

of Soviet communism, and the opportunistic morality of the Soviets, has also served to compel psychotherapists to think positively on ethical questions. The "ideology" of Marx and the "rationalization" of Freud were much alike. But when it became clear that Sovietism wished to unmask other ideologies only to preserve its own intact, the analogy had ethical implications even in the practice of psychotherapy. In any event, the "climate of opinion" toward ethics has changed.

But this interest, insofar as it has received expression, is not yet entirely general or ontological or metaphysical in character. Both Flugel and Fromm, who will be discussed, are humanists with a positivistic flavor. But psychotherapists, in their ethical thought, need not remain so.

#### The "Bridge" Function of Ethics

Because of the change in Christian theological thought, and also in psychotherapeutic thought, it now appears that a "bridge" between them may be possible. This would appear to be ethics. Psychotherapy has moved toward a constructive view of ethics, though with limited generality. Protestant theology has moved toward a more empirical view in ethics, though still tending to neglect both psychological and philosophical aspects. These tendencies suggest the possibility of a bridge in the sense of mutual understanding and correction.

It may be asserted that the basic bridge-point is not ethics but the doctrine of man. This does not seem to be so, for the simple reason that the "doctrine of man" is itself a

theological idea, while "ethics," generically understood, is not necessarily so. This is not to minimize the mutual understanding that may emerge out of "doctrine of man" studies, as in the excellent volume by David E. Roberts.<sup>1</sup> But this makes the psychotherapists, so to speak, hold the meeting in the theologian's house rather than in a jointly owned building in which neither of them lives all the time.

Whether ethics will become such a bridge remains to be seen. This essay, in any event, will assume that a bridge is possible, and will explore its nature.

#### The Method of this Essay

In the course of this study, I have sought first for a principle of limitation of data to be considered. One possibility was to select some well elaborated system of Christian ethics, and then bring psychotherapeutic findings to bear on it. The difficulty with this would have been twofold. The psychotherapeutic material would have been too diffuse, and any one Christian ethical system would have done less than justice to the scope of Christian ethics.

Another possible method was to concentrate almost entirely on an exposition of the psychotherapeutic findings which have some implications for ethics, but to deal only briefly with the way in which the ethical system may be changed as a result of these implications. The danger in such an approach is that the

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<sup>1</sup>David E. Roberts, Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950).



ontribution may be thought of as but one-way, when in fact it works both ways.

Still another method which might have been tried is semi-experimental. Reports of actual psychotherapeutic work could have been studied in order to discover shifts in point of view on matters of ethical concern; and these could have been correlated with professed Christian ethical principles before and after the therapy. This ought to be tried some time, but it was not possible for me for practical reasons.

In the choice of method limitation, I wanted to preserve these things: (1) concern for the two-way contribution, critical and constructive; (2) consideration of most of the basic general areas, not just of a few of them; (3) the best and most thoughtful representative consideration of ethical questions by both theologians and psychotherapists, not poor thinking of one group against good thinking by the other; (4) study of points of view sufficiently congenial to my own so that I could reasonably demonstrate my own point of view as bearing a close relationship to those considered--contrast to a black-and-white kind of study.

The method chosen, then, is as follows. I have selected two leading contemporary theologians who are also concerned with Christian ethics, and two leading contemporary psychotherapists who have also done work on ethics. My study will deal with the ethical thought of all four. The ethical thought of the therapists, conditioned by their therapeutic work, will have its implications drawn out for the ethical thought of the theologians. I will draw on my own point of view and critical judgment in commenting on

the ethical thought of both theologians and psychotherapists, to the end of reconsidering the bases upon which Christian ethics should rest.

The psychotherapists to be studied are J. G. Flugel and Erich Fromm. The most obvious reason for their selection is that both have written explicitly about ethics, and in some detail. That is to say, each has actually worked on ethical theory in the light of his psychotherapeutic experience, not merely permitted it to be implicit, as is the case with many other excellent therapeutic workers like Karen Horney, Franz Alexander, Fritz Kunkel, Karl Menninger, Carl R. Rogers, Harry Stack Sullivan, and others.

