being of needs; private property entails the frustration of needs. However one has to be careful not to take the term 'need' in too narrow a sense. For Marx obviously wants to say more than that under the conditions of private property many people remain hungry, thirsty, and without

shelter. Even though Habermas is right when he claims that Marx's notion of alienation refers to a de facto encountered situation of pauperism, not to a "metaphysical accident," 1/ and even though the disappearance of this pauperism would (and in fact did) considerably weaken the persuasive power of Marx's arguments, the Marxian criticism of private property cannot possibly be reduced to the claim that private property throws a substantial part of humanity into misery. While Proudhon, for example, was almost exclusively interested in discovering ways to ameliorate la condition physique,

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morale et intellectuelle de la classe la plus nombreuse et la plus pauvre, 2/ Marx's interest centered around an emancipation of the whole of humanity. Consequently he was interested in the misery of the proletariat only insofar as, on the one hand, it was particularly indicative of the wretched situation of man in general and, on the other hand, it suggested why and how the proletariat would become humanity's savior.

1/ Habermas, J., "Zur philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus."



Philosophische Rundschau (1957) 181.

2// Cf. Proudhon's letter to the Academy of Besancon, introducing Qu'est-ce que la propriété (1840); cf. Proudhon, P. J. Oeuvres complètes. I, Paris, 1923 ff. 119.

essential need

Lobkowitz, p. 370

This is not to say that Marx has a low opinion of freedom. But he is and always does remain very sceptical about any freedom which is not based upon very palpable and "very material conditions." And the first of these "very material conditions" is that man should be able to satisfy all his needs as those of a truly human being. Liberation always entails a change of the conditions essential for life. 1/

1/ K. Marx-F. Engels, Historisch-kritische

Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and (from
vol. 3) V. Adoratskij (Frankfurt 1927 ff)
I, 3, 207; tr. Dixon, 52.

Lobkowitz. p. 371

For even though after 1845 Marx almost completely abandoned this notion, his central objection to private property always remained that it is both an expression of man's still not being truly human and the greatest impediment to his eventual becoming human. In fact there is a sense in which Marx does not oppose private property -- he "criticizes" it in order to show that it will inevitably disappear. His "critique" of private property ultimately aims at proving that the "movement of private property" eventually will result in its self-annulment, and his "opposition" to



private property amounts in the end to the insight, or rather claim, that this self-annulment is good, indeed entails man's ultimate self-completion.

Lobkowitz p. 371/2

As to what is wrong with private property, Marx puts it in many different ways. But the central argument is always the same: it isolates man both from other men and from nature and thus impedes the emergence of man's true social nature. "Private property does not know how to change crude need into human needs," since under the rule of private property everyone is interested in the other's needs only for selfish reasons. "Each tries to establish over the other

an alien power, so as to find thereby^{1/} satisfaction of his own selfish need." ^{1/} Under the rule of private property man's humanizing activity par excellence, labor, becomes a means of satisfying the least human of all needs, the "need to maintain physical existence." ^{2/} Indeed, the very nature of man, his "species essence," becomes a means to his individual existence, ^{3/} which amounts to saying that man's human nature becomes a means to his subhuman, or prehuman, nature. Therefore, private property is the "material sensuous expression of alienated human life," ^{4/} a statement which means not only that man's true life is outside himself but also,

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and more fundamentally, that man still is not the true subject of his history, ^{5/} that is, master both of his own nature and of nature outside himself, and of the social reality which relates the two.

- ^{1/} MEGA I, 3, 127; tr. Milligan, 115
^{2/} Ibid. 88; tr. Milligan, 75
^{3/} Ibid. 89. Cf 72; tr. Milligan, 76, cf. 57
^{4/} Ibid. 114; tr. Milligan, 103.
^{5/} Ibid. 153; tr. Milligan, 146

Lobkowitz. p. 374

The theory of true human emancipation can become a material power only by gripping the masses. Not just any masses, it is true. For a revolutionary theory can be actualized only by those for whom this actualization is, or rather implies, the satisfaction of an absolutely vital need. Moreover, as the revolution aims at overthrowing all conditions of the present world order, the masses who will carry out the salvific revolution must be in an all-round opposition to the existing conditions. But only the proletariat is a



social group for whom the "dissolution of the hereto existing world order" is the "secret of its own existence." Consequently, if the real emancipation of man is to be accomplished the philosopher and the proletariat must join in a common cause.

