

Of "compulsions" as opposing the exercise of freedom or its actualization, Tillich says little in these terms. And yet it would appear that their importance has increased in his thought, as indicated by the greater emphasis on "destiny" in polar relation to freedom, and not merely to freedom's qualification by finitude. He does point out that to most people "Psychological explanations seem to destroy responsibility. Psycho mechanisms, compulsions, and their methodological healing seem to deny personal freedom."¹ But Tillich does not of course believe that they do. In a discussion in 1943, Tillich once made this distinction between two ways of recognizing compulsion.² In the first I say to myself in effect, "This happened to me and I have no responsibility." In the second, "This was the result of my total character and is at the same time my responsibility." The implication of this is that the adequate recognition of the presence of compulsion is itself an act of actualizing one's freedom. But Tillich does not take the compulsion point of the psychologists and follow through its implications systematically in relation to freedom.

The concepts of personality and freedom are bound inseparably, in Tillich's thought, with "theonomy." Theonomy is the fulfillment of autonomy, not its negation. "Autonomy means the obedience of the individual to the law of reason, which he

¹Tillich, "The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations and Theoretical Questions," *op. cit.*, p. 368.

²Unpublished mimeographed report of discussion by a reporter.

finds in himself as a rational being."¹ In this sense reason is "the structure of the mind which enables the mind to grasp and to transform reality."² That is, autonomy is "obedience to reason" in the sense of the "'logos' immanent in reality and mind."³ Autonomy may be understood as "the dynamic principle of history,"⁴ and also of the individual, for "the man who enjoys autonomy-- however feeble and empty it may be--has experienced something that he cannot easily surrender."⁵

Contrasted to autonomy in many ways is heteronomy, in which one submits to the authority of other persons, institutions, cultural forms, so that heteronomy tends to deny autonomy. But autonomy tends to over-reach itself, to be finite but forget its finitude, to see things only at one pole and in one dimension. The difference between autonomy and theonomy is that in autonomy "the cultural forms appear only in their finite relationship," while in theonomy "they appear in their relation to the unconditional."⁶ Theonomy is "an autonomy filled with religion."⁷ It does not mean "the acceptance of a divine law imposed on reason by a highest authority; it means autonomous reason united with its own depth."⁸ Theonomy says that "the superior law is, at the same time, the innermost law of man himself," although it is "rooted in the divine ground which is man's own ground."⁹ As

¹Tillich, ST, I, 84.

²Ibid., p. 72.

³Tillich, PE, p. 44.

⁴Ibid., p. 45. ⁵Ibid., p. 195.

⁶Ibid., p. 45.

⁷Tillich, IOH, p. 24.

⁸Tillich, ST, I, 85.

⁹Tillich, PE, pp. 56-57.

Adams notes in Tillich's thought, "Theonomy supports autonomy and at the same time breaks through it without shattering it."¹

It is vital to the understanding of Tillich's thought to see that heteronomy contradicts or works against both autonomy and theonomy, but that theonomy is a perspectivistic or contextual transformation of autonomy without violating its basic nature. There is autonomy beneath the surface of every theonomy, for example in "the struggle of ethical as against ritualistic 'holiness.'"² Theonomy is "the free devotion of finite forms to the eternal."³ So almost anything or event may be theonomous.

Personality problems and developments, educational aims and methods, bodily and mental healing, can become objects of theology, not from the point of view of their ethical and technical form, but from the point of view of their power of mediating some aspects of that which concerns us ultimately in and through their ethical and technical form.⁴

There is no event or relationship in existence wholly without the power to mediate or witness to the unconditional ground of being, not only in general but of the event or relationship or person itself. This is Tillich's transformation and redefinition of the "other-worldliness" of traditional theologies. Anything, even ethics, is seen "autonomously" if in and of itself. To see it "theonomously" does not violate but reveals its real nature, and the ground on which its being rests.

