

understand and assimilate facts about himself and his relationships which he has not previously been able to accept, and these have kinship to what other sufferers have confronted, still he sees each person as fundamentally unique, as a person not an object. Psychotherapy calls for a considerable degree of agapé in the therapist; and this is possible only if the needs of the therapist or mutual interchange are met elsewhere than in the therapeutic situation.

All of this means that psychotherapy is not in itself scientific in the natural science sense of the term. Experimentalism is severely limited by the fact of dealing with persons, and therapeutic experiences can not be reduplicated. Psychoanalytic therapy has, for the most part, tended to shrug its shoulders over this point, and indicate that it is as scientific as is permitted by the nature of the human material.

That this can not be a final answer to the problem of research in psychotherapy is being shown in a preliminary way by the psychotherapeutic studies now going on at the University of Chicago under direction of Carl R. Rogers and with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Certain kinds of questions can be dealt with in terms which approach quantification. For instance, is there any concomitance between the change in attitudes towards the self and towards other people as therapy progresses? General therapeutic experience says yes. But the research may be able to give some idea as to how close this correspondence is. The proper removal of the scientific bogey, in a form irrelevant to this kind of material, had to be done. But with full consideration

of the nature of the material, new kinds of exactness in knowledge would appear to be possible.

The recording of psychotherapeutic interviews has been the indispensable preliminary to any such research.¹ Originally done by Rogers, this practice is now being followed also by some of the psychoanalytic groups. There is still considerable resistance to it with the usual excuse that a recording does not give everything. This fact is of course true; but the question is whether merely general reflections give as much as a recording, to which the obvious answer is no.

Despite the early attention which Freud gave to the question of transference in analysis, it is still true that the three factors involved in therapy have not, in their individualized form, received equal attention thus far. Up until now the most attention has been given to the patient; then to the relationship; and in an individualized sense, only a little and only recently to the therapist's own attitudes. Recorded material tends to force the last more into the open.

In brief summary of this chapter on the development of psychotherapy with special reference to the relevance of its findings to ethics, we may return to our original general points concerning the relation of psychotherapy to the scientific and the existential. Through the specific account of the developments, it has become more clear that psychotherapy has not only created

¹Carl R. Rogers, "The Use of Electrically Recorded Interviews in Improving Psychotherapeutic Techniques," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. XII (1942).

a new kind of relationship between the scientific and the existential but has also contributed heavily toward a redefinition or reconception of each.

When the modern development of psychotherapy began at the turn of the century, science was conceived not only in more or less mechanical terms, but more importantly it was assumed to proceed only from the simple toward the complex (from part toward whole), and in an objective fashion when objectivity was interpreted not alone as readiness to see hypotheses confirmed or disproved but as separation of subject from object. In addition, where human material was concerned, there was an organicistic undertone.

When he began, Freud worked within such assumptions as these. But we have seen that his actual findings took him step by step away from them in the direction of a point where the psychological could be considered to be as "real" as the physiological, where it could move directly after the complex fact, where the therapist could be a participant observer without losing objectivity. It is true that Freud did not himself reach these goals; but they were logically implied in the movement of his work and thought, and we have seen that those who have followed him have gone farther in that direction.

As to the existential element, the alteration has not been from complete unconcern to concern, but a tremendous broadening in the character of the concern which warrants us in calling it existential. At the beginning of his work, Freud the physician was of course concerned with finding something to help his patients;

but this was interpreted as change in their physical condition, loss of symptoms which expressed themselves physically (which is why the doctor got them in the first place). It had nothing to do with the patient as a person, as a psyche, or as a member of a community; and certainly was totally removed from his ethical aspirations. All this implied that the physician's concern was limited to a specific segment of his patient, and this segment did not involve the physician as a person.