There are other reasons for this choice which are even more important. In a sense, the two men together can be said to represent the British, American, and Continental traditions in psychoanalysis. Flugel represents the British middle-of-the-road approach in psychoanalysis, which never was as liberal and radically conservative as was true on the Continent, but which also has never become as radically progressive as has some psychoanalysis in America. Fromm merges the German and American traditions in a radically progressive way. Trained originally as a social psychologist, he has always been progressive because oriented to the social dimensions of psychological problems. But he also represents something of the radical conservatism of Continental psychoanalysis, in much the same sense that a Neo-Reformation theologian represents the radically conservative side of the Continental tendency. The merely progressive analyst would stop talking, e.g., of the Oedipus complex. Fromm redefines



it in symbolic, i.e., non-literal, terms, showing the basic truth which lies in it, symbolically speaking. This is in no sense a reactionary tendency. It is rather a radical conservatism, allied with his radical progressivism, which looks back for basic meanings into the historical tradition of psychoanalysis.

It would of course be false to imply that these men are representative of current psychotherapy in a statistical sense. But as representing the best in the three great social habitats of psychoanalysis--Britain, the Continent, and America--they are unexcelled for our purposes.

The question may immediately be raised as to why non-medical psychotherapists have been selected. The answer is simply that no medically trained therapists have dealt as explicitly with ethical questions. Besides, both these men are recognized as excellent therapists even by their medical colleagues. Perhaps it is no coincidence that their background of training in social and psychological studies inclined them to be more expertly aware of the dimension of ethics, and more quickly, than was true of their medical colleagues.

It may also be asked why avowedly Christian psychotherapists were not chosen. The answer to this is that no one of psychotherapeutic stature, who is a professing Christian at the same time, has yet dealt explicitly with ethics. This too would appear to be no accident. It is a watered-down form of Christian ethical principles which is the root of the professed humanistic principles of western civilization. Those most likely to do pioneering work are, like Fromm and Flugel, impressed with some aspects

of this heritage but critical of others. Once they have made their mark, other therapists who are also Christian may be stimulated to do more constructive work on ethical problems.

Still another question may deal with the choice of two psychoanalysts to represent psychotherapy in general, instead of, e.g., one psychoanalyst and one other therapist (psychotherapy is of course the broader and more inclusive term, psychoanalyst the term for therapists in the Freudian tradition). The answer is partly that no non-analytical therapist has written well about ethics, but mainly that the analytic tradition (even when dealt with symbolically as in Fromm) has been the basis for all modern dynamic psychotherapy.

The reasons behind the selection of A. E. Taylor and Paul Tillich as theologians are similar to those governing the choice of the psychotherapists. In the field of Christian ethics as well as theology, Taylor represents the same kind of non-extreme British tradition that Flugel represents in psychotherapy. It is interesting that both men, while writing with "style" in the British tradition, seem wordy to the American reader; whereas Fromm and Tillich are both concise. Tillich represents the merger of German and American traditions in theology and Christian ethics, much as Fromm does in psychotherapy. In Tillich there is the same radical progressivism, but also the same kind of radical conservatism, returning again and again to study the truth hidden symbolically under this or that part of the tradition. It is not without significance that both Fromm and Tillich, transplanted Germans, speak and write English with extraordinary facility.



Thus Tillich and Taylor together represent the three great traditions of the west in Christian ethics--Continental, British, and American--as do Fromm and Flugel in psychotherapy.

Another reason for choosing Taylor and Tillich is that both deal in their writings with what I would regard as the three broad dimensions of ethical relevance: the philosophical and general principles, the social, and the personal or psychological (with the exception of Taylor on the social). Many theologians who have written on Christian ethics have neglected one or more of these dimensions. Reinhold Niebuhr, for instance, has written on the first two but neglected the third.<sup>1</sup> Knudsen has in large part ignored the second.<sup>2</sup> Ramsey has dealt significantly only with the first.<sup>3</sup> Brunner deals but little with the third, and is doubtful about the first.<sup>4</sup> Taylor (with some qualifications) and Tillich deal with all three.