Just as philosophy finds in the proletariat its material weapon, so the proletariat finds in philosophy its spiritual weapon.... The emancipation of the Germans is the emancipation of man. The head of this emancipation is philosophy; its heart is

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the proletariat. Philosophy cannot actualize itself without abolishing the proletariat; the proletariat cannot abolish itself without actualizing philosophy. 1/

1. MEGA I, 1/1, 620 ff; tr. Bottomore, 59

Lobkowicz. p. 376

In any case Marx does not and in fact never will imply that the philosopher, or rather the critical economist, may restrict himself to a perfectly detached study of laws as objective as those of natural science. Contrary to the old Engels, and in spite of a few misleading phrases which in later writings he himself used, Marx always seems to have known that the effectiveness of his "laws" depended upon man's willful doing, at least in some respect. At the very least there remains the fact, hardly deniable, even though never explicitly stated by Marx, that he

always was inclined to think of the proletariat's knowledge of these "laws" as something without which the "laws" themselves might not have their full effect. He did not of course foresee that the capitalists, too, gradually would become aware of these "laws" and prevent their becoming effective by not permitting the proletariat's pauperization to become ever worse. It is ironical but certainly worth noticing that the laws discovered by Marx were not "falsified" in the sense in which, for example, hypotheses are experimentally falsified in physics; they were "made false" because Marx revealed them and thus gave the capitalists a chance which they might never have had otherwise.

Lobkowitz. p. 377

Of course political economy as it de facto existed could not possibly suffice; this point if nothing else had been convincingly shown by Engels' article. Political economy was a "science of enrichment" born of the merchants' mutual envy and greed, and bore "on its brow the mark of the most loathsome selfishness"; indeed, while the mercantilists at least had displayed a sort of "Catholic candor" by parading the mean avarice which governed all trade, the classical economy of Smith and Ricardo added



"Protestant hypocrisy" to this selfishness
and eulogized allegedly humanitarian
aspects of civil society's economic life.1/

1/ MEW I, 499, 503; tr. Milligan, 175, 180ff

Lobkowitz. p. 384

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The mercantilists, he argues, remained similar to Catholics in that they worshipped wealth as something external to man: they considered money as the wealth. Compared to them, Adam Smith may be described as "the Luther of political economy": by taking labor to be the only source of wealth, he incorporated private property in man himself and thus recognized man as its essence. In this way Smith certainly represented a progress as against the mercantile system. But this progress was in a sense for the worse: just as Luther "negated the priest



outside the layman because he transplanted
the ~~priest into the layman's heart,~~ "Smith
incorporated the alienation represented by
private property into man's very essence --
thus only perpetuating man's alienation
rather than overcoming it. 1/ As to Ricardo,
whom Marx always viewed with an odd mixture
of hate and genuine admiration, he drew the
cynical conclusion: contrary to Smith,
Ricardo saw clearly that the ultimate end of
civil society's economic life is neither man
nor national interest but only net revenue
Here the abstractions of political economics
have reached a "climax of infamy"; it
becomes obvious that "humanity is outside
political economy and inhumanity inside

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political economy." 2/

1/ MEGA I 3, 107ff; tr. Milligan, 93ff.

2/ Ibid. 514 ff: cf. 108

Lobkowicz. p. 386 ⑦

It goes without saying that the prole-
tarian -- that is, the man who, being without
capital and rent, lives purely by labor, and
by a one-sided, abstract labor -- is consi-
dered by political economics only as a worker.
Political economics can therefore advance the
proposition that the proletarian, the same as
any horse, must get as much as will enable
him to work. It does not consider him when
he is not working, as a human being, but
leaves such considerations to criminal law
to doctors, to religion, to the statistical

tables, to politics, and to the workhouse
beadle. 1/

1/ MEGA I, 3, 45, cf. 97; tr. Milligan, 29.
cf. 84

Lobkowicz. p. 386 (8)

It could not possibly suffice to develop a different type of political economics; as Marx will put it in the German Ideology, "this demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in a different way, that is, to accept it by means of another interpretation." 1/ Political economics was the reflection of a society in alienation -- that is, of civil society -- "in which every individual is a totality of needs and only exists for the other person, as the other person exists for him, insofar as each becomes a means for the other." 2/

The only way to transcend classical political economics consisted in overcoming civil society itself.

