

F 16

250

Robert A. Holt The Development of the

Primary Process, A Structural View, Pp. 106-110
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Psy. essays in memory of David Rapaport.

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theor. proposition: "... how the more or less rational, realistic thinking of normal adults is replaced by credible, more fantastical forms and fluid forms of ideation, this change for the relative dominance of the sec. proc. to that of the pr. pr. in the regressive conditions of a developmental regression." (1)

"... primary process itself is the product of considerable development." (2)

251

" Being scientifically a child of the mid-nineteenth century, Freud found explanations unsatisfactory unless they were stated in terms of forces and energies (cf. Holt 1963). He had been trained by his admired teacher, Brücke, to regard the regard dynamic as economic concepts as the ultimate explanatory resources of science; accordingly he developed a steady bias away from structure concepts in favor of energy. Nowhere is this imbalance more apparent than in his treatment of the various forms of thinking" (3)

252. Freud "usually equated p.p. with condensation & replacement viewed as economic concepts, even offering as equivalent phrases "primary process (mobility of c. forces)" (Freud 1915 c. p. 187) (2)

"The terms primary and secondary process as described by Freud is the interpretation of the refusal of notes of discharge of psychic energy." (Bauer, 1985 a, p. 19.) 39.

253 [Freud's Metapsychology a concept of bridge between psyche & psychology. But not the most fruitful way. Dismiss just like ~~classical~~ ~~theory~~ ~~of~~ ~~metapsychology~~ or the difficulties arising from blending.

254 "The economic characteristics of the primary process is that the energies involved are uninhibited, free, and not neutralized whereas those of the secondary process are inhibited, bound, and neutralized." (follows definition of these terms.) 3

255 [What did Freud not deal with sufficiently:
 1) Affects & emotions (rational & irrational passions, active & passive, see Buddha, Spinoza, etc.
 2) How does the lib. become con.? Process, conditions and effect.



256. Critique of Neo Freudian:

- 1) No theory of Passions (I changed slowly)
- 2) ... of culture
- 3) neglect of situational, w/ favor of realistic circumstances.

257. Primary process in Rosencell. 4

258. General critique of doctrine of psychic energy. (see Rubinstein Ch. 2; Holt 1965 a & in press. 4)

259. If cathexis, libido, and similar economic concepts are to keep the name of energy, as if metapsychology is to be the kind of theory that Freud had in mind. Then to model it on physicalistic physiology, (cf. Holt 1963, 1965 a), it must contain some conceptualization of what it is that generates energy, transmits or conducts it, stores it, transforms it, or finally uses it to work. "Psy. theory has been strangely silent about structures, laying most of its analytic theoretical emphasis on energies without specifying much about the non-energetic arrangements necessarily implied. Part of the reason for this silence, I believe, is that in Freud's original theories, the structures were explicitly neurological, but then he decided to give up - at least temporarily -

259 (cont.) The attempt to neurologize, the psychic structure hypothesized in the topographical model of the VII. Chapter was unconformably vague, metaphorical, and unspecific. Rapaport did more than any other theorist I know of to emphasize the theoretical importance of structure in psychoanalysis, yet he did not provide a satisfactory definition either. Rebinstein (Ch. 2) is right, I believe, in arguing that ps. will ultimately have to develop new proto-neurophysiological concepts of structure. For the present, the essentially metaphorical concept implied by existing metapsychology can be used if it is interpreted proto-neurophysiologically. (5)

260. Pr. p. not random chaos, it has a purpose logic of its own.

261. Danger of reifying the structural concepts of metapsychology (Benes 1965 B.) - (4)

262. Critique of the concept of condensation. Is it really different of what happens in any waking thought? Cf. Botanical monograph dream. Both associations mean, that without them the dream would not have been dream? Rowlands "grass bean" = green a bear shaped (9)



263. Use examples for Poetry, or Shakespeare & explain "primary thought."
264. Psycho. mechanism use of a structured network of memories: the dense organization of memories.
cf. Freud 1900 p. 543.
"The thought process based on dense-organization of memory ... [is] conceptualized as the 'primary process.' (Rapaport 1951 a, 693 f.)"
265. The non-arbitrariness of many condensations and displacements requires structural explanations.
266. Freud: "The directions in which condensations in dreams proceed is determined ... [in part] by the rational-preconscious relations of the dream thoughts" (1900, p. 596).
267. "The fact that the content of images is affected in certain types of condensations argues that a structural as not merely an economic explanation of primary process is needed." (1901 Dr. of yellow beard. I Dr. p. 322 ft)