All this changed in Freud himself. Although here also Freud moved along a certain line, and then stopped, those who succeeded him have developed the logical consequence of his movement in position. The therapist is now as concerned with the patient's psyche as with his soma; indeed, as a psychotherapist, he is more concerned, referring his patient to a physician if somatic factors are prominent in the difficulty. He is concerned with the patient in his interpersonal relationships, first with those immediately related to him in face to face ways in past and present, and beyond this to those whose lives impinge indirectly upon that of the patient. He is concerned not just with his patient's symptoms but with his character; for only by getting at the character can even the symptoms be genuinely touched. Although he maintains objectivity, does not "sympathize" with the patient, he is nevertheless in the therapeutic situation as a person himself. He realizes that the issues of life and death may be within any kind of material which serves as the basis of the psychotherapeutic discussions, that any day may be judgment day. If he refrains (as he should and does) from telling his



patient what he should believe, think and do, it is not because this is irrelevant to his concern on behalf of the patient, but because he is convinced that it would not help the patient as the patient needs to be helped.

So both the scientific and existential dimensions or aspects of psychotherapy have changed. By the same token, this redefinition means that a new relationship exists between them. There is now possible a kind of dialectic between scientific and existential, which we may illustrate as follows. Objectivity in the therapist is necessary so that he will not simply react to the patient in the same way other people do, but can introduce a new element; but this has nothing to do with completely unconcerned detachment. The therapist will examine material brought out in any way and in any order or disorder by his patient; but he will do so in the conviction that this has inherent interconnected meaning. The therapist will see the general principles of psychodynamics illustrated in his patient; but he will also see the unique individuality of every patient. He will see and deal with the patient both as the locus of the difficulty and the resource for its solution; but he will see the patient's interpersonal relations and cultural environment as having worked creatively on the patient's divided selfhood and also as being the potential resource for its integration. The therapist's science does not keep him as a person out of the situation; but failure does not leave him sleepless, nor success send him to the confetti. He knows he is participating in a process, partly predictable, partly unique and incapable of complete anticipation; that he is



partly creator but partly midwife, that he is a creature, even of the therapeutic process; that he is not left unchanged by the psychotherapy in which he engages.

It would be misleading to suggest that the full implications of this movement, and my statement of it, would be perfectly agreed to by all contemporary psychotherapists; for this is not true. Like Freud, most of them have made one or two "leaps" in their perspective, but then become fixated. For each succeeding shift requires not just a smooth flow from one detail to another, but a radical reorganization of the elements in the system and a new concept of what the system is about. Such shifts, as their own findings should make clear, are among the most threatening, or anxiety-inducing, experiences which a man can undergo.

Nevertheless, we have seen that the most progressive of the therapists have come close to my statement, and that the general direction of movement of all has been in this way. To place or classify a psychotherapist, one might ask at what point he stopped leaping! If he continues to jump, he will reach my statement, and no doubt beyond. Ethics in the sense in which it will be discussed here is just beyond.

Parenthetically, it ought to be noted that this movement can not be described as away from the physiological and toward the psychological, or away from the psychological and toward the ethical. This would give a false picture. Some of the most fruitful work in psychotherapy has come about through the advance to the inclusion of factors viewed psychologically as being as important as the physiological; then by a return to consider the

physiological in the new terms. As some physicians keep insisting, we must shortly get beyond talking about psychosomatics, since this concept seems to preserve a dualism in the object or patient and therefore in the mind of the therapist or healer. The physiological, the psychological, the social and other dimensions are bodies of knowledge built up out of experience with a certain perspective. They have point and meaning. But their separation for the convenience of the subject's observation should not blind us to the fact that all knowledge is one; and where therapy of a human being is involved, there can be no categorical division among these perspectives. There may well be functional separation, as there is in psychotherapy itself, but this is a distinction for convenience, not within the realm of being.

Another note has run through our account of the development of psychotherapy, emerging in different form and language in different therapists, often only implicitly, which is of special interest to ethics. Much less than what we have said before has its essential nature been growing and changing. In its generalized form, we can see it from the beginning in all the leading psychotherapists. This may be called, generically, the psychotherapeutic reaction against compulsions on the individual, to see it negatively; or a concern for freeing the powers of the individual, when seen positively. The negative statement is of course much more common.

Freud saw this general principle in terms of the negative weight of culture upon the individual, chiefly upon his impulses which were viewed biologically. Something not of the individual's exclusive making has put him under compulsion. In Freud especially,

and in the others as well, the unique character of the psychotherapeutic assertion of this "democratic" point is the demonstration of the ramifications of the fact of compulsion, its subtle and unconscious as well as open and obvious workings.