The "good for man," according to Tillich, could be char-

¹James Luther Adams, "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era," The Protestant Era, by Paul Tillich (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 293.

²Ibid., p. 45.

³Tillich, RS, p. 179.

⁴Tillich, ST, I, 14.

acterized as becoming a person, actualizing one's freedom in polar interdependence with his destiny, living under an autonomy filled with theonomy. But it is interesting that Tillich rarely uses such a term as the "good for man." Apparently this phrase carries for him the connotation of concentration on one pole at the expense of the other, and such a hesitation carries over to his general feeling about "ethics." He does indicate that "The goodness of man's created nature is that he is given the possibility and necessity of actualizing himself and of becoming independent by his self-actualization, in spite of the estrangement unavoidably connected with it."¹ But there is a fear that discussion of the "good for man" will suggest that this can be seen only in the subjective pole.

Tillich indicates that it is his Lutheran heritage which makes him suspicious of progress in moral matters.

If by education and favorable circumstances the plane, on which moral decisions are made, be raised and original crudeness be suppressed to a large degree, morality as such, the freedom to do good or evil, would not be touched by that fact. Humanity does not become better, but Good as well as Evil are raised to a higher plane.²

"Moral evil is the tragic implication of creaturely freedom," of the destiny which is the other pole of human freedom.³ Although man retains "his essential goodness," this "goodness condemns rather than determines his existence."⁴ This is the "law" situation, which we shall look at more thoroughly in the section following.

¹Ibid., p. 259. ²Tillich, IOH, p. 56. ³Tillich, ST, I, 269.

⁴Tillich, "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," op. cit., p. 213.

Tillich is uncompromising in criticizing any one who believes there is some point where the "prison of finitude" can be broken through, as by Kant in the realm of "moral experience."¹ Kant's "doctrine of the categories is a doctrine of human finitude," but apparently Kant would have done better to stick to that and not attempt to find a kind or realm of experience in which finitude could be negated.²

The Moral and the Transmoral

We turn now to the second main category in our exposition of Tillich's thought bearing on ethics, the nature of the moral. This becomes for him the question of the relation of ethics to ontology. His answer is of course in the tradition which makes ethics dependent upon metaphysics if the latter be understood as ontology.

It would appear to me that Tillich leaves the question of the nature of ethics in a stage which involves some contradiction rather than paradox, and that this comes about because the strength

¹Tillich, ST, I, 82. This statement in the text requires some correction, according to Tillich. In commenting on it, he said he believes that finitude can be broken through, both ontologically and ethically, although not in terms of "natural theology." It can occur, he continued, through a theonomous experience within the autonomous realm, where the self-transcendence is actual, where there is direct or intuitive experience of the unconditional demand which is within every ethical demand regardless of its content. In the light of this correction, it becomes clearer that Tillich's criticism of Kant is not that the latter believed finitude could be broken through, but in the conception of the kind of experience which would make this possible.

²Ibid.

of his Lutheran heritage prevents his stating an adequate redefinition of the moral or the ethical. We shall examine the reasons for this criticism in detail.

What impresses Tillich most, as it did Luther, is the futility of the moral striving of the "Old Man." But the course of modern history has accentuated moral striving in these terms, i.e., without the sense of judgment and grace which would produce the new man. This is what is wrong with the modern ideal of personality. Even the Protestant theory of justification by faith was undermined in its essential meaning by being applied "exclusively to morals."¹ "The holy became the righteous, the morally good, usually with ascetic connotations."²

In Tillich's view, this situation came about as follows: First, there was a "primitive unity between the holy and the real."³ Then under the influence of prophetic criticism this was broken, and properly so, for it had become ritualistic in a way which tended to lose theonomy and also to be removed from the action of life, or from ethics.⁴ This is like the experience of the individual child, moving from an original primitive identification with mother toward a sense of individuation. But what happens in the next stage? There may be no move toward a higher union or identification or socialization, but a standing pat on the individuation, a treating of this as the whole of life and reality and personality. Morality then becomes the means of

¹Tillich, IOH, p. 172.