268. "It use for defense requires that there be mechanisms (i.e. structures) of the primary process." (11)
269. "Dreams often contain repeated elements despite a remarkable coincidence without structural means of dream work. (12)
270. "Neurotic symptoms typically involve forms of primary-process." (12)
271. Symbolism. When Freud first spoke of symbol "it was applied to any portion of an experience (usually a traumatic one) that later was used to stand for the totality.
"Freud hypothesized repression clearly takes place by the help of symbolization -- of displacement on to other memories"
(Project, 1895 p. 409 f.) 13
- Freud: "... representation of a symbol is among the indirect methods of representation" - but one must not together all forms of repr indirect representation. (1900, p. 351
(14)



272. Freud stressed the racial incontinence of
primitive ideas, (unconscious) / symbols.
Was.
273. Freud was reluctant to state that
symbols are displacements.
274. Holt: "... the great majority of symbols
refer to sexual organs and activities."
(42)
275. Freud: nothing occurs to a person
under analysis in response to
symbols" (Freud 1916-17, p. 149.
(For what idea symbol is displacement
see Gill ch. 7.
276. "I propose therefore that we consider sym-
bolism as a special case of displacement, with
the following characteristics: A symbol is
a socially shared or structured dis-
placement-substitute." (14)
277. Beres 1965 (p. 16): "The so-called universal
symbols... are created anew by each
person out of his own perceptions and experiences.
Their universality comes from the common experience
of all men share."
278. "... there is no necessity to assume that any peculiar
symbolizing activity of the mind is operating
in the dream-work... dreams make use
of any symbolizations that are already present in
the unconscious thinking". (Freud, 1900, 349)



279. Form of symbol : other form of expression
needs.

280

~~279~~

Freud, description of the id (1933 p. 73)

"a chaos, a cauldron full of
seething expectations" "It has no
organization, produces no collective
will, but only a striving to bring about
the satisfaction of the instinctual needs
subject to the observance of the pleasure
principle. The Copernican laws of thought
do not apply in the id, and this is true above
all of the law of contradiction." "There
is no negation, no concept of time,
"the id of course knows no judgment of
value, no good and evil, no morality...
instinctual caresses seeking discharge -
that, in our view, is all there is in the id."
ibid. p. 73 (18) text

281. It shows that id is a mixture of pre-scientific,
artistic, archaic thinking; simply
all that is not scientific thought (post-Re-
naissance!)

282. But, in Freud's writings a far-reaching
amount of structure is attributed to the id (18)

See: Freud "a model of perceptual organization". It detects with extraordinary acuteness

283. Gill's definition of ego - id as continuum (20)
284. At beginning of life undifferentiated plane
↑ "simple undifferentiated form of cognitive function, that is, not yet either primary or secondary process." (20.) (points purely logical argument.)
285. Project's of cognition at earliest plane. (21)
286. "The baby as preverbal child ... does not strike me as being psychotic, as he would if his mental life consisted solely of primary processes." (21)
287. ↑ baby, not yet fully developed ~~form of~~ perception of reality. Gradually increasing.
288. ↑ Ad problem of identity. Reamine Erikson's definition as slow deeper dimension.
289. "If even psychic life approaches the truly death, it must at the beginning of life; and the central point of my argument is the proposition that primary process is not synonymous with chaos, or random error." (22)

290. First months of life: the consciousness of the child consists entirely of perception, an object exists for him solely as "things-of-action" & he can not be conceived or imaged separately from action on him, a process he (Bruner (1964) calls enactive representation." (22)
291. Piaget, in 8th months, reports observation "that he has directly suggests the primary process" & a moment later is followed by novel result "In a magical fiction he tries to perpetuate his novelties by applying indiscriminately the schemata with which he was successful in particular cases" (Piaget 1936 p. 200) (23)
292. ^{also} Early thinking of child is best seen in terms of his lack of sufficient knowledge: Berlin's (narcissistic) element in magical thinking, for pre-scientific mode of managing. (see 293)
293. Wolf pointed out (1960 p. 98): "Despite these magical characteristics, the sensori motor behaviors of the third stage are the basis for later objective reality adaptation. "Psychoanalysis... has not so far explored the possibility that p.p. functions may play a role in reality adaptation, as has not shown in systematic fashion how the p.p. functions may actually prepare the way for later s.p. functions." (p. 116)

294. Child's tendency to revert to magic " whenever he is confronted by insoluble tasks or he intends to solve " (Wolff 1960 p. 140)
295. (ad 294.) Adult too tends to return to magic if he has to or wants to solve insoluble task.
296. Principle: In general man has the equipment to solve the task he is confronted with. When this is not so, anxiety arises.
297. Sense of reality develops together with increasing capacity of managing reality. This is dependent on developing development of ORR process. Merged thinking corresponds to premital stage of ORR. Cf. Comas in di'ev'ed or social development.
298. I. E. & Wolff reasons for these findings of Piaget; that Freud's account of the origins of ideation can not be true. Wolff rejects of early infantile hallucination on the additional ground that it implies the capacity to conceive or represent an absent object without some kind of action on it (26)
299. Holt's hypothesis: "Primary process develops out of frustrated goal seeking."



