

The worst calamity that can happen to man is "to feel himself utterly outcast and alone."¹ Flugel cites the immense relief of the child who has offended and then been forgiven by his parents, even at the cost of previous punishment. Something similar is true, he adds, of the "adult sinner" when he has been taken back into the fold of church or society. This continuing need for approval is "probably to a very large extent a continuation into adolescent and adult life of the young child's need for the approval of his parents."² Citing various authorities, Flugel says they all agree "that man's need of social support is due at bottom to an attitude that he inevitably acquires during his long defenceless infancy . . ."³

The logic of this point in Flugel's argument would seem to require him to say something like the following. It takes man a long time to develop and grow up. During that period he is necessarily dependent on his parents for care and love, although he should be decreasingly so. When he offends, he offends his parents at first; later, he offends his Ego-Ideal. But as he grows older, he ought to be able to rely on the Ego-Ideal without necessarily having current support from parents or other authorities. This he does in ideal instances. But for the most part his continued need for social approval, and therefore by implication for the fellowship out of which social approval may come, is not altogether or perhaps even primarily an expression of spontaneous desire for social relationship, but is instead a com-

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 56.

³Ibid., pp. 56-57.

pulsive compensation against the Ego-Ideal's never having developed properly, including assimilation into conscious awareness. So stated, Flugel's position becomes an interesting warning against considering all forms of desire for fellowship as being of the same order and motivation. On the other hand, his position represents an excess of suspicion against the spontaneity of a social interest.

But the Ego-Ideal is by no means exhausted yet. Indeed, it has conflicts within itself. These conflicts may come about through different attitudes in the parents.¹ Or parents may alternate between "loving" and "thwarting" in capricious and unpredictable ways; and the child may then project all this onto "good" and "bad" figures in the outside world, representing the "good" and "bad" aspects of his parents. A third way in which conflicts may come is that the Super-Ego of the child, and the Ego-Ideal as a part of it, may be derived from the Super-Egos of the parents rather than from the parental Egos. That is to say, the parents will react to the children not as the parents' own Egos want them to, but in the way their own Super-Egos compel them to do. This is a somewhat mythological way, we may suggest, of pointing to an important fact--that a parent, guilty, may suggest more solicitude than he feels, or that, angry, he may communicate more of this feeling to the child than his overt behavior suggests. Children's reactions to overt adult behavior often appear disproportionate, because they may be more proportionate to the adult's underlying feelings.

¹Ibid., p. 59.

A fourth source of Super-Ego and Ego-Ideal conflict comes from the fact that some aspects of conduct are entirely forbidden the child, e.g., sex play. If such prohibitions are strictly enforced, great effort of restraint may be required in the child, and he may also be aware that similar restraint is not required of the parents though this fact often becomes repressed. When the effort of the child has been severe, it may later prove much more difficult to alter this type of feeling and thinking. In that case, the conflict may be between more archaic and less dissociated levels of the Super-Ego and the Ego-Ideal.¹ One of Flugel's illustrations demonstrates the meaning of this point. There was a young man who, from his learned and bookish father, took over the ideal of learning and of wide reading. But he could not concentrate on reading; and in spite of standing for hours in front of bookstores, could not bring himself to buy or to read the books which he felt it his duty to examine. The explanation, says Flugel, is that he suffered an inhibition against knowing what his father knew, because he once was forbidden to know what his father knew about sex. When the young man's efforts were directed toward reading in fields far from those of his father's interest, he had no trouble.

Even when the Ego-Ideal and the Ego appear to be in harmony, and one has no conscious sense of strain between one's attitudes and his conduct, there may still be conflicts within the Super-Ego, i.e., between the Ego-Ideal so far as it has

¹Ibid., p. 62.

become conscious and the rest of the Super-Ego which has not.

