

see his transformation in terms both of freedom and security, he will eventually state that his freedom and security obviously changed in character and depth at the same time, the same rate, and by the same process.

If we ask him whether he has renounced security, he will state this to be false, but that he has a new kind. This is not wholly unlike Taylor's "freedom from circumstance," although it includes much more than freedom "from passion" or emotion. It may indeed mean the freedom to exercise passion. But this, he will tell us, is none the less security because we do not have to keep thinking of security. And what makes it secure is not a non-alertness to ways of changing oneself further, i.e., it is not something stubbornly static. It is security because it does not need to stand on itself or prove itself unchangeable. It is non-compulsive.

If we ask whether this means, in effect, that he has renounced freedom, he will vigorously and properly deny such an allegation. The fact that he has found a new security would itself at once be negated if he could not act, decide, be responsible. But the anxious tone which pervaded his decisions has disappeared or diminished. They still require sweat and blood, at times; but the whole of one's existence is no longer threatened by them. Surely this is freedom, finite freedom.

~~The corollary question we raised was the relation of~~ spontaneity to deliberation. There may be some question whether it is worth while using these terms or not. Fromm, in earlier writings, used "spontaneity," but later subsumed this under "pro-

ductiveness." Tillich uses "spontaneity" to refer to the sub-human freedom potential to animals. Yet it would seem of value to separate the term from connotations which lead to such discarding, and this may be done, on the basis of psychotherapeutic insights, by linking it properly with "deliberation."

Initially spontaneous behavior, in the child or race, is characterized by immediacy of response--not, even in the baby, by a mere heeding of impulse, since the factors of social introjection are also involved from the start. But it is total and immediate action or response. Deliberation enters, initially, as doubt, hesitation, non-immediacy, and therefore as partial rather than total action or response. As a human being, one must reflect. He reflects the more as initially immediate and total actions are ineffective. Thus deliberation, initially, is inhibition in relation to the immediacy, totality, and naïveté of action.

Let us suppose that the direction in which deliberation originally appears were continued with no checks or diversions. What would emerge is a character pattern, a readiness to respond, or an attitude set, which met every thing, person and situation under the compulsion to wait, to think, and to analyze before acting. Whether it was a choice between a red and a green apple, or the giving or not giving of oneself in friendship, one could not act with immediacy and wholeness. The fact that there would be no appreciable difference of outcome on the apples, but that non-immediacy of response to a person as a person would chill one's life blood, would become utterly confused. The set toward deliberation would be defeating its original intention, the ability to

make partial instead of total responses when these are adequate to the situation (e.g., smiling with the face instead of with everything down to the toes), or the ability to make delayed responses in order to protect against injury (e.g., see if the one apple is rotten). If the original deliberation direction has become a set, the power of discrimination between those situations calling for immediate or delayed, whole or partial responses, has disappeared. Deliberation has turned on itself and eaten up its intention.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the original immediacy of action, always holistic in character, should continue unchecked by deliberation. Not only would we not have a human being, but life would become very dangerous for such a person. To caricature, suppose that, like a baby, his pleasure or his rage had always to be expressed by the entire body, in complete action. Social retaliation would be swift. That is to say, there can be no solution to the spontaneity-deliberation problem by considering the original form in which these qualities may be viewed in human development.

But what happens in proper human development, or, in our context, the transformation which psychotherapy helps to bring? The person who comes to therapy may have, at the outset, an inability to be "spontaneous" in the original sense--the incapacity to act or to respond with wholeness and immediacy in any situation--or he may have an inability to be "deliberate" in the original sense--be under compulsion in reference to either his drives or his conscience. And as therapy proceeds, it is clear that

what he learns is not how to "balance" one against the other, how to mix occasional spontaneity with his deliberation or vice versa. What he learns, in general terms, is how to objectify each situation in relation to his own interest, or how to bring the subjective aspect into relationship to each situation--how to transcend subjectivity and objectivity in each situation without losing the reality of either.

In more specific terms, he learns how to make immediate and whole responses when the situation (in relation to him and his desires) calls for it, e.g., to another human being as human being. But at the same time, he learns to make partial or deliberating responses toward a situation (in relation to him) when its nature or importance suggests this. In relation to freedom and security, he is free to act immediately and wholly, or free enough to defer action or to act only in part; and at the same time he is secure enough to be able to exercise this freedom. He no longer is under compulsion to act or not to act, to inhibit or to express. But in this case, he is both spontaneous and deliberate at the same time--not in the same act, but in the same character.