Furthermore, both these men take philosophy seriously. This does not mean that they let philosophy guide their Christian ethical thinking regardless of the gospel. It means that they both realize there is no getting around the questions of philosophy, that such questions must be dealt with constantly and explicitly.

<sup>1</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935).

<sup>2</sup> Albert C. Knudson, The Principles of Christian Ethics (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943).

<sup>3</sup> Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950).

<sup>4</sup> Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947).



This gives a breadth to their work not found in writers who concentrate on a mere exposition of Christianity without constant correlation with philosophic questions. Since philosophy symbolizes, in the deepest form, all scientific or empirical knowledge, it is difficult to see how there can be a universe of discourse between Christian ethics and something like psychotherapy unless philosophy is taken seriously and relevantly (though not necessarily determinatively).

It would be less than honest to conceal the fact that Fromm and Tillich have been personal friends for many years, and that I have developed my own point of view on these questions in part through stimulating discussions with them singly and together. This gives me a feeling for their thinking which might not come solely through a perusal of their writings. I have not met personally either Flugel or Taylor, and Taylor died in 1945.

What I am really concerned about is the Protestant Christian tradition in ethics, and what the findings of psychotherapy say that is basic in relation to it. Because of the peculiar way in which these four men represent the best in the Continental, British and American traditions, they are unusually well suited to an exploration of this kind.



## CHAPTER II

### BASIC PROBLEMS

Before entering into the detailed discussion of Flugel, Fromm, Taylor and Tillich, two preliminaries are necessary. The first, in this chapter, is the presentation of basic problems of Christian ethics upon which the psychotherapeutic material may be able to shed some light. The second, in the following chapter, will be to set forth a brief historical sketch of the development of modern psychotherapy.

As Tillich points out, it is a function of philosophy (in our context, of psychotherapy) to define and sharpen up problems to which Christianity is the answer.<sup>1</sup> This is to say that, unless faith is relevant, it is no faith at all. It is to say that apologetics, dealing with the context in which the faith is to operate, is not just something conceded, but something of a character which can be called basic.

When we speak in this chapter of basic problems, therefore, we are not necessarily raising the questions in the form in which Christian ethics has considered them traditionally. We are asking them out of the modern philosophic context (informed chiefly by psychological and psychotherapeutic knowledge), in the belief

<sup>1</sup> Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 60.

hat the subsequent systematic consideration of the therapeutic and Christian ethical thinkers may more effectively be brought to focus upon them, and therefore upon the nature and meaning and relevance of Christian ethics to our world.

These questions are original constructs. They are themselves a synthetic attempt on my part to be as sharp and fundamental as possible in raising questions to which Christian ethics must find an answer in order to demonstrate relevance in our situation today.

### Authority and Content

On all occasions in Christian history when some existing system (interpretation) of Christian thought has been questioned, the bases of Christian ethical authority have also been questioned. The authority upon which modes of conduct have been assumed to rest has been doubted, and these doubts have been expressed strongly. But attack upon the authority, and attack upon the content, of conduct have not necessarily appeared together. In fact, many of the most vicious attacks upon the content of conduct have been carried out while lip service was still paid to the authority, as by Nazism.

When the conflict has been between some existing ethical system and an antagonist of that system, the conduct (e.g., principles of relationship between man and man) of both has quite often been the same. Thus, we might say, the battles recognized as religious battles have not focused on content but on authority. This fact has given a flexibility to modes of conduct down through





the Christian years, the significance of which has not always been appreciated. It should be noted that flexibility in this sense does not necessarily mean less stringency, but capacity to change in relation to some previous norm. There has been the possibility of changing to more rigid standards and away from easier ones, as well as vice versa. Because content was not the center of the battle, it could more easily change.

If it had been otherwise, it is hard to see how Christianity could have been absorbed by so many peoples of such diverse cultures. There was adaptation by various peoples to Christianity as it was represented to them; but there was also interpretation and adaptation of what was held to be Christian in line with previously held modes of the particular culture. How else, for example, could a completely patriarchal and authoritarian assumption about the nature of family life have been held within a Christian context?

So Christian ethics as an ally or branch of Christian theology--the human reasoning about the modes and ends of human conduct in the light of the Christian faith--has fought what it has regarded as its biggest battles at the point of its authority. It has always held, in one way or another, that ethics can not be viewed as something independent, but is subservient to or derivative from theology and from the Christian revelation.