For Adler, the individual is also compelled to develop a style of life (much like "pattern of character" in current usage) in reaction against threats to the emergence of his selfhood. For Rank the individual's dependency needs are so cultivated by his culture, that, if he is not to be uselessly average or hopelessly divided against himself he must come again to the finding and expressing of his own creative powers.

For Fromm the great threat is authoritarianism in all its forms and intricacies. Even when external conditions of life make the old authoritarian forms unnecessary, new authoritarian forms may be created to meet the inward sense of alienation of the individual. For Sullivan, the parataxic distortions have developed through interpersonal relationships, and in that same way will they be made straight. For Carl Rogers, the individual has not learned that he can deal with his own problems, accept as facts his own feelings, and move on from there; and this he can be helped to do through psychotherapy.

Through all these persons (and many others) there is an underlying democratic note, or a dignity-of-man note. What is distinctive about it, or of similar liberal points in other aspects of western civilization, is its exploration of the meaning of compulsion and freedom (or release and fulfillment) in psychological terms. If psychotherapy is to make any lasting contribution



to ethics, we will do well to follow carefully the implications
of this disclosure of the nature of compulsion in human behavior.

CHAPTER IV

JOHN CARL FLUGEL ON ETHICS

In this and the following chapter, we shall enter upon a descriptive and critical treatment of the views of two psychotherapists upon ethics. We shall be at some pains to distinguish the fact, or type of fact, upon which they base various conclusions, from the conclusions themselves. That is, we are interested to see the conclusions they draw for ethics from their data, and also to estimate the force of their data as leading toward these or toward other conclusions.

John Carl Flugel is a Britisher, sixty-eight years of age. This is to say that he was about twenty when Freud started psychoanalysis as such, and that he was able to take training and become a psychoanalyst (though not a physician) in the days before it became an issue as to whether only physicians could become analysts. He studied at Oxford and then specialized in psychology at the universities of London and Würzburg, London awarding him his degree of Doctor of Science. For one year early in his professional career he was an assistant in psychology at the University College, London, and resumed his relationship there as Assistant Professor of Psychology in 1929, a post which he still holds or has held until recently. From 1911-1920 he was Honorary Secretary of the British Psychological Society; and later, 1932-1935, he served as president of that body. During the entire time his



main work has been the practice of psychoanalysis.

For a long time he has been interested in the extension of mental health principles in many realms of society; and organizationally has been active in mental health bodies at many geographical levels. He is now considered an elder statesman, a kind of Bernard Baruch of British psychoanalysis and mental health, in which capacity he was very prominent at the 1949 International Congress on Mental Health which led to the formation of the World Federation for Mental Health.

Flugel has been a prolific writer since his thirties, almost entirely on the application of psychoanalytic concepts and findings to various aspects of cultural and social life. He must write with great facility. All his writings suggest a careful prior organization of the material; then a plunging into the writing itself, with an excellent memory leading him to many references and cross-references as he writes. He seems to have a feeling for communicating with his reader while he writes, which may be merely a characteristic he shares with so many British writers in all fields, or which may be more personal. Whether due to this or to a general undertone of preciseness and sub-obsessionalism which seems characteristic, his writings are repetitive and, after a time, tiring. They do not lack precision; indeed, their trying hard for it wears on the patience of the reader. Flugel often tries to get several perspectives on a problem. The reader, seeing this method, expects certain others to emerge. But when they never do, and Flugel seems to conclude he has covered the field, the reader may grow weary--perhaps with repressed hostility!

Flugel first became well known through his The Psycho-analytic Study of the Family.¹ Read from today's perspective, this seems extremely wooden in its concepts and terminology. Oedipus, castration, sublimation and all the rest are entirely literal as was then still generally true within the orthodox Freudian movement. And Flugel was by no means the first to discuss the implications of the psychoanalytic findings for aspects of culture. Rank, Hanns Sachs and others had even established about 1908 a magazine called Imago which was intended for the discussion of such implications. But the analytic ideas had not previously been applied systematically to the study of the family situation as a whole, nor had they been presented clearly and more or less popularly. Despite the tendentious elements which I have mentioned in Flugel's style, he was able, through his desire and capacity to communicate, to recognize when other terms could be substituted for the technical, or when definitions of technical terms were necessary. The book was hardly a smash hit in popular circles; but in the many professional circles dealing with the family, it very soon became well known. It was not basically original except in the nature of the object to which it applied the analytic findings, in this case the family.