Spontaneity and deliberation, therefore, as redefined qualities (from their meaning at the time of emergence) are not properly qualities of acts, as they were at first. Instead, they become qualities of character or personality in relation to acts. If viewed in this way, a "capacity" for spontaneity or deliberation would be a unified quality, not the merger of two antithetical qualities. This would seem to be a concept of great value for

ethics; for other terms, including freedom and security, do not easily lend themselves to description of the sense in which immediacy and delay, whole or partial action, naïve or complex viewing of a situation, are related properly. By generalizing from the psychotherapeutic evidence, we see that they are adequately descriptive not of acts divorced from character but of character-readiness in types of situations (when the situations are viewed in polar fashion), and that they are contextual aspects of the capacity to exercise freedom because it has a security on which to rest.

Transcendence in Christian Ethics

The fourth basic problem to which we referred was that of a "transcendent world or self-transcending creatures." The two views, we indicated, tend to correspond to the Catholic and Protestant conceptions of ethics. In the former, we come as close as possible to the ethics of the transcendental world but remain aware that we have not reached it--this is the Catholic ethics of a "transcendent world." In the latter, we can approach moral action only as we, creatures, are made new, are made to transcend ourselves--this is the Protestant or "self-transcending creatures" view of ethics.

We noted that, traditionally speaking, both views have usually rested on the assumption of a "second world," and in any event have been discussed much more in static than dynamic terms, in concepts of substance rather than of process. Assuming that second world, static, and substantive frameworks of thought are

eliminated, may it be that there are truths or values inherent in both types of approach which need conservation or emphasis, when placed in a different framework of thought? And does psychotherapy make any suggestions along this line?

In our preliminary analysis, we suggested that psychotherapy suggests two things negatively and two positively which bear upon this problem: first, that real moral growth does not occur through what is experienced as "effort" or "moral striving;" second, that real moral growth is never wholly discontinuous with previous (moral) experience; third, that there is always an eruptive element when real moral growth is taking place; and fourth, that setting a new course or direction is not enough unless accompanied by a re-examination of the areas or orders of life in the light of the newly experienced sense of direction. All these points have been abundantly illustrated in the course of our discussion.

But if they are true, then several things follow which bear on our problem. Real moral development is not characterized by "moral striving," but transcends it in that the old good and the old creature become the new good and the new creature. There is "leap," discontinuity, in the development; so that it may properly be called transformation. But there is continuity as well, not alone in the Old Being which becomes the New Being, but also in that the intentionality of the old moral striving, freed and unimpulsive and not preoccupied with itself, moves into the new morality.

There is, therefore, in a symbolic sense a "transcendent

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world" in ethics as ontology, which beckons us however dimly we may see it, but the vision of which may be vitiated at any time. We think we are wholly within it. There is a continuity between the old and the new morality in us, between not moving or being unconcerned on the one hand and, on the other, having a vision but being aware of our distance from its object. This seems the truth of the Catholic view.

On the other hand, what is most important is that we are or can be "self-transcending creatures." Qualitatively, what we have and see and feel after the eruption which has transformed us, is utterly different from what we experienced before. Had we proceeded along the old direction, we would have been lost. So our new vision of the good, which has come through faith not our own efforts, is qualitatively entirely different from what we had before. It was not we but God who worked in us. We are new creatures, and our good is a new good. This is the truth of the Protestant view.

Insofar as both views have traditionally been set forth in a "second world" framework, they must be understood to be symbolic not literal truth. And by the same token, insofar as they have both tended (in contrast to Tillich, for example) to minimize the human side of the polarity, they have been biased and compensatory.

Once those corrections have been made, we can see that the one way in which transcendent or transcending elements may be understood in ethics is within a context of process. There is always a reaching beyond, and the source of this is not myself,

but it is myself who does the reaching at the same time my awareness is that my arm has been sustained. I know that what I have grasped is qualitatively quite different from what I thought I was reaching for; but the good it fulfills is not to be compared with the lesser or illusory good which I thought I wanted. Transcendence is a way of referring to the discontinuous aspects in a process whose continuities are in the form of intentionality. When I am reaching for an illusory freedom, protecting the Old Man, exercising moral striving--I defeat the emergence of true freedom, the New Being, and the new morality. So these modes of procedure must be transcended, and I, with whatever ground of help I have, must do the transcending. On the other hand, my intentionality is toward freedom, toward the realization of my being, toward generically moral action. It requires transcendence to fulfill the intentionality of my being and my good. But though I be corrupted, at the vital point of intentionality I am not deprived.