²Tillich, ST, I, 216.

³Tillich, PE, p. 108.

⁴Ibid.

perpetuating this kind of structure of personality, the Old Man, in a world in which there are other people and things. But this is fundamentally what we might call a fixated or premature solution of the problem. For to Tillich "Neither works of piety nor works of morality nor works of the intellect establish unity with God. They follow from this unity, but they do not make it."¹ The ethical demands must appear in the course of this development, but they tend to become "utilitarian."² The vision that they are not enough then disappears, and there is no motivation to seek on a non-primitive level that "unity with God" without which they are self-deceptive. The moral becomes identified with "controlling knowledge," and objectifies both "ontologically and ethically."³ So there emerges the western ideal of personality in which man tries, by moral striving, to have "concentration, self-control, discipline, stability, and consistency," a condition in which "life has ceased to be open," or as we might say, in which the obsessive and suppressive patterns of protecting the Old Man's security have become predominant.⁴

So understood, moral striving is part of the Old Man, and ethics would be the study or systematization of it. But if this is the moral in the conditions of historical existence, is this the generic or essential meaning of the moral, or of ethics? Is it possible or not to have a morality of the New Man? It is in answering this question that Tillich's philosophical and

¹ Ibid., p. xv.

² Ibid., p. 108.

³ Tillich, ST, I, 97.

⁴ Tillich, PE, p. 119.

Lutheran background seems to leave the problem in something of a contradiction. On the one hand, when speaking of the vertical and horizontal dimensions in every religion, with the vertical pointing to "the ground of our being and the ultimate meaning of our lives," and the horizontal to the "transforming power of the eternal whenever it manifests itself," he includes ethics as one of the expressions of the horizontal.¹ "The future of religion," he adds, "is dependent on a new, creative union of its vertical and its horizontal element."² This would seem to imply not merely the playing down or conquest of the moral striving of the Old Man, but the emergence of an ethics of the New Man--not a mere transcendence of the moral by a transmoral which is no longer moral, but a new and more adequately oriented morality and ethics. Tillich is clear when he writes that "An ethics can come to fulfillment only as a religious ethics."³ An ethics need not be of "self-sufficient finitude" without a transcendent reference.⁴ But can such an ethics be discussed?

It would seem that the logic of Tillich's position is to assert such an ethics, but to use some qualifying adjective or adjectives which indicate its difference in reference, context, or perspective from the ethics and the moral striving of the old man, of self-sufficient human finitude, and the like. But this he does not do, presumably because of the strength of the

¹Tillich, "Vertical and Horizontal Thinking," The American Scholar, XV (1945), 103.

²Ibid., p. 105.

³Tillich, RS, p. 119.

⁴Ibid., p. 120.

Lutheran elements in his thought which are suspicious that any positive statement about morals or ethics will be put into a merely autonomous, or heteronomous, framework, and the reference which gives them meaning thereby denied. On the one hand, Tillich refers to "the patriarchalistic ethics of Lutheranism" in critical tones;¹ and indicates that Luther forgot that "No ethics ever can become an actual power without laws and institutions."² On the other hand, he seems to confront an inhibition in any mention of morals or ethics which is not preceded by "trans-," thus leaving it unclear whether there is any generic continuity between the new and the old--or whether there is, in an adequate and positive sense, a Christian ethics.³

The ghost which haunts every reference to the moral in Tillich's thought is that "We are not allowed to call ourselves white because we cannot help calling our enemy black."⁴ Somehow

¹Tillich, PE, p. 57.

²Ibid., p. 159.