Flugel has written a good deal on clothes, their meaning in the light of analytic findings, in The Psychology of Clothes.²

¹ ("The International Psycho-analytical Library"; London: The Hogarth Press, 1921).

² ("The International Psycho-analytical Library"; London: The Hogarth Press, 1930).

and in many articles, the most recent being "The Psychology of Nudism."¹ He has also been much interested in the implication of analytic findings for international relations, and especially in the psychology of war and peace. These subjects have been dealt with both in books and articles; and appear in some degree in the book we shall chiefly consider, on ethics. He has written a general introduction to psychoanalysis and certain other general materials. In none of these is there originality of psychoanalytic conception. It is his communicability and the choice of his objects for study which chiefly distinguishes him within the psychoanalytic movement.

Man, Morals and Society, was written during the second world war, in London.² In his preface the author asks whether the writing and printing of his book can, by analogy, say yes in reply to the war-time notice in British rail stations, "Is your journey really necessary?" His motives for writing it are then made clear when he writes:

... it appears to be pretty generally agreed that the failure of our civilization to solve so many of its greatest problems, and above all its involvement in two world wars within a quarter of a century, makes it more than ever necessary that we should think seriously about fundamental moral problems. In spite of all that has been said and written, we are very far from having solved these problems.

¹Complex, Fall, 1950.

²Man, Morals and Society: A Psycho-analytical Study (New York: International Universities Press, 1945).

³Ibid., pp. 5-6.

In the second place, he notes that, in the field of psychology, "there has been during the last twenty years or so considerable thought and observation on aspects of mental life which clearly have a most intimate bearing upon ethics."¹ There is, so to speak, the need seen in social terms and especially in terms of international aggression; and there is second the opportunity, the building up of relevant findings not previously considered systematically.

General Characteristics of Ethical Views

Before giving a comprehensive statement about Flugel's distinctive general emphases in relation to ethics, it will prove useful to demonstrate the development of his ethical thinking from point to point, as he himself does in his volume on ethics. In preparation for this extended account of his position from his own point of view, we may, however, suggest the main lines to which the reader will wish to be alert.

Freud once suggested somewhere, writes Flugel, "that psychoanalysis had shown that man was not only far more immoral than he believed but also far more moral than he had any idea of."² Thus we are warned to expect the dimension of depth, to find the unfamiliar beneath the familiar, to discover that things psychic are not what they seem.

Flugel comes at ethics through conscience, through a study of how man comes to feel something is good or bad, not from examining what makes it good or bad. He warns early of this

¹Ibid., p. 6.

²Ibid., p. 189.

imitation, indicating that he has "endeavoured to avoid all general treatment of the nature and problems of ethics, psychology, or psychopathology."¹ Whether this means that the possible contribution of psychology to the value perspective in ethics is actually omitted, or is simply relieved of critical discussion so that it enters unobserved, we shall see when assessing the thought later. In any event, the thrust of the treatment is about conscience.

Three broad points are dealt with by Flugel: (1) the nature and function of the Super-Ego; (2) the nature and directions of psychic aggression; (3) the large quantity of morality which is a protection against an unintegrated psychic structure. We shall be especially alert to these points as we go along.

It may also prove helpful to give at the beginning of our narrative Flugel's own summary of what psychoanalysis can tell us about morals. In relation to morals, like other things, psychoanalysis can reveal to us consciously the kind of "mental operations" which go on anyhow though ordinarily outside conscious awareness.² Flugel's eight-point summary is as follows:

1. Morality moves from "egocentricity to sociality."³

This process is "an aspect of a more general process of intellectual and erective development, in the course of which the individual's interests, desires and conduct become increasingly orientated towards the outer world."⁴ This point, Flugel notes, is more in line with "traditional morality" than any other to follow.

¹Ibid., p. 6.

²Ibid., p. 241.

³Ibid., p. 242.

⁴Ibid., p. 243.