In Christian ethics, therefore, transcendence ought to be considered in relation to intentionality on the one side, and to evil, guilt, sin, and so on, on the other. Its function in ethics is not polar with immanence, whatever relevance that may have in other contexts.

Criteria for a Constructive Christian Ethics

We turn now to the second part of our conclusion, the presentation of a constructive outline of Christian ethics which includes the contributions and suggestions emerging from psycho-

therapy but also the depth of the views of Christian thinkers like Taylor and Tillich. This section will be only a sketch, an indication of basic points rather than their elaboration. But most of the points have been elaborated in the previous pages; so that what follows is an attempt at constructive synthesis of much that was given previously in critical consideration of the views of others.

The constructive outline will be presented under three headings: first, content (or cases); second, method (or dialectics); and third, status (or ontology). Under each heading there is a general thesis: on content, that Christian ethics and moral theology relates general principle to concrete case in both directions; on method, that a dialectical and dynamic method must be used consistently in relating principle to case; and on status, that Christian ethics is the practical study of which ontology is the theoretical correlate.

Content.--Constructive Christian ethics is inseparable from moral theology and a casuistry, and therefore also from a moral pathology--not merely the pathology of moral striving itself, but also the pathology of actual contingent movement toward the good. The rationalistic separation between moral and ethical principles, and their application in concrete instances, must be broken down. This needs to be done not by reverting to the notion that we discover them through some means other than reflective and existential study of concrete cases in context and then application of these principles in concrete situations--but instead that we study principles through cases and cases through principles, the

general or universal and the concrete together. In ethics the concrete is casuistry; the universal is both good and conscience, with the subsidiary principles of freedom, security, love, etc., which follow.

If the right relation between case and principle is to obtain, constructive Christian ethics needs to have a dialectic of moral development, involving polar interdependence between selfhood and world. The dialectic must be developmental as well as cross-sectional. To speak of selfhood of the New Man emerging out of the work of grace upon man's old nature is cross-sectional; and, while true, static. There can be no general description of the moral life whose dialectic does not permit the growth of children to be included in as significant a sense as that of the most sophisticated adults. This demands the inclusion not only of a casuistry of individual children and groups or nations of children, but also of aspects of child development per se--a point which extends beyond childhood to other stages of life, and beyond chronological considerations to other ways of viewing human development. There is much of truth and value, for instance, in the newer concepts and discoveries of "normal child development;" but these suffer from not being presented in polar interdependence terms, and therefore the moral-development aspect of them is seldom seen. This fact provides another reason, incidentally, for the recovery of the generic concept of "moral" from exclusive association with that which is untransformed.

What constructive Christian ethics needs to present is not a "proper balance" notion of the relation between old and new.

morality, but a dynamic picture of the relationship between moral striving and the ethics of the New Being. There needs to be proper statement of the continuity and discontinuity in the process of development and emergence. It is not enough to lump all the old morality together, but it must have a casuistry resting upon a dynamic pathological characterology. There needs also to be a casuistry of the new morality, which is an equally dynamic but creative characterology.

Constructive Christian ethics requires a conscience theory which includes the pathological material of Flugel and Fromm, the "humanistic conscience" of Fromm, and the "transmoral conscience" of Tillich--stressing the discontinuity between humanistic and authoritarian as Fromm does, and between moral and transmoral as Tillich does, yet without losing sight of the intentionality of conscience at any level of consideration. Conscience as a positive intentionality does not belong exclusively to a "trans" category as if it were an effete guide for only a few; and yet there should be no blinking the need to shatter the old structure that the new might be born.

Constructive Christian ethics requires a theory of the "unconscious" which acknowledges in full its ambiguity, but which moves beyond the ambiguity to a more adequate contextual and dialectical statement of the relation between ethics and the unconscious. The clue for such a statement would seem to lie in the context of relationships between the specific contents of the unconscious at any particular time and the degree of reconciling or divisive elements in the relevant environment at that



time. Development of a proper statement will include more subtleties than this, but perhaps the general direction has been indicated.

As we saw in the first section of this chapter, constructive Christian ethics will deal seriously with the transcendence question, but will do so in process terms, will reject a "second world," and will not use transcendence concepts to deny continuity in morals and ethics.

Method.--The general thesis on method in constructive Christian ethics is that a dialectical and dynamic method must be used consistently in relating principle to case, the general to the concrete. This involves several corollaries.