The immediate point of this discussion is not to draw a judgment upon this fact, but merely to describe it clearly in view of its consequences for our study. We might also note in passing that this is a fact because of the peculiar character of

Western European history, in which Christianity rose to being the dominating element in the culture and so impressed certain aspects of its nature upon that culture that they remain as a common secularized substratum. If genuinely different challenges (in content of conduct) had struck severe blows at Europe at any time before the twentieth century, Christian ethics might well have dealt differently with the problems of authority and content. Some sense of the difference may be gathered by the panic over the near-conquest of much of Europe by Islam. For such an eventuality would have altered completely the substratum, as a later temporary victory by Hitler actually did. No significant group in western history has seriously questioned, for example, the institution of monogamous marriage. Because so many such things remained basically unquestioned, the battles were fought with a peculiar kind of unacknowledged common agreement.

We have indicated that this situation permitted a certain capacity for change in the standards of actual conduct. Yet at the same time, it may be said to have had a hypocritical flavor. Many actual changes in conduct have taken place which were recognized only later; and hence for a long time were not made part of the thought structure of Christian ethics. Because the battle line was drawn at the point of the authority for ethics, actual conduct could change without altering theory and interpretation of principles for long periods.

In different ways, Marx, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Freud have all sensed this hypocritical element in Christian ethical theory, and have tried to unmask it. Marx saw it in large-scale



social terms, with the ethical theory serving as a soothing syrup or preoccupying agent; while at the level of content people starved. Feuerbach was a prophet against the idolatry of identifying the status quo in religion and ethics with what Christianity professed itself to be. Nietzsche concluded the theory itself was wrong, for the actual principalities and powers were served by it instead of serving it. Freud saw it in personal and interpersonal terms, in which the rigid quest for good actually defeated the appearance of good.

In earlier days there had been other "bad boys" notably Hobbes and Machiavelli. The real motivating forces of men, they said in effect, are not at all what they are represented to be in existing ethical (mainly Christian) thought. But they were naughty boys in their day, in a way which Marx and Freud have not been in ours; for the common substratum was too broad in their period for them to make much impact on it.

Marx and Freud have made a much heavier impact on this hypocritical element in our day. And yet it is doubtful whether the critical attack they have made has had as large an influence as it deserves (apart from the development of political Communism out of Marx) because of the generally negative attitude which both took, almost one of muck-raking where Christian ethics was concerned. Besides, each of these men continued to count on aspects of his own tradition which he did not acknowledge, Marx on idealism and Freud on romanticism and rationalism.

Obviously, our purpose is not basically negative. But the negators may often be found to have critical points of great importance, overlooked because of the context in which they are



set forth.

If we can keep this clearly in mind (with regard to Freud and the psychotherapeutic tradition), we may now have a chance to correct without vilifying, to appreciate some new insights without scorning all the old. We may be able to move away somewhat from a complete preoccupation with authority in Christian ethics to a serious and open concern for content, not simply waiting until actual changes in conduct have occurred and then either admitting them to the circle or calling them bad names.

It is also possible that an approach which looks seriously at content may make some contribution to the problem of authority, just as past consideration of the problem of authority has made undeniable contributions to the problems of content. We may see that there is a dialectic here which has usually been ignored in Christian ethical thought.

Without denying in any way the importance of the problem of authority in Christian ethics, we may nevertheless see that a complete preoccupation with it tends to an all-or-nothing kind of attitude--so that we might find ourselves compelled to say, for example, "It's all in Luther," or in apparent contrast, "Luther understood nothing." When we approach something like psychotherapy with this kind of attitude, we are almost sure to be wrong one way or the other. To be so seduced by it that no other dimension of thought seems worth while, or to feel so deeply hostile to it that we can only fight it at all points--these are logically opposite, but psychologically twin, outlooks neither of which is calculated to perform the function needed. Nor is



it fair to accept certain findings of psychotherapy which have found their way into general human thought, but without acknowledging the blood which their proponents had to shed in order to make them a part of the common culture.