³Tillich's oral comments, after reading this chapter, are very helpful in understanding his position, although they do not altogether answer the question raised in the text. There certainly is, says Tillich, an ethics of the New Being. But when, in Germany, Tillich began some discussions with the New Being, he indicates that he found himself attacked for being moralistic. In his systematic thought (still unpublished), he indicates that the section on regeneration comes before that on justification, thus indicating that a fundamental change is required before justification is possible. The new behavior, so to speak, is correlated with, and is within, the new being. The characteristics of the New Being are reconciliation, reunion and resurrection. This is the beginning of an answer to my query. But the fact still remains that Tillich's propositions on "The Christian" have not been written.

⁴Tillich, "Our Disintegrating World," Anglican Theological Review, XXIII (1941), 143.

ethics is associated with calling ourselves, or something, white as an autonomous being or event, without qualification. The inconsistency is that one can become a New Being instead of the Old Being and yet continuity is retained. The situation with regard to the moral should be the same if the logic of the thought were followed. But instead of a reference to the new moral, or the new moral being, or the true moral being, or even theonomous ethics, it is merely to the "transmoral," which leaves obscure the element of continuity.

It is possible that Tillich's hesitation on this point is derived from his philosophical equipment as well as his Lutheranism. Thus he confirms the Lutheran suspicions by pointing to the attempt of groups like the Neo-Kantians to reduce philosophy to "epistemology and ethics" during the nineteenth century.¹ Such attempts were clearly expressions of moral striving in the old sense. Their pursuit is inevitably positivistic, leading to "realism without self-transcendence or faith."² Rightly, Tillich sees this tendency as akin to the "Catholic sanctification of a special philosophy, a special art, a special ethics."³ So long as the problem is seen in terms of moralism, Tillich's position is quite clear. As Reinhold Niebuhr notes,

Obviously Tillich's analysis of the demonic elements in human history places him squarely on the side of the Pauline-Augustinian emphasis in Christian theology as against the

¹Tillich, ST, I, 19.

²Tillich, PE, p. 77.

³Ibid., p. 214.

Pelagian and moralistic schools of thought, in which the hope is held out that men may achieve freedom from sin by moral striving.¹

And as James Luther Adams writes, Tillich has "introduced a new theological conception of nature and of its relation to history . . . he has attempted to correct the liberal theology that has exhausted itself by identifying religion with moralism."² But this is not the whole problem. What Tillich is against is clear-- the old moralism or moral striving. What he is for is clear-- life action in the perspective of the theonomous or the unconditional. The question is what does the moral or ethical have to do with the latter? Is "the moral" to be reserved for the old moral striving, in effect with moralism?

Tillich is aware that sensitivity to the holy, or to the unconditional, might be interpreted to leave out of account the ethical dimension, and of the dangers this would bring. Indeed, this is the basis of his criticism of Luther. The truly religious attitude, he therefore says in order to guard against this danger, "concerns the whole man, is person-centered and ethical."³ But if this is so, then there must be a new ethics, or an ethics of the new man--even if for no other purpose than safeguarding the criteria for judging contacts with the unconditional. That is to say, a positive ethics is necessary not only for ethical but

¹"The Contribution of Paul Tillich," Religion in Life, VI (1937), 579.

²Adams, op. cit., p. 316.

³Tillich, "The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations and Theoretical Questions," op. cit., pp. 362-363.

also for theological reasons. But how this can properly be stated is not clear in Tillich up to this point.

And yet our real "freedom is moral freedom."¹ And immediately following, "Freedom is freedom to receive unconditional demands."² It should follow that what is truly or really or newly moral is the reception of "unconditional demands." But this is not stated. Both "the Protestant cultus and its personal and social ethics have to undergo a far-reaching transformation."³ But under this transformation, are they still ethics? Or are they just "transmoral," retaining the ambiguity concerning the continuity of "moral"?⁴

As we noted in Tillich's more recent discussion of freedom, this is "experienced as deliberation, decision, and responsibility." This is intended to be understood of course as within a certain context and frame of reference. Provided the same context were applied, would it not be appropriate to use these very qualities or characteristics to describe a positive ethics or new morality: "deliberation, decision, and responsibility"? If "apologetics, dogmatics, and ethics" are all properly aspects of systematic

¹Tillich, "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," op. cit., p. 206.