Constructive Christian ethics needs to come to respectful but critical terms with philosophy and science, including psychotherapy. Much light is shed on the need for this relationship by the very nature of psychotherapy, which has to be existential as some science and philosophy does not, and which by this token is closer to Christian ethics than is much philosophy and science. The psychotherapists we have considered in this essay have not spoken in the context of Christian ethics. We have seen that they are not sufficiently dialectical in the thought which undergirds their work, that they have been guilty of compensatory modes of thought in neglecting statements of the object pole in ethics. But we should note that there is nothing in psychotherapy itself which demands this theoretical neglect. Psychotherapy can not be understood generically as philosophic or scientific in any sense which automatically sets it off from Christianity or



Christian ethics. It is much more difficult for Christian ethics to put out of account the findings of psychotherapy, existential as they are however ontologically inadequate in statement up to this time, than it would be for a non-existential philosophy or a positivistic science.

Constructive Christian ethics will continue to struggle with the Greek and the Hebrew aspects of its tradition (which we have characterized in shorthand as "aspiration" and "response"), but will be the better able to do so as these are handled dialectically throughout.

Constructive Christian ethics, using a fully dynamic and dialectical method, will give some serious reconsideration to its traditional dichotomies and polarities. An illustration is found in the polar relationships in which it is possible to discuss freedom. We have approved Tillich's change from freedom-necessity to freedom-destiny as from a static to a dynamic view of the world and of man. But we criticized Tillich for not dealing explicitly enough with the humanly correctable aspects of destiny in distinction from those inherent in contingency and finitude. And we indicated that both the current situation and the actually existing processes make it necessary to consider freedom in polar relation to security. This illustrates the fact that not only ought certain different things to be said, for example, about freedom and its polar relations, but the very nature both of freedom and its polarities requires reconsideration.

Constructive Christian ethics, in order to fulfill its dialectical method and polar interdependence point of view, needs

to develop explicitly the equivalent of a "field theory" in relation to the meaning of "psychic appearances" and "psychic reality." We have pointed repeatedly to the deceptiveness of psychic appearances, to the difficulties, in Tillich's terms, of distinguishing the concrete from the particular. Field theory offers a kind of dynamic symbol (focus and field) by which the centralizing and unifying agent (the old subject) has functional clarity in spite of as well as because of the power or force in the field (the old object). The symbol of focus easily suggests greater or lesser degrees of clarity. Thus there can be theonomy, or the concrete pointing to the universal, at one focus; while there is only autonomy, or the particular, at another. The difference may lie in the focus or in the field. This may be enough to suggest the possibilities that lie in a "model," or symbolic apparatus, which preserves the humility needed to be not too sure that one can separate out the merely particular at a glance, while at the same time one is alert to those conditions in both focus and field which indicate the concrete as pointing to the universal.

Constructive Christian ethics requires an adequate conception of the relation between vitality and personality--between the ordered and whole aspect of our existence, and the partial and dynamic basis on which its movement and energy rest. It is the latter which Christian ethics has often minimized or ignored, though never negated. It needs to be brought within the doctrines of love, of salvation, and of sanctification--and not consigned entirely to the doctrines of sin and the old morality. If the terms Spirit and Nature are to continue in theological use, they should

do so without the moralistic overtone which treats Nature as enemy and Spirit as friend. Spirit without Nature is lifeless, as Nature without Spirit is chaos.

Constructive Christian ethics will deal with the "tone" of ethics in such a way that the proper relationship is asserted between "fulfillment" and "control." To the majority of mankind, morality is, in terms of tone and feeling, only control. This is incompatible with ethics either as man's search for or his response to the Good. A tone around ethics of an opposite kind, the unfolding of something wholly given in substantive form and requiring only a pleasant emergence like a flower, plainly would lead either to a Nietzschean type of morality on the one side or to pure romanticism on the other, with the two types indeed having more in common than in division. In some respects, however, the tone of "fulfillment" is more basic than that of "control," for control is instrumental; but in a process, control may at any given moment be as important as fulfillment. What requires elucidation is the proper nature and character of this relationship, not standing for one against the other nor standing for both-and in simple substantive terms.

In following its proper method, constructive Christian ethics will and can be apologetic, dialectically mediating, without failing to acknowledge the kerygma as its ultimate source. In a dialectical view, the gospel is not only not just the Bible; it is not just the message either. Instead, it is the message as it strikes men--the Word made flesh, not the Word disembodied, which means no more eviscerated than de-corticated. There can be no



regression from the basic forms of process thought even in identification of the nature of the gospel. For the most part, this essay has stressed apologetic forms of thought rather than kerygmatic. It might have done otherwise if its purpose had been the exposition of constructive Christian ethics rather than study of the relationship between such ethics and psychotherapeutic thought.