Flugel cites a study in which subjects were asked to give facts on their own conduct, and then to give their opinion on general principles of conduct.¹ Even when there was no sensing of discrepancy by the subjects, such a fact was often revealed. This indicates that a Super-Ego conflict may emerge into consciousness as a fact, even if it is not so recognized by the person. To put it another way, the degree of the actual conflict and the sense of discrepancy do not necessarily coincide.²

The so-called "mechanisms of defense" are to be understood as performing a function in relation to the Ego-Ideal, that is, they are to prevent the Ego from falling or appearing to fall below the standard required by the Ego-Ideal. Briefly reviewed by Flugel, who cites Anna Freud's categorization of them, they are as follows: (1) compensation, striving to produce a quality because one suspects he does not have it; (2) reaction-formation, development of an opposite trait, as prudery to cover extreme sexual curiosity; (3) "restriction of the Ego," in effect not producing or not trying so that we can not be judged and found wanting; (4) "identification with the aggressor," becoming like the person who is feared so we need not fear him; (5) "altruistic surrender," taking pleasure in the successes of others while eschewing any for ourselves, a Cyrano motif. In the Freudian

¹S. Brahmachari, Moral Attitudes in Relation to Upbringing, Personal Adjustment and Social Opinion (London: Unpublished Dissertation, University of London, 1937).

²Flugel, op. cit., p. 65.

catalogue, there are of course many other mechanisms for defense of the Ego, or of the Ego's appearance, such as repression, displacement, sublimation and the like. But those cited above are of later discovery, Flugel points out, and are all concerned with preventing the Ego from appearing to fall too far below the level of the Ego-Ideal; and are therefore of special concern to an understanding of morals.¹

The Aggression of the Super-Ego

Flugel then turns to the second main section of his treatise, on the aggression within the Super-Ego. Along with the discovery of the unconscious factors in morals, this fact of aggression is considered the cardinal moral discovery of psychoanalysis. To clarify the context in which the succeeding discussion takes place, we may comment from the outside on Flugel's concept of aggression itself. We have already indicated that Flugel rejects a purely instinctivistic theory of aggression, inclining to a more social view in which aggression is called forth by the situation.

But this is not the sole problem requiring comment in order to understand Flugel's general concept of aggression. To him aggression is any motive, impulse, act or feeling moving against something or someone, and this may include the self. With such a sweeping concept, we may expect that distinctions between, for instance, a hostile moving against some thing and an expansion of the self in which something is moved against in-

¹Ibid., pp. 69-74.

identally may become blurred. As a matter of fact, the concept of aggression in later more orthodox psychoanalysis has been expanded in much the same way that the concept of sexuality was expanded in early years. This may or may not be justified. But it is confusing in direct proportion to our failure to recognize what is occurring.

To return to exposition of Flugel, the element of aggression would not be of the same concern for morals if it were not capable of being turned against the self, what may be called "nemesism."¹ Once this has occurred, the Super-Ego becomes cruel, negative and restrictive in its dealings with the Ego; so that the relations between Super-Ego and Ego are through hate not through love.

The arousal of aggression in the child, as "anger and revolt against the frustrating parent figures," is inevitable because parents "inevitably frustrate their children in some degree," because the child is too weak to stand up against them, and because the child also loves the parents. Once aroused, something must be done with this aggression. Since the other devices and psychic mechanisms (like repression) which are available to the child are few, it is especially likely that the child will turn it in against himself.² This accounts for the fact that many children become not just compliant but over-obedient, perhaps making themselves suffer because of the unacceptable aggressive feelings, or else getting back at some one through over-obedience

¹ Ibid., p. 75.