We need to deal with content and authority and their relationship, with the hypocrisy which would deflect us from looking seriously at content as well as authority, and with an all-or-nothing approach which would have us see ethics and psychotherapy in complete harmony or complete tension. Psychotherapy should be able to shed some analytical light on the nature of this problem. Christian ethics, reconsidered in the light of the psychological analysis, should be able to restate more adequately the proper relation between authority and content.

#### Good and Conscience

There is a second basic problem which the findings of psychotherapy suggest, which may first be described in terms of its historical development. This is the question of the two ethical perspectives derived respectively from the Greek and the Hebrew aspects of the heritage of Christianity.

We call these "perspectives" advisedly. For it is not that the Greeks made no reference to conscience or that the Hebrews were uninterested in the good. But the Greeks assumed that the real problem of ethics, that which defines its nature, is the search for the good, for that which is valuable. It might be good for man, or good for God--generally these were considered to correspond--but in any event it is a search for the good.



To the Hebrews the perspective or point of view was different. The problem of ethics is the problem of conscience, i.e., the problem of loyalty to the group as God makes known to the group his will for it.

The difference is not, it should be noted, between reason and revelation, although it is true that the Greek perspective relied more heavily on what man could do to discover than on his receptivity to revelation. But despite this difference, it is not fundamental. The basic distinction is one of perspective-- of the assumption about where one begins to look for the nature of the ethical.

Because of the confluence of the Greek and Hebrew traditions in Christianity, one would expect that this difference in perspective would have been fought out long since; and that either one side would have won, or a position including both perspectives would have been reached. The fact is that neither of these things occurred. Both perspectives have been retained in Christian ethics; but a combining kind of viewpoint has not been achieved. So far as I can see, every system of Christian ethics, if analyzed far enough, may be classed as dominantly Greek or Hebrew on this point. Every system also contains aspects of the other; for there was a real merger of content elements. But this is not the same as a serious consideration of these two basic perspectives resulting in a new one.

A reading of Christian ethical literature in the light of this fact leaves the strong impression that this failure to deal with the perspective problem has many practical implications.



Where the point of view is assumed without comment to be a search for good or for value, the result is often a Hellenistic flattening out of life, a minimizing of the immense difficulties in the way of growth in ethical or moral insight and capacity. Potential harmony, whether cosmic or intrapsychic, tends to be emphasized, at the expense of adequate wrestling with the stubborn obstacles.

On the other hand, if the conscience perspective is assumed, the tendency is to move toward a compulsive legalism or, in reaction, antinomianism in some form. The Hebrew-conscience perspective does tend to deal seriously with conflict, to face the obstacles, but to be not so clear as to what all the activity is about. In the Freudian mythology, the Hellenistic-value trend tends toward an illusory harmony of Id, Ego, and Super-Ego; while the Hebrew-conscience trend tends toward conquest by either Id or Super-Ego of the Ego.

It is not out of order to suggest that these two perspectives are like what we mean today by the objective or rational approach on the one hand (Greek-good) and by the existential on the other (Hebrew-conscience). Both are necessary; but saying so does not necessarily mean that we bring them into fruitful interrelationship.

Is ethics to be conceived fundamentally as a search for the good, as a response to that which creates value? Or is it to be understood as a heeding of that which our distinctively human capacities tell us at any moment to be our deepest concern?

Or is it possible that both these notions are in some respects abstractions from something still more basic, which is capable of

being identified, and which could therefore serve as a perspective transcending the Greek and Hebrew viewpoints in the realm of ethics? Is it possible that the psychotherapeutic implications shed any light on this question?

### Freedom and Security

Ethically speaking, what is the relation of freedom and security? Ethics is frequently viewed as an understanding of the process by which freedom is actualized at a human level. This is in some sense freedom to become what one potentially is. Ethics can also be seen as an understanding of the process by which security is gained and maintained against the dangers which threaten it at a human level. Both these may be true, but it may be noted that the first is like the Greek-good approach and the second like the Hebrew-conscience approach. Even if both be true, how can their meaning and proper interrelationship be understood?