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- 1/ MEW III, 20; tr. Pascal, 6.
2/ MEGA I, 3, 138ff; tr. Milligan, 129

Lobkowitz 386/7

(4)

However, and this immediately leads us to the last and most fundamental level of Marx's critique of political economics, Marx is beyond the point of believing that a philosopher like he could instigate a revolution and induce the disappearance of civil society. Since 1844, and especially since 1845, to transcend political economics no longer means for him to look for an extraphilosophical partner whom he might instigate to revolutionary action. Rather it means to discover the "laws" in terms of which civil society

abolishes itself.

Lobkowicz. p. 387

(10)

"A forcing-up of wages... would be nothing but better payment for the slave and would not conquer either for the worker or for labor their human vocation (Bestimmung) and dignity." 1/

1/ MEGA I, 3, ~~128~~ ff; tr. Milligan, 81.
92

Lobkowicz. p. 388

(11)

"In fact, private property, in its economic movement, drives itself towards its own dissolution,... in as much as it produces the proletariat as proletariat, a misery conscious of its spiritual and physical misery, a dehumanization conscious of its dehumanization and therefore self-abolishing. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounced on itself by begetting the proletariat.... When the proletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes the absolute side of society, for it

is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite. Then the proletariat disappears as well as the opposite which determines it, private property." 1/

1. MEGA I, 3, 206; tr. Dixon, 52

Lobkowitz. p.388

However the ultimate end of his critique of political economics is and always will remain to unveil the laws of the self-abolishing movement of private property, laws which must be known to the proletariat if it is to become aware of itself as the savior of mankind and eventually carry out its praxis a la hauteur des principes, the total salvific revolution.

Lobkowitz. p. 388/9 (12)

In this sense one might argue that Marx's critique of political economy is both a scientific analysis involving prediction and a message of salvation, a call to action. This is not as contradictory as it may seem at first sight. For in a sense it is not correct to say that Marx's critique of political economy predicts communism (even though this will become obvious only in Marx's mature economic writings). His critique predicts the end of the "movement of private property" and with it the end of

civil society as a whole (which Marx later will describe as a total stagnation of all economic traffic and eventually of production itself). It offers this scientific prediction as a message of salvation to the proletariat, as an invitation to carry out the revolutionary deed to which it is destined - even while it demonstrates that all socioeconomic conditions of communist society, in particular a high level of production involving the cooperation of virtually all men, are rising within civil society itself.

Lobkowitz. p. 389

(13)

It is from this perspective that one has to understand Marx's bitter polemics against Bruno Bauer. For as we saw earlier, Bauer argued that all great revolutionary movements were and always will be failures "because the mass became interested in and enthusiastic over them" and that therefore the "critique" has to disassociate itself from all mass interests and become absorbed in itself alone. Marx could not argue that "all great actions of previous history" were not failures, for he thoroughly agreed with Bauer that the era

of salvation was still in the future. But he could, and indeed did, argue that all previous revolutions were failures because the mass which carried them out was neither representative of "man as man" nor in need of the revolution as its "life principle." If a revolution was a failure, "it was so because the mass whose living conditions it did not substantially go beyond was an exclusive, limited mass, not an all-embracing one." 1/

1/ MEGA I, 3, 253; tr. Dixon, 109ff.

Lobkowitz. p. 389/90 (17)

Marx's main criticism of Bauer, however, aims at his former friend's belief that a purely philosophical critique could change the course of the world. As Marx observes time and again, this belief is based upon the false assumption that the realities to be criticized and transformed are in the order of thought. "According to the critical critique the whole evil lies in thinking" 1/; consequently it believes itself able to change the world by correcting ideas. Yet

as these ideas are only a reflection of more basic realities, Bauer in fact is fighting windmills. He reduces all theories to which he objects to religious "forms of consciousness" instead of considering the "commercial and industrial practice" from which they originate. 2/ Certainly Bauer is right when he argues that it is high time for man to rise against the existing world order, "but to rise, it is not enough to do so in thought and to leave hanging over our real sensuous head the real palpable yoke that cannot be subtilized away with ideas." 3/

2

1/ MEGA I, 3, 223; tr. Dixon, 73
2/ Cf. *ibid.* 284; tr. Dixon 147 ff.
3/ *Ibid* 254; tr. Dixon, 111

Lobkowitz. p. 393

But when Marx read The Ego and Its Own, he suddenly realized that Stirner's denunciation of Feuerbach as a "pious atheist" had very much truth to it. This impression was even reinforced when Marx read Feuerbach's reply to Stirner. 1/ For Feuerbach quite frankly admitted that his atheism, even though radically anthropocentric, was "religious" after all; to him the statement that there is no God was only a negative form of the "practical and religious, that is positive" statement that "Man is the God!" 2/



Moreover, when Feuerbach defended against Stirner his notion of "species being," Marx immediately saw that this certainly was not what he himself had in mind when he identified the actualization of the "species essence" -- that is, cooperation in production and consumption -- with communism.