² Ibid., p. 77.

while enjoying "a relative freedom from the fear and guilt that a direct and straightforward indulgence in his aggression might entail."¹ This may be accomplished by making the other person feel guilty, or may deprive the other person of the chance to express aggression.²

Whatever the reason or reasons for the difference, some people develop with more tendency to turn aggression on themselves than others. These tendencies, or their absence, become a fixed part of character. Flugel quotes the findings of Saul Rosenzweig, whose experiments were designed to test this point. People were given an extremely difficult puzzle. The "extrapunitives" tended to deny that the failure in completing the puzzle was due to them; the "intropunitives" tended to ascribe the failure to themselves; and the "impunitives" tended rapidly to forget they had ever worked on the puzzle.³

All this leads to the conclusion that "the more we repress our aggression the more likely is this aggression to turn against ourselves and . . . to ally itself with moral tendencies."⁴ And ". . . the severity of the Super-Ego may be altogether out of proportion to that of the real parental authority."⁵ When parents are harsh, children may be able to express some resentment and thus get rid of some aggression. But when parents are apparently loving (but not actually so underneath), it becomes more difficult

¹Ibid., p. 82.

²Ibid.

³Henry A. Murray, et al., Explorations in Personality (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938).

⁴Flugel, op. cit., p. 86.

⁵Ibid., p. 87.

for the child to express aggression, hence the greater likelihood of its being turned in.¹ We may put this point in common sense language by suggesting that, in the face of open rejection or harsh treatment, a child may be in conflict with his environment but he will see it straight and hence not have inner conflict within himself; but if he gets outward love but inner harshness, or hypocritical rejection, he will develop inner conflict. Whether or not he develops aggression if he receives real affection is not discussed by Flugel.

The whole process whereby aggression may be turned inwards and then put "in the service of morality" may be very valuable for man if it occurs in moderation; for it is an ingenious device for making man fit for social life. If man expressed all his aggressions directly and openly, social life would be impossible. And this becomes all the more interesting from a moral point of view because the forms of aggression against the self may become institutionalized. If asceticism be understood generically as the "capacity to turn one's own aggressiveness inwards and then to put it in the service of morality," then there are several forms of it, more or less useful, more or less institutionalized.

There is "utilitarian asceticism," the endurance of a temporary frustration for the sake of some foreseeable goal, conscious and rational waiting.² "Disciplinary asceticism" is similar but with a longer time span; besides, with the longer time, there is likelihood of coming to believe that the pain

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 89.

itself, originally instrumental, is an end in itself. Third, there is "Epicurean asceticism," in which some previous suffering becomes necessary if one is to enjoy a satisfaction, e.g., one would be acutely uncomfortable if he passed an examination without going through a requisite amount of suffering in preparing for it.

In the three other forms of asceticism distinguished by Flugel, the nemesistic element is more pronounced. There is "masochistic asceticism," in which suffering somehow is enjoyed for its own sake; "punitive asceticism," in which punishment is inflicted on oneself to free one of guilt, and this may be institutionalized in rituals; and finally, "aggressive asceticism," in which there is a simple recoil of aggression against the self, without the pleasure element of the masochistic or the moral elements of the disciplinary and punitive.

Indeed, so much do men tend to believe that deprivation and suffering are self-sufficient ends in themselves that man "might just as truthfully be called a pain-seeking as a pleasure-seeking animal."¹ This conclusion, we can readily see, certainly turns hedonism on its head. But it is far from being an adequate explanation of the pleasure-pain problem. For the capacity or predilection to seek pain is clearly learned in the social matrix, according to Flugel. Is this also true of pleasure? A truly social theory would have to assert it as true in some measure of both. Flugel's point, the pain-seeking, needs, therefore, to be

¹ Ibid., p. 94.

understood not as a complete statement, but as a corrective even of concealed hedonism in motivational theories.

One aspect of nemesism has not yet been mentioned, its capacity so to blur psychic vision that there is identification of self with some one else, i.e., that a hated person may become introjected and thus hated through self-hatred.¹ Freud thought of the development of this mainly in terms of parents; love parent and lose him, introject the parent, then hate the person through hating oneself. If this is true, then "the character of an individual being thus in considerable measure is determined by his past history of abandoned love objects."²

For an understanding of nemesism, it is necessary also to explore the nature of masochism. Although Flugel at this point cites Freud and many others, he does not himself take a clear position except for this statement, that the clue to both sadism and masochism must be found not in special qualities of sense experience but "in a particular conative attitude."³ This tends toward circular reasoning, saying little more than that we experience the infliction or reception of pain as pleasurable if we are prepared by the whole context to do so.