²Ibid., p. 207.

³Tillich, PE, p. xxiv.

⁴In oral communication, Tillich has reminded me that his sole use of the term "transmoral" is in connection with conscience, that my comments in the paragraph immediately following suggest misunderstanding of his thought. I accept this correction of his intention. Yet until he has stated his views about the morality of the New Being, my question still seems appropriate even though requiring the indicated correction.

⁵Tillich, ST, I, 184.

theology, may we be reduced to talking about trans-apologetics, trans-dogmatics, as well as the "transmoral," in order to make it clear that we are against the Old Man in all his forms?¹

"Moral Freedom may become moral servitude," but may moral servitude also become moral freedom, i.e., may there be some element of continuity in both directions?

There is one point in Tillich's writings where a line to solution of this dilemma is hinted at. Ethics is once referred to as "the question about activity directed toward the Unconditioned." Remembering that this appears in an early writing, and that "unconditioned" is not a good translation, it would appear from this that ethics is not necessarily to be identified with moral striving of the Old Man type, but is generically the activity side of the positive relation of man to God, or to that which is man's ultimate concern. Tillich added at this point, "The ethical attitude corresponds in the practical sphere to the metaphysical attitude in the theoretic . . ."³ Properly pursued, this direction of thought would follow the logic of Tillich's whole position.

Now that Tillich has made it clear, in oral communication,

¹Ibid., p. 32.

²Tillich, RS, p. 116.

³Ibid. In oral communication, Tillich has indicated that he still agrees with this statement. If this is true, and if he meant by this statement what I understand him to mean, then my criticism of his not following through on the implications of the statement to date is more a comment on what he has not yet been able to do than it is a negative judgment on his total position. In the light of his confirmatory statement, therefore, many of my subsequent comments may be seen as the raising of questions which I believe Tillich must answer as he works out the systematic implications of the ethics of the New Being.

that he still adheres to the above point, the question about his intention disappears, and we have instead the question of the extent to which his published works actually implement the position.

James Luther Adams contends that Tillich, in a number of places but notably in Die sozialistische Entscheidung,¹ carries this out to a notable degree.² Tillich himself, as already noted, seems to consider that he has done it in part but only in part.³ Adams seems to believe that my calling for an exposition of the New Man morality in Tillich will be satisfied only by an explication of the "law," but this does not seem fair to the position I am attempting to set forth.⁴

Perhaps this line has not been fully followed up because of that characteristic of Tillich we mentioned in the beginning, his alertness to the concrete only if conveying the generic. Tillich has a concern for the "practical," and rightly indicates that the word "practical" has degenerated, but that, properly conceived, practical is distinguished from theoretical theology by its "technical point of view," which is a descriptive judgment only.⁵ It may be that the negative-evaluation meaning of "technical," as used in "technical reason," for example, obtrudes itself into "practical" as well; so that in practice Tillich has not pursued the "practical" as he has the "theoretical," or, to use the phrases from The Religious Situation, has unintentionally de-

¹(Potsdam: 1933).

²In personal communication.

³In oral communication.

⁴In personal communication.

⁵Tillich, ST, I, 33.

valuated the "ethical" at the expense of the "metaphysical" or "ontological," when according to this they should be coordinate modes of approach.¹

It is significant that Tillich believes one of the reasons for the success of psychoanalysis in Protestant countries has been "the rigorous moralism which developed in Protestantism after the sacramental grace was taken away and which poisons the personality through repressing vital impulses by moral law and social conventions."² Tillich also states that, in examining the affairs of the mythological gods such as the Olympians, we should not speak of them as "immoral."³ They are "demonic," but not immoral.⁴ So far as indications of this kind go, they seem to suggest a tendency to identify the "moral" with the "moralistic." But as we have noted several times, this is not Tillich's intention.