1/ This reply, entitled "Über das 'Wesen des Christenthums' in Beziehung auf den 'Einigen und sein Eigenthum,'" was published in Wigands Vierteljahrschrift 2 (1845)193-205;
Cf. Feuerbach, VII, 294-310.
2/ Feuerbach, VII, 297; cf. 309

Lobkowitz. p. 393/4 (16)

For Feuerbach did not even mention social cooperation, nor did he speak of the necessity of changing the social order. Even though he twice used the term 'communism,' he seemed to have nothing in mind except a vague sort of community based upon mutual recognition and love. Feuerbach's man had no revolutionary drive at all; he reveled in his divinity -- and was a "communist" only in so far as he saw his human essence "in the community." 1/



1/ MEGA I, 3, 310.

Lobkowitz p. 395

(16)

And now Stirner came and reduced all this, including communism and its ideals, to an extreme individualistic egoism. Everything dissolved into "fixed ideas," "ghosts," "phantoms," "loose screws": history, mankind, society, communism, socialism, as much as Christ, the Absolute Spirit, or ideals of bourgeois society. All this was treated by Stirner from the point of view of a naked Ego which was neither committed to nor bound by anything; Ich hab' main Sach' auf Nichts gestellt, as Stirner parodied Luther. The



only real problem which still occupied Stirner was how to "utilize" and to "use up" such ideals for the sake of "myself," who was the only thing that really counted.

Lobkowitz. p. 395/6 (17)

Like Strauss, Bauer, and Feuerbach and in a way more radically than any of them, Marx had worked at a profanization of all realms which had been "transfigured" by Hegel; he had fought against what he believed to be illusions and opiates, against religion, political ideals, and eventually against Hegel's philosophy itself. But he had not given up the hidden eschatological attitude and the implicit revolutionary drive underlying Hegelianism.

Lobkowitz. p. 396 (18)

While Marx believed it obvious that the atomism of civil society was objectionable and therefore had to be transcended, Stirner made this very egoism of modern society his principle.

Lobkowitz. p. 396

All these confusions Marx in turn traces back to the real situation of contemporary civil society, a procedure which permits him to denounce Stirner as a representative of the German petty bourgeoisie as well as to elaborate on his own notion of "ideologies."

Lobkowitz p. 397/8 (19)

Marx was quick in discovering what the fundamental difference between all these philosophical critiques and his own critique of political economy was: none of the Left Hegelians realized what had meanwhile become the basic premise of Marx's position, namely, that the critique was embodied in the real movement of empirical history. Hegel, it is true, had implicitly been aware of it; as late as 1873 Marx will admit that Hegel was the first to describe the "general forms of the movement" of history and its dialectics. !!



20

Lobkowitz. p. 404

Let us try to be somewhat more specific. We may begin by briefly summarizing Marx's views on Feuerbach, Bauer, and Stirner as advanced in the preface to the German Ideology. The Left Hegelians, so Marx argues, reduce all evils to the simple fact that people invent false conceptions and thus "limit (beschränken)" and misguide themselves. Accordingly they believe that to save the world amounts to liberating it from the "chimeras, ideas, dogmas, and imaginary beings," under the yoke of which it is pining away. Feuerbach, believing



that all evil results from the fact that man ascribes the perfections of his own species to a non-existent Absolute, argues that such false imaginations should be replaced by correct ideas about man's divine nature; Bauer, reducing all evil to a lack of a critical self-awareness, demands that man take up a critical attitude toward his engrained dogmatic presuppositions; and Stirner, believing the evil to consist in the very existence of abstract ideas and ideals argues that one ought simply to forget everything that does not serve one's self-centered individuality. 1/

1/ Cf. MEW III, 13; tr. Pascal, 1.