We can only approach Flugel's theory through his discussion of the theories of others. Freud had three successive theories, Flugel says. The first (1905) looked on sadism and masochism as more or less independent members of a list of component in-

¹Ibid., p. 95.

²Ibid., p. 96.

³Ibid., p. 99.

instincts.¹ The second (1915) saw sadism as primary, and masochism as sadism turned against the self.² The third (1924) saw masochism as primary, as the death instinct in simpler form, and sadism when this is turned outward.³ Flugel seems to consider all three theories as inadequate. He rejects the death instinct as lacking decision.⁴ He cites Freud's three forms of masochism; erotogenic, feminine, and moral. Flugel believes the feminine a mistake, that the connection of masochism and femininity is sociologically not biologically determined. But he does not do as Fromm does a little later, demonstrate the contrast between Freud's erotic and moral (or interpersonal) forms of masochism.

On the whole, Flugel seems inclined toward the view of auto-masochism which he quotes from Theodore Reik--seeing sadism as primary (outward aggression) and masochism as secondary (aggression turned in on the self), with the element of pleasure or satisfaction being explained by learning or conditioning to develop "a particular conative attitude." At this point Flugel seems not to have the courage of his sociological convictions.

If aggression is so prominent a feature of the Super-Ego, how and when does it get started? Here Flugel relies chiefly

¹Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, trans. A. A. Brill (New York: The Modern Library, Inc., 1938), pp. 553-632.

²Sigmund Freud, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," Collected Papers, IV, 60-84.

³Sigmund Freud, "The Economic Problem in Masochism," Collected Papers, II, 255-268.

⁴Flugel, op. cit., p. 102.

on the studies of children and babies made by Melanie Klein.¹

Klein points out that the small baby has no capacity for tension and so feels beset by any frustration. He operates on the all-or-nothing principle, and therefore can love and hate the same objects in rapid succession, and all over. Tension is experienced as bad; its release as good, whether from inside or out. But if tension is not shortly relieved, what is aroused may be called aggression; and if still unrelieved, the child becomes "overmastered by its own aggressiveness," which was called up in order to try to achieve tension release.² The move for salvation may eventuate in self-destruction. Quite early the child becomes able to use the projecting mechanism; and tends then to project the "bad" outward. The tendency to do this is only slowly corrected with the course of human development, which is another way of saying that the "reality principle" of Freud is only won to after much struggle.

This tendency to project the "bad" outside has led Klein to take a position which many psychoanalysts reject. She indicates that the child, even the little baby, may have a fantastic notion of the severity and cruelty of his parents, and that this may be due to his projection capacity. The traditional psychoanalytic view has been that this distortion is due to the attitudes, albeit hidden, of the parents. Flugel says there is some truth in both. In any event, we may note parenthetically that, whether

¹The Psycho-analysis of Children (London: The Hogarth Press, 1932).

²Flugel, op. cit., p. 110.

these distorted or exaggerated responses of the child be in response to concealed attitudes of the parents or due in part or instead to psychic protection devices in the child (homeostasis), we are dealing in the question with the chronological origin of anxiety in the human being. Ernest Jones, a British psychoanalyst, even coined a fancy term, "aphanisis," to describe the baby's anxiety lest all sources of release from tension (and hence satisfaction) be totally removed. According to such a theory, the non-release of tension is perceived as a threat of "psychic annihilation."