2. Morality moves from "unconscious to conscious."¹ While conceding that consciousness is not an unalloyed good, citing the way in which useful habits can get things off our minds, nevertheless consciousness is valuable "in situations of novelty or difficulty."² When psychic life is so organized that something can not be brought into awareness, even though new or difficult situations would make this desirable, then the movement is away from morality, i.e., the possibility of true moral action is diminished.

3. Morality moves from "autism to realism."³ Flugel prefers the word "autistic" to Freud's "pleasure principle," because the latter implies a "psychological hedonism" which Flugel considers naive.⁴ Autistic thinking is not merely an expression of desire, or of the Id or impulses; it may also come from fear, from Super-Ego, from conscience.⁵ "Unconscious morality is no more realistic than is unconscious impulse."⁶ So morality grows as thought, feeling and action become less autistic and more oriented to reality.

4. Morality moves "from moral inhibition to spontaneous 'goodness.'"⁷ Psychoanalysis first reveals that moral inhibitions, and a generally negative aura around them, "are responsible for the suppression and distortion of much that is good in human nature . . ."⁸ What psychoanalysis hopes to accomplish, says

¹Ibid., p. 244.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 245.

⁴Ibid., p. 216.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 217.

⁷Ibid., p. 245.

⁸Ibid., p. 247.

Flugel, is a "smooth coalescence" of wish and duty.¹

5. Morality moves "from aggression to tolerance and love."² Not only does true morality have this movement, but it includes moving away from ambivalence in which love and hate may be closely fused.³ In mature morality we should find love, and not love fused or confused with hate or aggression. It is easier to hold this view, Flugel remarks, if aggression is understood fundamentally as something evoked by a threatening situation, than if it is felt to be analogous to hunger as Freud saw it.⁴ That is to say, Flugel takes a more socially-oriented view of the meaning of aggression.

6. Morality moves from fear to security.⁵ We shall see later that Flugel demonstrates in detail how widespread is the "need for punishment." Ethical progress requires a reduction of this need for punishment, which involves a movement from a fear motif to one of security.

7. Morality moves "from heteronomy to autonomy."⁶ This should be seen in two perspectives: intrapsychic, and the relation of person to environment. Moral progress involves learning to substitute one's own moral judgments for those of other people, originally the parents; and within the personality, the Ego takes over moral control on a conscious basis from the automatic action of the Super-Ego. The general movement is away from reliance on

¹Ibid., p. 248.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 250.

⁴Ibid., p. 249.

⁵Ibid., p. 251.

⁶Ibid., p. 252.

taboos, laws and rules, and more upon "moral judgment" and "intelligence."¹

8. Morality moves "from orectic (moral) judgment to cognitive (psychological) judgment."² This is to say two things. First, that the orectic aspects of the mind (from Aristotle, referring to the feeling, striving and wishing aspects), which are the original, and blind, determiners of our judgments of right and wrong, need to be replaced in terms of final control by the cognitive aspects of the mind ("reasoning, knowing, and perceiving aspects," writes Flugel). Second, that the former type of control is traditionally associated with morality, while the latter is not.

The Relevance of Psychoanalysis to Morals

Having presented a brief over-view of Flugel's approach to ethics, we may now consider it in greater detail, moving within his own sequence of ideas for the most part. He begins by indicating that, if we are to attack the problem of "rebuilding our tottering society upon a sounder basis," we need to appeal, among other things, to the "moral impulses of men."³ But the minute we turn to psychology and psychoanalysis for help in understanding these moral impulses, the suspicion arises in the general mind that values will be destroyed by this process.⁴

In reply to this we may assert, he says, that "Values happen to be facts of mental life . . ." Psychological knowledge

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., p. 254.

³ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

like other kinds of knowledge may be put in the service of selected values, and the distinction between means and ends is usually relative.¹ Because there is no hard and fast line of distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, it is difficult to say just where the influence of psychology should end. Insofar as psychology touches upon the realm of intrinsic values, the change is "from a relatively emotional attitude to a relatively intellectual one."² The moral (old style) point of view in relation to the physical world has gone out of fashion. Similarly, the "psychological" is tending "to replace the moral point of view."³

"Moral action is action in accordance with values."⁴ What constitutes value for man is determined basically "by our biological nature and our innate psychological equipment."⁵ There is a kind of natural morality; for man has many "natural tendencies" which fit him for harmonious social life. Nevertheless, any primitivism which believed nothing else was needed but to let such tendencies unroll must be rejected. Man needs also a "superimposed factor" of direction and control.⁶

In approaching morals psychologically, we need to be alert to feeling tones which become attached to one or another kind of course of action. A Viennese study of the late thirties attempted to get people to state things which came into their mind as wishes, and others which came as duties. There were livelier feelings

¹ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

² Ibid., p. 14.

³ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

attached to the wishes, which also impelled more strongly to action. The wishes had more visual images attached and were more unquestioned. Wishes tended to be associated with oneself; duties, with something outside.¹ An interesting aspect of this study was its suggestion that, in older people, the contrast between what was regarded as wish or as duty tended to disappear.² What people usually regard as moral in terms of its tone tends to be external, not felt to be related to oneself, sparse on imagery, and lacking in spontaneity--except in older years when the vitality necessary for any wishing may have greatly declined.

Flugel then turns to psychoanalytic findings and theories which have significance for understanding the function of morality, beginning with some general considerations about the Super-Ego, then moving on to an understanding of the Ego-Ideal, and later to aggression in the Super-Ego, and other matters.

Psychoanalysis began, says Flugel, with the discovery that a therapeutic effect was obtained when hitherto unconscious material was made conscious.³ Thus from the beginning it was opposed to anything which repressed, that is, which forcibly kept out of awareness factors which, if they entered consciousness, could have a therapeutic effect. It was discovered very early that the content of the repressed material which was most dynamic (i.e., most forceful or energetic) was frequently much out of line with the recognized ethical standards of the person.⁴ It

¹ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

² Ibid., p. 19.

³ Ibid., p. 28.

⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

was also recognized early that the force which maintained this material in a repressed condition was also strong. By reason of these early discoveries, it appeared at first as if psychoanalysis were actually, in practice, "an attempt to undo the work of the moral forces."¹ But it soon became clear that, in the neurotic conditions which psychoanalysis was trying to help, there was "already a failure of satisfactory moral control."² So the opposite case might be made, that people came to psychoanalysis for help when their own moral controls failed to work. What psychoanalysis had actually done, however, from the first days was to show that "conscience was a factor in the mind that was capable of doing harm as well as good . . ."³

The moral standard of what psychoanalysis at first called the "Censor," the repressing agent, was frequently found to be "rigid, infantile, archaic . . ."⁴ The difficulties in the therapeutic process were found to lie as much in the "stubborn, stupid opposition of unadaptable, repressive moral tendencies as to the clamorous exigency of crude unsocial instincts."⁵ In both instances, therapy had to bring these factors into the open where reason could get at them.

In Freud's The Ego and the Id (1923),⁶ the theory of the Super-Ego was first set forth as "the source of our moral control."⁷

¹ Ibid., p. 30.

² Ibid., p. 31.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 32.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Trans. Joan Riviere (London: The Hogarth Press, 1927).

⁷ Flugel, op. cit., p. 33.

As Flugel understands the Super-Ego in Freud's conception, it contains four main elements or characteristics (it is a little unclear which they are): (1) the Ego-Ideal, that part or aspect of the Super-Ego which we build up to compensate for what we have sometime recognized as our defects; (2) the residuum of the constant process of introjecting the yea's and nay's from our culture; (3) the aggravated tone around the content of the Super-Ego, affecting the nature of the content by making it more severe--aggression aroused by frustrating objects outside, then recoiled against the self; (4) perhaps a sado-masochistic tendency, in which it is possible to speak of taking pleasure in the self-directed aggression. Whether the fourth point is properly a part of the nature of the Super-Ego as such, says Flugel, is a controversial question.¹

Flugel then makes clear that he believes our understanding of conscience did not begin with psychoanalysis. He quotes with qualified approval the conscience theory of the American psychologist J. M. Baldwin with his "dialectic of personal growth," with a succession of projective-ejective stages in which the limitations and norms of other persons are gradually transferred to the child himself.² Citing the similarity of Baldwin's to Freud's conscience theory, Flugel adds that in both instances there is "something within the self that demands obedience to its claims and at the same time something the nature of which is determined by social and moral influences from outside."³ The contribution

¹Ibid., pp. 33-39.