Status.--The general thesis here is that constructive Christian ethics is the practical study of which ontology is the theoretical correlate. This wording is appropriated from an early suggestion by Tillich.

While stressing the "leap," transformation, justification by faith, the chasm between the Old Man and the New Being, we ought nevertheless to view ethics, status-wise, as the practical aspect of which the theoretical correlate is ontology. There is a New Good as well as a New Being, a saving good as well as a saving faith. This should not and need not be a Kantian position, with morality and moral experience considered as an area or realm of life offering our only direct insight into being and God. Morality, of the old or the new, is not to be understood as an area of experience, but as an aspect of it, or as a perspective on it. So understood, moral experience is coordinate with ontological experience or experience of the unconditional and the theonomous, but from slightly different human perspectives. In order to depreciate the value of the Old Man morality, we do not condemn generic morality and ethics. Indeed, our best condemnation of the old moral striving is by demonstrating the ways in



which its intentionality is frustrated by its "striving."

Constructive Christian ethics may well make more than it has of its "ethical trinity" of Being, Good and Love. These correspond to the same functions, or personae, as in the traditional doctrine of the Trinity: Being as dynamic source, Good as mediator and dynamic fulfillment, and Love as the creative agent which also transforms. Love as the "unity of being" is an ontological power from one perspective, an ethical power from another perspective, and a creative and transforming power from a third. This is why it belongs in the ethical trinity. But its own function is uniting, therefore creating and transforming. Only if understood in this depth and this context can love be considered as the basic principle of Christian ethics. The several forms of love can be considered not by placing agapé against eros, philia, and so on, as if they were coordinate aspects of a single reality--but instead by understanding them all in the light of their ground, love as the uniting power of being. This does away, incidentally, with either a disjunction between love and justice, a disillusioned renunciation of love in favor of contingent justice, or a romantic notion of the relationship between love and justice stemming from the automatic harmony notions which escape the confrontation of human finitude on the one side just as the complete discontinuity notions do on the other.

In considering the subjective pole of its "status," as well as the objective, constructive Christian ethics will have a theory of character and act which makes the latter always and inevitably subsidiary to the former. If this is done, then it



becomes possible to reconsider some of the traditional abstractions of ethics, such as the seven cardinal virtues or the seven deadly sins, but to make them universals instead of abstractions when viewed in the proper context, which includes taking them out of the "moral striving" orbit. It can also in itself help toward the new morality and the New Being, if it is indicated that any feelings one has about an act (which may be very complex) are in reality reflections on one's judgment of character. For reflections on character are deeper than those on isolated act, and tend to lead toward that kind of concern out of which transformation may come.

Constructive Christian ethics, while not denying the problem of authority, will view it in contextual terms, and will see that it is never considered wholly apart from content. This point was considered in detail in the first section of the current chapter.

A Concluding World.--This essay has been a long journey, no doubt tortuous and even at times boring to the reader. But I have accomplished the heart of the purpose with which I began, to demonstrate in critical and constructive form that Christian ethics requires some correction to be relevant to the modern world but that its basic points are sound when disentangled from a world view in which they have often been embedded, that psychotherapy's combination of scientific and existential makes a particular contribution to this end regardless of the formalized philosophy or ethics which have thus far been set forth by psychotherapists, and that an understanding of the most basic concepts and processes as Christian ethics sees them can contribute

contextually to the understanding of ethics which is held by the psychotherapists today. A good deal of the contribution which the Christian understanding of the ethical problem makes to current psychotherapeutic thinking has only been implied herein, and advisedly, for the reason that the new discipline of psychotherapy is not necessarily anti-Christian and should not on such grounds be set off against Christian ethics. But at least some of the implications of Christian ethics for the context of the thought of Flugel and Fromm, and other psychotherapists of the day, have been brought out.

At the beginning we indicated that there are three practical aspects to Christian ethics: the philosophical, psychological, and social. We suggested that the psychological had been most neglected in recent ethical thought, and that there threatened to be an unnecessary division between the philosophical and social aspects of Christian ethics. While we have ourselves of necessity been one-sided in this essay, in view of our subject, it has taken us more deeply into philosophical and social aspects of ethics than had originally been envisioned. This indicates the inseparability of Christian ethics. This essay may also, it is hoped, suggest that a proper consideration of the psychological aspect may do much to bridge the gap which too often now exists between social ethics as a kind of "concerned sociology" and philosophical ethics as a mere handmaid of doctrinal or philosophical theology.



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