The Klein theory continues in this way. The child first projects, vaguely on to objects rather than on to whole persons. Then there begins to come an equivalent series of introjections. And as soon as introjection begins, the Super-Ego is born. Klein stresses the difference between the actual person or object and that which is introjected, the latter being much more severe and barbaric. The dialectic which then continues to take place between projection and introjection is what is responsible for the Super-Ego. As the all-or-nothing approach of the baby is slowly left behind, and the baby comes more under the reality principle (sees the parents a bit more as they really are, or as other adults see them), the primitive and savage Super-Ego becomes tamed. According to Klein, growth in conscience is not movement toward severity but away from it. Eventually the child learns that the Super-Ego may be a source of strength, something within him shielding him "from the consequences of his own unbridled

passions."¹

Klein says also that the baby has "no clear idea of the limitations of his own powers."² That is to say, he believes that if he wants to kill he is able to kill. So there begin attempts at "reparation" by the child quite early.³ He wanted to kill; therefore he thought he did kill; therefore he had better make up for it. In this way, says Klein, we can account for the initiation of much obsessionalism--essentially on the basis of a magic identification of wish with act.

While believing Klein's thought suggestive and in the main probably correct, Flugel is cautious about agreeing with it in entirety. On the genesis and meaning of the desire to make reparation, he says, ". . . so far as the need for reparation is a genuine and persistent one, it is clearly of the greatest moral, educational, and sociological importance; perhaps the greatest injury that we can do a child or man is to make him feel that he is quite incapable of helping and of doing useful work."⁴ This implies that the root of positive moral growth is in the belief that one can make some reparation and the desire to do so.

Although we are still far from having explored all the tortuous channels of the Super-Ego, Flugel at this point in his argument moves away from depth to consider breadth, or, better, away from the explication of the general psychological principles

¹Ibid., p. 118.

²Ibid.

³Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere, Love, Hate and Reparation (London: The Hogarth Press, 1937).

⁴Flugel, op. cit., p. 119.

to a consideration of their appearance on a large social scale. This results in a discussion of taboo, which corresponds on the social scene to the Super-Ego in the individual. The reason for this correspondence is: "it is the basic factor in moral control" of society: "it is primitive and archaic;" and "it is orrectic and intuitive and divorced from reason."¹ Taboo is adaptive in its intent, but "is devoid of any clear insight into means and ends."² Basically, "a taboo is a prohibition that carries a supernatural or a social sanction."³ There are observable stages of the growth of taboo, says Flugel: first "mana," then animism, then religious sanctions of what he called the "supernatural" kind, then to the general disapproval of society. The rigidity becomes less with each stage.

Freud's contribution to the understanding of taboo was to document, from psychoanalytic experience, the point Wundt had made, that there is an ambivalent or double attitude toward taboo objects, e.g., a holy object being untouchable, both because it is revered and because it is resented. So Freud had said that taboo is an institutionalized form of the neurotic compromise between a repressed desire and a repressing force. In social life as well as in the individual, the original object may be represented symbolically by other objects.

In such stark form, taboo rarely exists in civilized society, but it has equivalents. Obsessional neurosis in particular, and neurosis in general, are taboo-equivalents of an

¹ Ibid., p. 122.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 123.

individual kind. Rational restraint and law also perform the same social function as taboo. Other things which perform taboo functions are "divine law, superstitions, conventions, and good manners."¹ Flugel notes the obvious differences among these, but believes it important to indicate what they have in common. If no one believes that taboo still operates primitively in regard to some objects and occasions and symbols, let him produce a couple of four-letter Anglo-Saxon words in respectable company when the same ideas, expressed in Latin-French derivatives, would pass unnoticed. Or let him violate some detail of mourning customs of a locality. Folkways as well as mores are not merely social habits; they are dynamic compromise means of social control of psychic conflicts.

Guilt and the Need for Punishment

Returning from the brief excursion into taboo, Flugel takes up the main line of argument, now moving toward an understanding of guilt. The presence of aggressive elements in the Super-Ego has already been indicated, and also that these may be self-directed. These may effect the "renunciation of desire and the erection of stern prohibitions."² But they may do more than that; they may "urge mankind irresistibly towards the infliction of positive suffering."³ This leads to the "need for punishment" and the sense of guilt.

It is an original discovery of psychoanalysis, says

¹Ibid., p. 134.

²Ibid., p. 143.