Lobkowicz. p. 405/6

Man, you are not quite right in your head; you have a screw loose! You imagine great things and picture for yourself a whole world of gods who exist for you -- a spiritual empire to which you are summoned, an ideal which beckons to you. You have a fixed idea! Do not believe that I joke or use only symbols when I declare that all people pursuing higher aims... are veritable fools, fools in a lunatic asylum. 1/

1/ Stirner, 57

Lobkowicz. p. 406

(20)

For at this moment Marx clearly was an ally of Bauer and all the more of Feuerbach: he felt that he had to defend the Left Hegelian "ideal-ism" against Stirner's cynical egoism. Indeed, while his objection to Bauer, and in a sense to Feuerbach as well, only amounted to saying that their haughty intellectualism prevented them from realizing the ideal which he, Marx, shared with them, against Stirner he had to defend the far more basic claim that it was at all meaningful to seek a realization of such an ideal rather than simply letting go all

ideals and the whole conception of a
salvation of man.

Lobkowitz. p. 406/7 (21)

It is worth noticing that when he begins to explain "the point of view of our criticism," that is, his own position, Marx puts greatest emphasis upon the fact that his own pre-suppositions "are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real presuppositions from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination." 1/ Marx's line of defense consists in arguing that he really is not pursuing an ideal after all; that which Bauer and Feuerbach describe, and Stirner denounces, as ideals, Marx describes as empirical facts which it is beyond man's power to disregard

1/ MEW III, 20; f. Pascal, 6

Lobkowitz p. 408 (22)

"The all-round actualization of the individual will cease to be imagined as an ideal... only when the moving force of the world (der Weltanstoß) which solicits the individual's capacity for real development will have come under the individual's control. -- as the communists desire it." 1/

1/ MEW III, 273

Lobkowitz. p. 412 (23)

Communism is for us not a state (Zustand) which ought to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state /originally, as one can see from the deletions, Marx intended to write: "which is the practical Aufhebung of the present state"/ The conditions of this movement result from the presuppositions now in existence. 1/

But this means that Marx is not advancing an invitation to action at all, contrary to

what the eleventh "thesis" seems to suggest. Rather he states as a fact that people do change the world in a definite way and thus push history in a definite direction. Instead of urging people to act he predicts that they will act. But what does then the eleventh of the "Theses on Feuerbach" mean? As it seems impossible to construe it in such a way as to make it say that ideals are irrelevant, the only plausible answer would seem to consist in saying that it means just what it says, namely, something incompatible with Marx's dismissal of ideals, and that it therefore reveals a basic ambiguity in Marx's thought.

3

1/ MEW III, 35; tr. Pascal, 26. For the fact that this passage is a later insertion by Marx's own hand see MEGA I, 5, 572, sub 25, line 5.

Lobkowitz p. 413

(24)

To be more precise, this thesis reveals the fact already mentioned, namely, that almost against his will Marx has been pushed into this dismissal of ideals by Stirner. By his very nature and certainly by his Left Hegelian tradition Marx is an idealist and a fighter against the existing order; but Stirner spoiled the game for him by showing that such an idealism contradicts the intrinsic logic of the profanization of Absolute Knowledge and therefore cannot be justified. The much discussed ambiguity which obtains between Marx, the determinist, who later speaks of laws and

tendencies which work "with iron necessity towards inevitable results," 1/ and even condones an interpretation according to which he would have considered social developments as a "process of natural history, 2/ and Marx the voluntarist, who his whole life incited the proletariat to rebellion and occasionally even organized secret associations supposed to carry out revolutions, is the outcome of this very problem. For it would be much too easy to claim that in March, 1845, Marx still wanted to change the world, while several months later he already believed that the world would change by itself. As we have seen, Marx always had the

2

tendency to translate the Left Hegelians' revolutionary mentality into objective laws; already in his dissertation he had spoken of a "psychological law" in terms of which spirit in certain situations becomes an "energy."

- 1/ MEW XXIII, 12; tr. Aveling-Moore, I, 8 ff.
2/ Ibid. 26; tr. Aveling-Moore, 1, 18

Lobkowitz p. 413. (25)

On the other hand, the activistic spirit certainly is not completely absent from the German Ideology. For Marx argues there against the Left Hegelians as follows:

Since according to their fantasy the relationships of men, all their goings on, their chains, and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical, or egoistic consciousness and thus of removing

limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret the existing order (das Bestehende) in another way, that is, to recognize it by means of another interpretation. The Young Hegelian ideologists... are the staunchest conservatives. 1/

1/ MEW III, 20; tr. Pascal, 6.