The full seriousness of this problem is rarely faced. Sometimes it has been dealt with in an almost offhand way, as by asserting that freedom comes through a form of bondage and security through the renunciation of securities. Psychotherapeutic observation would suggest these are superficial statements of the relationship.

Here is the kind of starting point we can find in psychotherapy toward a better definition of this problem. A person comes to psychotherapy unfree, i.e., blocked from becoming what he thinks he wants to be and also from what he might be beyond what he now knows. He comes insecure, i.e., not having found



firm ground to stand on where he had sought it, and also not having found the truly firm ground where he has not been able to seek it. As he proceeds with therapy, he becomes more free, i.e., more able to be what he wants, and more able to want what will better release his residual powers. He also becomes, at the same time, more secure, i.e., better able to stand for the time being on any ground that happens to be around, and better able to move toward ground that is firmer. As his freedom and security both grow more real, neither becomes quite so preoccupying as before. Because compulsion is lessened, he is free to be either more automatic and spontaneous or more painlessly deliberate in his reactions. He is secure enough either to stand quietly on ground experienced to be firm, or to move away from it in pursuit of chosen ends.

It is not, therefore, double talk when we refer to the concomitance of freedom and security. But these are not the same as the subjective feelings to which we may ascribe the names freedom and security. The therapeutic patient may at times be making his best progress when suffering most through realization of his unfreedom; yet it may be a new feeling of security which enables him to do this. One who pushes himself toward a new dimension of insecurity may wrongly deny that he has no need of security; for if he had none, he could not do so without panic. There is, therefore, no way of solving the problem merely through subjective feelings, but also no way of handling it by denying the relevance of subjective feelings.

We noted also that the accretion of freedom and security

could result in more spontaneous or more deliberate behavior.

But what is the proper relation of these two? Perhaps spontaneity and deliberation require redefinition. In the usual connotations, spontaneity tends to mean impulsive, i.e., acting with only a segment of the being. Perhaps it should be redefined to mean so acting in the security that the result of the action, either way, will not threaten one's existence, and therefore in the freedom to act at once. In the usual sense, deliberation is hard work, toiling over alternatives, struggling to bring the segments of self and problem together. Perhaps it should be redefined as the security in which not acting immediately will not threaten one's existence, and therefore in the freedom not to act at once. So redefined, both spontaneity and deliberation would have to be opposed to pseudo-spontaneity and pseudo-deliberation, the former representing the whole being and the latter being segmental.

So understood, the criterion of appropriateness of spontaneity or deliberation would rest with the situation in which the person finds himself, that is, with the exact nature of its enhancing or threatening character. When responding appropriately, deliberation would represent spontaneity, and spontaneity, deliberation.

In ethics, do we teach people to love God and (be free to) do as they please? Or do we teach that their security is in the law of the Lord on which they meditate day and night? Can we reach a better understanding, through the interrelated consideration of Christian ethics and psychotherapy, of the relations between freedom and security, spontaneity and deliberation?



## Transcendent World or Self-Transcending Creatures

We have indicated that all the traditional views in Christian ethics have held, in one way or another, to the dependence of ethics upon theology or, to put it in a more accurate form, to the non-independence or illusory independence of ethics if divorced from theology. The ways in which this has been interpreted fall into two main groups, which we may give in short-hand as the emphasis upon a transcendent world or upon self-transcending creatures.

The first view says something like this. While we fall short of a transcendental realm in ethics, because of sin, we come as close as possible to the ethics of this transcendental world by acting morally, at the same time aware that we have not reached it. This is the dominant view in Catholicism. The other view says something different. We can not of ourselves act morally at all, because of our sin; indeed, we can approach moral action only as we, old creatures, are made new, are made to transcend ourselves, which we cannot bring about by ourselves. This is the characteristic view of Protestantism. The general problem is: What is the nature of transcendence in Christian ethics? It may be noted that there is a psychological dimension to the difference between these two views. The more Catholic view is akin to the ascendance, Hellenic-good perspective on the nature of ethics. The more Protestant view is like the under-judgment, Hebrew-conscience perspective. Two psychologies of human motivation underlie them. In part, the solution to this part of the problem must

depend upon finding a solution to the more general question of the two ethical perspectives.