³Ibid. f

Flugel, that guilt is associated with a "need for punishment."¹ Here is the way it works. Guilt is not just fear although it is grounded in fear; it also implies that we have "at least some budding moral sentiments."² That is, we not only fear; we also feel some responsibility for some wrong we have done. When we feel guilty, in this sense, we seek punishment in one way or another; and once we have received it, we experience relief. Hence there is an observable need for punishment, springing not just out of fear but also from the "budding moral sentiment" including a sense of social responsibility.

But it is important to realize, says Flugel, that seeking punishment is not the sole way of relieving guilt although it appears to be the earliest and most primitive. The attempt to make reparation appears a little later, but Piaget has pointed out that some form of this appears quite early.³ There is also available the method of confession as soon as children can talk at all. Piaget found, Flugel notes, that at first children can not distinguish motive in terms of confession, but see only the material consequences, e.g., a broken vase is a broken vase whether the child intended to knock it over or not. In addition to these ways of relieving guilt (which more or less confront the situation itself, although Flugel does not note this distinction), one may also resort to repression, rationalization, projection, and other

¹Ibid., p. 146.

²Ibid., p. 144.

³Jean Piaget, et al., The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. Margorie Gabain (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1932).

mechanisms of defense. In them, Flugel notes, the guilt itself is lost to consciousness, which is to say that in trying to deal with a problem they throw out the alarm signal which indicates here is a problem. We could say that they concentrate on the subjective feeling of guilt, that is, on getting rid of it, at the expense of dealing with it as an indicator of maladjustment in the interpersonal situation. In this sense, even the need for punishment contains a positive element not found in repression, rationalization, and the like, even though it may appear much more bizarre. Boisen's studies of acutely disturbed schizophrenics document this point.

The need for punishment, however, is not a simple matter of starting from scratch with each new guilt-inducing experience. A pattern is built up to the place where one becomes ready to respond if guilt should be aroused; then to the place where he anticipates the arousal of guilt; and then to the state where he feels anxious or uneasy if his anticipations of the arousal of guilt are not forthcoming. By this point he has become a victim of the "Polycrates complex," which appears to be an original phrase of Flugel's. King Polycrates of Samos, the story runs, had an extraordinary run of success with many things. His friends, alarmed, suggested that he make some voluntary sacrifice so he would not have to pay too hard later on for his good fortune. He threw a ring into the sea. Taken by a fish, it was swallowed, the fish caught, and of course turned up on the king's table. This proved that the gods would not accept

Polyrates' sacrifice.¹

This is also the question of how success, or productive achievement of any kind, can in some people result in panic or disorder. One person may be "neurotic or inhibited as long as external circumstances are favourable, but suddenly acquires a new freedom when difficulties or disasters are encountered."² If hardship does not come of itself, such a person may seek it even though there be no redemptive value in the work wrought by the suffering. Flügel cites a man who suffered alternately from neuralgia and depression; when his neuralgia was painning him, he did not require the depression.³

The Freudian mythology has some explanation for this phenomenon. This is to indicate that there is a kind of pact between Id and Super-Ego, remembering that both operate automatically and unconsciously, and are archaic in content. "By the terms of this pact the Super-Ego permits a certain amount of gratification of desires of which it does not approve, on condition that tribute is paid in the form of suffering or punishment."⁴ The fact that this pact can exist, between the forces which in intent move in a socializing and moralizing direction (Super-Ego) and those which move in an individual gratification direction is, says Flügel, "a source of weakness in man's moral constitution."⁵ By analogy, it is as if the policeman and the criminal were in league against the citizen.

¹ Flügel, op. cit., p. 153.

² Ibid., p. 154.

³ Ibid., p. 155.

⁴ Ibid., p. 158.

⁵ Ibid.