²Ibid., p. 42.

³Ibid., p. 43.

of Freud, in contrast to people like Baldwin, is in showing the influence of the unconscious and in demonstrating the aggressive aspects of conscience.¹ Baldwin felt that conscience in time became better understood, freer from the caprice of particular persons, finally emerging as general law. Psychoanalysis shows this as too simple and optimistic.

The Ego-Ideal and Morals

In considering the Ego-Ideal aspect of the Super-Ego, Flugel points out that Freud became so much concerned with the aggressiveness in the Super-Ego that he paid little attention to the Ego-Ideal.² At this point he indicates that Adler's theory suggested how "our wounded self-esteem is apt to arouse in us a sense of injury and outrage at the limitations of our powers . . . "; so we erect a "guiding fiction" (like the Ego-Ideal) to compensate.³ Hence Adler's guiding fiction is the outcome of ego-tism and of a desire to be superior, not as for Freud primarily a moral factor. Feelings of inferiority, which to Adler start this process, Freud believed "more likely to be the consequence than the cause of moral ideals."⁴

Still dealing with the Ego-Ideal, Flugel also comments on Horney's views. In doing so, he had available only her two earlier works and not the last two, in which the point under discussion is developed much further. She mainly emphasizes, he indicates,

¹Ibid., p. 45.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 46.

⁴Ibid., p. 47.

the necessity in neurosis for keeping up moral or cultural appearances. "What Freud describes as fear of a punishing Super-Ego she would be inclined to interpret as little more than a fear of being unmasked."¹ Flugel approves Horney's point, as he sees it, about the Ego's having a tendency to cast aside an ideal which is just a "moral bluff." But he believes she minimizes the factor of aggression within the Super-Ego.² This is because, he feels, she underestimates the extent to which the Ego-Ideal and the whole Super-Ego have become a part of ourselves.³

Flugel also approves Horney's point that much depends on "the distance between the real self and the Ego-Ideal."⁴ If too "high" a standard is set for oneself in the Ego-Ideal, then the gulf is too great and one will feel guilty and inferior. People who do this should "reduce their aspirations and pretensions."⁵ On the other hand, says Flugel, ideals may be too low. In western culture there is a tendency for most of us to have obsessive traits; but if there were a very low degree of the incentives to work, then ideals would be too low. What is needed is an "optimum ideal that is neither too far above nor too far below the level of capacity."⁶ Step-by-step goals are more effective than "a single distant higher goal."⁷

The Ego-Ideal is not of course a purely "endopsychic structure" but involves also the social world. What should happen

¹Ibid., p. 48.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 49.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 50.

⁶Ibid., p. 51.

⁷Ibid.

is a union between the Ego and Ego-Ideal, as a result of which we may feel strong, righteous, and "lovable."¹ Presumably, we may interject here, Flugel's view of the union of Ego and Ego-Ideal, since the Ego-Ideal has been a part of the Super-Ego, means getting it away from the Super-Ego, i.e., making it conscious. But in that case, Flugel ought to state his position in the following way: the Ego-Ideal is originally conscious in the childhood incidents and relationships which produce it in interaction with culture; then it goes underground, or at least the feelings and incidents which gave rise to it do so; later it may be made conscious again, and reunited with the Ego from which it has been dissociated.

Occasionally Flugel takes a fantastic flyer--at this point by suggesting that in the manic condition the sense of harmony and power represents "a union of Ego and Super-Ego."² This entirely misreads the nature of the euphoria in the manic condition, which is reactive or compensatory. In the Freudian topography, the manic condition actually represents a further dissociation of the Super-Ego from the Ego, and a more untrammelled alliance of Id with Ego.

Once established as an internal part of the psychic apparatus, the Ego-Ideal serves more or less in place of society and cultural demand, i.e., it operates to produce the same kind of conduct but without their having to be present. Yet we never become independent of the approval of our social environment.³

¹Ibid., p. 53.

²Ibid., p. 55.

³Ibid.