Lobkowitz. p.414

(26)

Since we have seen that Marx no longer asks us to pursue ideals but rather predicts their more or less automatic actualization, this certainly is a very curious criticism. For Marx's objection amounts to saying that the Left Hegelians are willing to change only their ideas about the world, not the world itself. But as we just saw, Marx himself does not want to change the world either; he believes to have discovered that it does change. Thus it is somewhat difficult to see why from his point of view the Left Hegelians should be called

"conservatives" rather than simply fanciful dreamers, for example. As he is not inviting to action but rather speaking about its necessary development, Marx intends to change reality even less than the Left Hegelians, who at least wanted to change it by developing their ideas; moreover Marx's "materialistic conception of history" is in a sense nothing but a change of consciousness, namely, a new theory of reality and thus a new "recognition of the existing order by means of another interpretation." The only real difference between Marx and the other Left Hegelians consists in that the latter pretended to save the world by changing their ideas, while Marx

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has reached an idea no longer to be changed, which amounts to saying that the world saves itself independently of philosophical speculations.

Lobkowicz. p.414/5 ①

I may do well to add that the point under discussion has to my mind nothing to do with the question as to whether according to Marx man is free or not, that is, whether Marx is a determinist with respect to human freedom. To be more precise, Marx's translation of "moral postulates" into "historical laws," of the ought into an is, might quite well be compatible with the claim that individuals have free will and thus are responsible for their actions. As long as it is not linked with a materialistic theory of being, as it is in the case in Engels' Anti-Dühring and



Dialectics of Nature, Marx's "materialistic conception of history" simply amounts to saying that human freedom is not unlimited -- an obvious truth which no one ever denied. That philosophical conceptions and legal patterns are determined by socio-economic conditions, or that the ideals which people pursue are "materially prescribed," by itself only amounts to saying that the sphere of truly free human acts is somewhat more limited than people usually believe. It does not amount to saying that there exists no free will. As contemporary Marxist-Leninists rightly point out, 1/ a historical

2

necessity (and be it ever so "iron") might very well be "statistical" in nature, that is, apply and therefore also be verifiable only with respect to relatively long periods of time and a relatively great number of individuals -- and thus be perfectly compatible with what ordinarily is called "free will."

1/ E.g. Filosofskaja Eneiklopedija (Moscow, 1960 ff.) the article "Determinism," 1, 466 b.

Lobkowicz. p. 415

One must indeed be careful to distinguish these two points. On the one hand, Marx counters Stirner's challenge by declaring that the Left Hegelian ideals and their revolutionary drive are but an alienated expression of a dynamics immanent to real history itself. On the other hand, however, he does not describe this dynamics of history in such a way as to make of history an organism which develops independently of what people do. Rather he argues that because of their "physical organization"... and their consequent relation to the rest of nature," 1/ human individuals act



in a definite way and thus set history going in a certain direction. To put it in other terms, even though history does not depend upon man's conscious intentions, it depends, and thoroughly so, upon what humans do. The question as to whether people acting in this way deserve to be called "free" in the sense of having a "free will" obviously does not interest Marx; what interests him is the (alleged) fact that their actions as well as the rationality inherent to these actions are not dependent upon the ideas and ideals which people make up for themselves.
1/ MEW III, 21; tr. Pascal, 7.

Lobkowics p. 416

(24)

The materialistic teaching concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that the circumstances are 1/ changed by men and that the educator himself must be educated. This teaching therefore is bound to split society into two parts, one of which is above 2/ taking seriously society. 2/

The coinciding of the changing of circumstances and human activity, or self-changing, can only be expressed and rationally understood as revolutionary practice. 3/



1/ ... dass die Umstände von den Menschen verändert und der Erzieher selbst erzogen werden muss. After 'verändert' there obviously is a word missing; as the 'muss' at the end of the sentence is singular, it cannot also refer to the plural in 'Umstände.' We do not know whether Marx would have inserted 'werden' or 'müssen,' that is, whether he meant to say that the circumstances are changed by men or ought to be changed by men.