So punishment sometimes leads to a release from a sense of guilt; yet at other times or with other people, punishment or disaster gives rise to quite different feelings including an increased sense of guilt. What is the explanation? Flugel says we know little about this, and it has not been much discussed by psychoanalysts.¹ In suggesting possible multiple explanations, he cites the degree of the feeling of helplessness that our social environment gave us in early years, the degree of tendency to regress in our character, the relative strength of our early projections, the strength of repression in us at the deeper levels, and the "libidinizing of suffering."² Here Flugel obviously needs a concept of character in process, with various degrees of crystallization, with a process and multiple-factor type of explanation. This he does not attempt. He is chiefly interested to make this point, "The notions of punishment and justice are, it is now obvious, very deeply seated in the mind of man, which in its moral endeavours seeks to establish and maintain a kind of equilibrium between suffering and satisfaction."³

We may summarize the basic lines of Flugel's argument on guilt up to this point. Guilt is grounded in fear plus some sense of responsibility. However defined, the responsibility element is the distinctive ground for moral development. But since the contents which are introjected to form the Super-Ego become dynamically unconscious, one or more of the automatic mechanisms of defense may come into action when a sense of guilt begins to

¹Ibid., p. 161.

²Ibid., p. 163.

³Ibid., p. 164.

ise--and the resulting psychic action may be to relieve a sense of guilt, and therefore the uncomfortable feeling of responsibility. But there is no necessary correlation between the reality of one's sense and the gravity of his sense of guilt. Psychoanalysis helps to reveal the great variety of automatic "mechanisms" which attempt to relieve a sense of guilt. But it is important to realize that morals in the positive sense can not identify themselves solely with the sense of responsibility; for they may be misguided and unrelated to reality. Nevertheless, the obvious short-circuit mechanisms of defense or evasion tend in general to lead away from moral action in the positive (and conscious) sense even though often masked as morality.

With this summary, we can continue Flugel's basic argument. Of great social importance is the fact that guilt may be projected, and that the punishment of that to which it is projected may relieve the sense of guilt of the projector. This is the mechanism, e.g., of scapegoatism, which satisfies at the same time primitive aggressiveness, the disapproval of the Super-Ego, and sadism.¹ The projection may be to an individual or a group. In any event, its social consequences are "sinister." "A society in which people are all bent on punishing each other for their own sins is not likely to be harmonious."²

The obvious forms of scapegoatism, as in anti-Semitism, are mentioned. But the "supreme example" of the scapegoat theme and of vicarious punishment, in religious context, is the atonement.³

¹Ibid., pp. 164-165.

²Ibid., p. 165.

³Ibid., p. 166.

Flugel is unhappy about what he regards as the basic mechanism of the atonement. "The fact that guilt can be removed by a brutal act of aggression is so paradoxical, so contrary to our other ethical notions, that it might appear utterly incomprehensible but for the existence of the 'need for punishment' and the possibility of this punishment being suffered vicariously by a scapegoat."¹

There are many ways, Flugel believes, in which the scapegoat theme works itself out less obviously. The imaginary playmates of small children often fill such a role.² Gossip and scandal sometimes perform such a function. The insistence that criminals be punished, is also from such motivation.³ Penal reformers, he notes, who do not take into account the strength of this force arrayed against them may well fail.⁴ In education he finds a general unwillingness to do away with punishment in spite of theory which would tend to do so. In the British public schools, he reports, there is sometimes "irrational and unnecessary harshness" by pupils to other pupils, openly frowned on but secretly connived at by the teachers.⁵ The first use of anesthetics for surgical operations was met with great protest.⁶ And some of the opposition to divorce carries the implication "that a certain number of unhappy marriages removes some of the general guilt attaching to humanity through sex."⁷ So with the usual attitudes

¹ Ibid., p. 167.

² Ibid., p. 168.

³ Ibid., p. 169.

⁴ Ibid., p. 170.

⁵ Ibid., p. 171.

⁶ Ibid., p. 172.