But there is something else involved in this question of the nature of transcendence in ethics. Both views, traditionally, have been transcendental, i.e., have held the assumption of a "second world." The statement of the problem has been made in relation to the actual existence of such a second world. In a still more general sense, both the traditional types of view have rested on substantive philosophical assumptions. If a second world, and substantive philosophy, are not adhered to, then the character of the transcendence problem is altered. This does not mean there is no problem, but that the problem must be redefined. There may well be truths and values which either or both of these types of view have attempted to maintain. Can these be discerned beneath the cosmological framework in which they have been set, and then examined especially in the light of the psychotherapeutic knowledge of human motivation?

In order to clarify the importance of such a procedure, we may give a brief anticipation of an answer to the redefined transcendence problem in Christian ethics. Psychotherapeutic experience would suggest two things negatively: (1) that real moral progress does not come about through what is felt as effort; (2) that it is not in fact discontinuous with previous experience. Positively, it would also suggest two things: (1) that real moral progress does occur through a "transmoral" process, an eruptive experience away from crystallized moralities or moral strivings; (2) that the mere setting of a new course or direction



is not enough, but must be supplemented by a re-examination of the several areas of moral and psychological experience in the light of the new direction. (2) Cannot be meaningful unless it follows (1); but (1) by itself may be vacuous.

To put these insights into the terms of Christian ethics and theology, there is an eruption, a "leap," but this is not discontinuous with previous moral experience. The leap is made necessary by the reality of the structures of evil, introjected as well as external. A sense of discontinuity with the course or career of past moral experience seems essential, in any man or society we know, if movement and growth in moral experience in any fundamental sense is to become a reality. But this feeling of discontinuity, and even the necessity for an experience of transformation through the loss of old patterns (of defense), does not indicate that moral growth involves only experiences of discontinuity. The eruptive experience is the clue to moral growth only if essential continuity is seen along with subjective discontinuity. This is to say that the moral and the transmoral can not deal with different realities, although they may well connote different and equally necessary perspectives on the same process.

If transcendence be understood, then, as ~~the~~ above discussion suggests, as an aspect of a process, then a subsidiary problem arises. Under what kinds of conditions does the transcendent aspect of the process come to the fore? This question is important because the Protestant emphasis has been on "complete regeneration"--the newness of the new man all at once, like going

to a clothing store, stripping, and getting entirely re-outfitted.

Is there, so to speak, also transcendence if the equivalent of but one sock is changed? To alter the metaphor, is there transcendence at low as well as high temperatures?

Here also a tentative answer may be suggested. We speak correctly of transcendence in connection with one sock if this points toward the new outfit, or to a low temperature change or apparently trivial incident if they nevertheless contain within themselves the possibilities of total transformation. It seems possible that the recognition of this may offer bridge possibilities between the more Protestant and more Catholic perspectives on transcendence.

### Conclusion

We have suggested four basic problems which the modern world in general, and psychotherapy in particular, make important for Christian ethics to consider. We have not attempted to confine ourselves entirely to a statement of the problems, but have made limited moves toward answering the problems by redefining them, especially in the light of psychotherapeutic findings but drawing also upon other sources of wisdom. This mode of discussion has been adopted because it makes redefinition of the problems clearer, and because it suggests what I believe to be true, that the correlation of Christian ethics and philosophic knowledge in general (for our purposes, psychotherapeutic knowledge in particular) is subtle, dialectical and continuous. To pretend otherwise--as by separating problems completely from answers--is to do violence to the nature both of problems and solutions.



It can hardly be that a consideration of psychotherapeutic findings in relation to Christian ethics can consider all dimensions of the ethical problems of authority and content, good and conscience, freedom and security, or transcendent world and self-transcending creatures. But if it be true that all knowledge is one, then a sufficient penetration into any realm of knowledge (in this case psychotherapy) may yield depth which affects all dimensions of our problems even if it does not wholly encompass them. We may have a valid avenue toward the whole truth even if it be not the sole pathway.

We shall attempt to keep these basic problems in mind throughout the discussion; and at the conclusion of the essay, go over them again in the light of the data which will have been presented.