2/ What Marx seems to mean by this odd sentence (supposing that one really has to read 'ihr' as referring to 'Gesellschaft,' not 'ihn'

2.

which then would refer to 'Teil'), is this: the materialists who consider men determined by circumstances have to consider their own ideas (and thus themselves who oppose the given order) outside society, outside the historical determinants.

3/ MEW III, 5 ff.

Lobkowitz. p. 417

(30)
Rather his point seems to be that materialists such as the philosophers of the French Enlightenment, who considered man a creature of circumstances and education, miss a crucial point by overlooking the fact that circumstances and education are not natural entities like climate or food but for the most part are created by man himself. As Marx puts it in the German Ideology, "circumstances make men as much as men make circumstances." 1/

1/ MEW III, 38; tr. Pascal, 29

(31)

Lobkowicz. p. 417

History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, deposits (Kapitalien), the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding ones, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other hand, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity. 1/

1/ MEW III, 45; tr. Pascal, 38

(32)

Lobkowicz. p. 417/8

Thus all revolutionary-minded economists and philosophers consider their own programs as something outside history and society; as they cannot very well explain their revolutionary ideas in terms of the circumstances which they fight against, they have to assume that, unlike all other conceptions, their own ideas are independent of circumstances, education, and the like. Marx, on the contrary, can argue that his ideals are as determined by the circumstances as these circumstances determine



the limited and unredeemed man of today; as ~~it is man himself who created the circumstances~~ the latter are embodied praxis, and thus at one and the same time the source of all evils and the preconditions of future salvation, the inhumanity of the present and the embodied ideal of a more human future.

Lobkowitz p. 418 (33)

It is in this perspective that the expression 'revolutionary practice' must be understood. Marx is far from suggesting "that human beings cannot change the world without changing themselves, and that actual social struggles... are the best school for acquiring an education in social realities" 1/; in any case he is far from advancing the imperatives which such an interpretation suggests.

1/ Hook, 289

Lobkowitz p. 418. (34)

His point simply is that human practice is revolutionary by its very nature. It is what men do that is decisive in history, not what they do by willfully engaging in social struggles aimed at destroying the existing order, but rather what they constantly and inevitably do as determined by what past generations have done. In other words, the fact that men are dependent upon their circumstances and nevertheless constantly succeed in overthrowing them can only mean that human practice by its very nature leads to and results in an overthrow of existing circum-

stances and the creation of new and less
"limited" ones. ~~This is why in the German~~
Ideology Marx without further ado identifies
"material practice" and "revolution" 1/; far
from arguing that man should rise and overthrow
existing conditions, he argues that "material
practice" necessarily does overthrow them.

1/ Cf. MEW III, 38; tr. Pascal, 28ff., where
there is a clear parallel between "explaining
practice from the idea" and "criticism as the
moving force of history," on the one hand, and
"explaining the formation of ideas from material
practice" and "revolution as the moving force of
history," on the other hand.

Lobkowitz. p. 418/9

(49)

Of course one will immediately have to add that
when he speaks in this way of a "material
practice," Marx has more in mind than only
labor or even production in the wide sense of
the term. As far as it seems evident, there is
nowhere in his writings anything resembling a
definition of 'Praxis'; in fact, considering
how central this notion is to his thought, one
time and again is astonished to see how rela-
tively seldom Marx uses it. But it is not too
difficult to gather from the German Ideology
what Marx means by 'Praxis!' It might be

described as a relatively homogeneous human ~~activity which can take on many different~~ forms; it may range from bodily labor of the most humble sort to political revolutions; and it may be anything in between as long as it results in a transformation of mind-independent realities which entails a humanization of man.

Lobkowitz. p. 420

Marx himself would of course object, even if we were to rephrase the question and ask, In terms of which norms is a practice "critical" and "revolutionary," that is, humanizing? For he believes to have demonstrated a fact as opposed to which all norms and ideals are insignificant, namely, "that the contemporary individuals necessarily will (müssen) abolish private property, since the productive forces have developed so far that under the rule of private property they have become a destructive force, and since the opposition of classes has been carried to ultimate extremes." 1/ But may



one not simply ask, then, what the expression
~~'revolutionary practice'~~ means?

1/ MEW III, 424.