⁷ Ibid., p. 173.

toward abortion, toward unmarried mothers, and toward venereal diseases. "No wonder again that man is a pain-seeking animal, though in this connection it is the pain of his fellow-creatures that he seeks, in order to ensure a more comfortable conscience for himself."¹

The Varieties of Super-Ego Expression

Having dealt with the projection of guilt and the need for punishment within the Super-Ego, Flugel then turns to the projection of the Super-Ego itself, i.e., to find in the external world representatives like our Super-Ego, either "masters who will guide our conduct" or "heroes who will exemplify our ideals."² The physician or psychoanalyst is often such a figure for people, and this fact is used for therapeutic purposes, the patient learning through contact with the therapist to "relax the control exercised by his own Super-Ego."³

This projection of the Super-Ego assumes many forms. In Freud's topographic theory of humor, the Ego adopts the point of view of the Super-Ego; and from a great height looks down tolerantly on itself like a small child.⁴ The Super-Ego may be projected onto a group especially a nation; when the true morality of the group or nation is low, this lowers moral standards in individuals, something which has been utilized by totalitarian states. In effective large-scale social leadership, says Flugel, the leader needs to represent something more and other than the

¹Ibid., p. 174.

²Ibid., p. 175.

³Ibid., p. 176.

⁴Ibid., p. 181.

uper-Ego of the members--else the ambivalence may become too strong and rebellion may occur.¹

In many respects, Flugel believes, God is the most suitable of all figures for projection of the Super-Ego. In his relations with God the religious man can to a large extent find relief from the burden of self-direction and moral conflict, and, like a little child, turn trustfully for help and guidance--this time to a divine parent of whose power and infallibility he feels assured.²

Even so, he continues, if the belief in God is a projection of the Super-Ego, ambivalent feelings toward God will remain. To regard God "as consistently benevolent" seems to require more freedom from guilt and the need for punishment than men usually have.³ Even if the "metaphysical aspects" of religion are removed, the primal fear remains that God is angered by human success and needs to be appeased by human suffering.⁴

If we seek, therefore, to achieve a morality that is free as regards feeling and behaviour as well as free from metaphysical constraints, it is not sufficient to abandon what we may consider outworn superstitions and beliefs as regards the external aspects of the Universe. We have also to free ourselves from the archaic aspects of our own internal Super-Ego.⁵

If we become free of the need to project our Super-Ego on to God, then we have to take it within ourselves again, and become more completely dependent on our own individual moral structure.⁶

The guilt (responsibility) aside of the Super-Ego may be projected, and the Super-Ego itself. Both these processes operate, Flugel implies, as evasions. Presumably the proper treatment of the Super-Ego is what psychoanalysis attempts, i.e., by making

¹Ibid., p. 185.

²Ibid., p. 186.

³Ibid., p. 187.

⁴Ibid., p. 188.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

ts content conscious, it ceases to be an automatic regulator of behavior but comes under control of the Ego. It is the Ego, we should recall, which in psychoanalytic theory maintains all contact with the external world; the Super-Ego was built up out of experiences which the Ego originally had.

But the Super-Ego, because it makes demands and claims, is always to some extent an enemy of the Ego (when it maintains its Super-Ego character, i.e., unconsciousness). Hence there are great pressures to avoid it, and a tremendous variety of ways in which this is done. Different people utilize some means of evasion more than others. Burt believes, Flugel notes, that "persons more liable to the positive or æsthetic emotions, such as anger, gregariousness, sex, and self-assertion, are, other things being equal, more likely to be criminal, while those in whom the negative or asthenic emotions, such as fear, disgust, and submission, preponderate, are more likely to become neurotic."¹

The person who has been indulged learns that crime does pay, and therefore fails to develop a sense of "inner justice."² Those who have been over-punished may also fail to develop such a sense because their restraint has brought no rewards. Those who have had inconsistent treatment never know where they stand. This seems to lead toward a golden mean kind of doctrine, although Flugel does not say so.

One way to look at the evasions of the Super-Ego is to see what does the evading. The Id may do it, and then we have

¹Ibid., pp. 191-192.

²Ibid., p. 193.