300. Freud (Totem & Taboo): tattoos are part of "a broad system of thought ... the animistic theory of the world," formed under the influence of synthetic functioning." (1913, p. 77.)
301. Rapaport did not question Freud's assumption (that any kind of organizing or synthesizing was ex facto an aspect of secondary process."
302. Magic thinking is "kind of synthetic function." (29) cf. predictive reasoning (hallmark of schizophrenia, Domarus (1944) & Arcti (1944 1955) is kind of autistic logic
- 303 "... various of synthetic functioning are not necessarily an exclusive characteristic of the secondary pr. as contribute something more elemental and inescapably human. Give an immature organism insufficient information, our imperfect tools of thought, but assume an insistent need for some kind of closure - especially in the service of the quickest attainment of pleasure - and you have the necessary raw materials for the development of a p.p. The very prematurity of an attempt to make sense out of the world will guarantee that it will generate false modes of thought, short-circuited logic, and a crude kind of purposiveness, which permits the dove-aimed slide to reality necessary, in intermediate steps to eroticization.

304. "... indoctrination into consolidated and extended forms of the primary process; a cultural transmission of ways to dream, to fantasize, consciously and unconsciously ..."
"cultural styles of primary process"
(20:30)

305 / Piaget's emphasis on "enactive representation" that the subjective part of the experience was not separate from but an integral part of a total motor sensory sensorimotor functioning; to be connected with problem of work as Koyhl.

306. Individual styles of p.p. (31)

307. // " Elsewhere (Holt 1965 a, b,) I have discussed the need for a radical re-orientation of the psychoanalytic theory of drives, based firmly on clinical observation rather than outmoded physiological models of tension-reduction ...
... rejecting the conception that the central process in motivation is the build-up of accumulated energy or tension, which then "discharges" in consummatory behavior."

308 "The motivational conception implicit in the recent neuroanatomical or neurophysiological work is far from any of Freud's theories of instinctual drives, however" (34)

309. unpleasant episodes in 2 ms. old baby;
dream, as whole or fragmentary nightmares.
"- it is difficult to remember such
unpleasant contents with the primitive model." (35)

310 / Study actus of child's dreams

311. "In the waking state of consciousness, the
infant of a few weeks is almost wholly
lacking in autonomy for the environment;
he is captured by objects. . . ."

late appearance of the capacity (imagine
something that is not perceptually present
... it seems to develop only well with the
second year." (35.)

312. But it is an unwarranted extension of
Piaget's observation to conclude that is not
possible during the first year in sleep. (cf. Studies
of visual attention in infants during first
weeks of life (Fantz 1964; Hershenson et al 1965
see ch. 8 for brief survey.

"...looking schemata develop a good deal
more rapidly than has been supposed". . . ."

313. "dreaming would be, from its inception a
sensorimotor matter with gradually increasing
phenomenal content." ^{2nd} chapter



314. Around 18 mos. (Volf Ch. 8) does achieve
autonomy in his perceptual environment.
(37/)

315. When Freud "yet then he [Freud] came to
fit these discoveries [meaning of dreams etc.]
into his metapsychology, Freud gravitated
& an explanation in terms of energies. It is
paradoxically but necessarily denied all of
the stability he had so painstakingly elucidated.
The more explicit he was in stating the
economic theory of free (or mobile) cathexis,
the more it degenerated toward the entropic
image of "a ~~chaos~~ chaos, a cauldron of
seeking excitation."

"If, however, we turn from dynamic
and economic explanations to a structural
theory, we can conceptualize the primary process
as a special system of processing information
in the service of a synthetic necessity. It must
therefore presuppose the operation of stable structures,
and it must be the product of considerable
development." (38/)

316. ¶ Kierkegaard in Sartre's The Possessed: "If God did not exist, everything would be allowed."
Sartre: "That is the point of departure of Existentialism."
Freud begins here too. How can man be moral without God. The instrument in the eye is super-ego who fight against the individual drive. This is Freud's system is a last attempt to show how one can be a virtuous bourgeois with God - the whole description of the inner mechanism of man serves that purpose. Man has it within himself to fight the evil. (repression!)

317. ¶ Freud was not the spokesman for the pleasure principle - but of the moral of a curbed pleasure in the name of civilization, however with a nostalgic sentiment of having lost so much by giving up sin.