Lobkowicz. p. 421

(41)

Marx has landed himself in a hopeless dilemma which has haunted his more intelligent disciples until today. This dilemma may be summed up as follows: if ideals play no genuine role in history, it hardly is meaningful to speak of a revolutionary practice and, in fact, to be a revolutionary or even "progressive" at all. Practice in this case is as little "revolutionary" as biological evolution or the movement of stars. On the other hand, if there really exists a truly "revolutionary," critical-practical activity," as Marx suggests in the first of the "Theses on

Feuerbach," then not only must it be possible to be guided by some ideals but moreover there must exist some norms, an ought which transcends existing reality more radically than the "consciousness of existing Praxis" to which Marx in the German Ideology reduces all theoretical consciousness. 1/

1/ MEW III, 31; tr. Pascal, 20

Lobkowicz. p. 422

(48)

Of course in the German Ideology Marx still is inconsistent enough not to carry his ideas to their ultimate logical conclusions. Thus he writes that while Feuerbach knows only a theoretician's relationship to the world, for real man and his exponent, "the practical materialist, that is, communist, the point is to revolutionize the existing world, of practically attacking and changing given things."1/ This statement about what the real man, in particular the proletariat, does, is of course perfectly compatible with the "materialistic

conception of history." But insofar as Marx ~~expresses this idea as an imperative, a~~ request to "attack" and to "change" the existing world, he clearly contradicts his own basic conception. Or perhaps it would be better to say, not that he contradicts himself, but rather that passages such as the one just quoted once more reveal the basic ambiguity of "historical materialism." If ideas formed in the human mind are "materially prescribed," nothing but the expression of objective necessities, then there is no need to urge people to be "practical," to act. On the other hand, if there really is a "point"

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in purposefully revolutionizing the existing world, if it matters whether people "practically attack and change given things" -- that is, freely decide to do it rather than do it under the pressure of existing circumstances -- then undoubtedly there must exist ideals which are more than only a reflection of circumstances themselves.

1/ MEW III, 42; tr. Pascal, 33.

Lobkowitz. p. 423/4

In other words, Marx accuses the author of the Essence of Christianity of overlooking the fact that virtually everything which man may contemplate today has been generated by human activities in the past. Feuerbach certainly was right in emphasizing against Hegel and the Hegelians that the really real is the empirical, the immediate, the sensuously given. But contrary to Hegel, who had grasped that everything except bare nature is a creation of man, Feuerbach is so fascinated by the "natural" as opposed to the

"historical" that he forgets that even the ~~objects of the simplest sense certainty are~~ given to human observation only through "social development, industry, and commercial intercourse."

Lobkowitz. p. 425

(50)

For Marx's claim that all economic, social, legal, and political patterns are results and sediments of human practice permits him to describe man's ultimate completion, communism, as a situation where all circumstances will be "liquidated," that is, brought thoroughly under man's conscious control, and thus no longer will be "circumstances" properly speaking. Even though Marx's conception is as contemplative as that of Feuerbach, it predicts a social formation in which history will no longer be



something which one merely has to watch
(for presently one can "make" it only quite
incidentally), but rather something which
one performs with the same ease and self-
aware spontaneity with which a great artist
creates his masterpiece.

(51)
Lobkowicz. p. 425/6

Communism differs from all previous
movements in that it overturns the basis of
all previous relations of production and
intercourse and for the first time conscious-
ly treats all natural (natürwüchsige)
presuppositions as creatures of previous men,
strips them of their natural character, and
subjugates them under the power of united
individuals.... in communist society where
nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity
but each can become accomplished in any
branch he wishes, society makes it possible



for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic. 1/

1/ MEW III, 70 and 33; tr. Pascal, 70 and 22.

(52)

Lobkowitz. p. 426

Of course the proletariat eventually will knock down capitalist society with all its institutions. But it cannot possibly do so before its time has come, and even then it will do so mainly, not because someone incited it to rebellion, but rather because it is driven by a "conscious awareness of a necessity." "If the material elements of a total revolution... are not given, it is absolutely irrelevant to the practical development whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred

times already -- as the history of
communism proves." 1/

1/ MEW III, 38 ff; tr. Pascal 29 ff.

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~~Hess had given to Marx the idea that money
ought to be treated in terms of Feuerbach's
concept of alienation. Engels' article, in
turn, suggested to Marx the idea of
transferring this scheme from monetary
matters to the economically most important
phenomenon of the time -- the separation of
labor and capital, which, being the cause of
society's division into capitalists and
proletarians, had to be the ultimate root of
the "social atomism" of the present.~~