Ethics and Changing the Whole Man

The third category of Tillich's thought dealing with ethics is difficult to define. It relates to justification by faith, man's boundary situation, symbols and things. It really has to do with the nature of the "righteousness" with which one is "made righteous."

Especially today men are in the "boundary-situation," perhaps more outside than inside the churches.⁵ But this is a permanent fact of human life, to be between the temporal and eternal,

¹Tillich, RS, p. 116.

²Tillich, PE, p. 228.

³Tillich, ST, I, 224.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Tillich, PE, p. 205.

the finite and the unconditional. We need to face our finitude and temporality and sin as a fact, and recognize that we are on the boundary. Instead of doing so, "We take ourselves as we appear and not as we really are. Like hit-and-run drivers, we hurt our souls by the speed with which we are moving in the surface, and then we run away and leave our bleeding soul alone."¹ But if we see the boundary-situation as such, when "the picture we have of us breaks down completely," then we may be "willing to look into a deeper level of our being."²

The one way out of this dilemma is faith, which is "an ecstatic self-transcending act in which man is reconciled with the god and with himself."³ "Ecstatic" is a word of Schelling's Tillich often uses to connote the breaking through, the complete shift in perspective, which "standing outside of" means. Faith, then, is that occurs when man is enabled, through being made to stand outside himself, to be reconciled. The function of faith and the reconciliation which produces it is "to make whole the man who struggles against himself."⁴ Faith in this sense produces "salvation" which "is the healing of the cosmic disease which prevents love."⁵ Tillich laments the unintelligibility of the doctrine of justification by faith to the man of today, and despairs of communicating it except in one way, "to discover

¹Tillich, "Depth," Christendom, IX (1944), 319.

²Ibid., pp. 319-320.

³Tillich, "The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations and Theoretical Questions," op. cit., p. 353.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.



anew the reality which was apprehended in that earlier day and which is the same today, and then present it in new terms to the man of today."¹

For our purposes the chief point to be made about justification by faith in Tillich's thought is that this is a justification of the whole man, not a making righteous of the (or a) moral aspect of man alone. He who is in "doubt" is justified by the faith experience as much as he who is in sin.² Justification is a "breaking-through of every law."³ This is to say that justification is not to be understood merely in terms of the moral striving of the old man. But the righteousness wherewith we are justified is not, in accordance with our discussion in the previous section, called a "new righteousness." Instead, it is that which transcends mere moral righteousness or goodness.

An important aspect of the justification experience is its power of re-integrating us with nature as well as with people, and the ground of being in both. We shall deal later with love and with interpersonal relationships. Here we comment on things and symbols. If the relationship to nature and our own "vitality" is not restored, we see people "who are estranged from nature, from their own natural forces and from the nature around them," and who "become dry and uncreative in their mental life, hard and arrogant in their moral attitude, suppressed and poisoned in their vitality."⁴

¹Tillich, PE, p. 196.

²Ibid., p. xiv.

³Ibid., p. 133.

⁴Tillich, "The Redemption of Nature," Christendom, X (1945), 304-305.

Lutheranism, writes Tillich, has tended to deprive "things of their inherent power by making the center of the personality the place where God meets man."¹ And, "Where nature is not related to the events of the history of salvation its status remains ambiguous."² This is the point where Tillich discusses the sacraments, which have lost their symbolic power of pointing to and in a special sense representing that which is unconditional, and have instead been largely replaced by "rational concepts, moral laws, and subjective emotions."³ Religious symbols are not merely arbitrary, Tillich insists; and therefore the neglect of the sacramental is a process of continuous "iconoclasm."⁴ Psychoanalysis has usefully demonstrated that symbols may refer to "vital and instinctive impulses which have been repressed."⁵ But, according to Tillich, psychoanalysis has not presented a theory of religious symbols, instead, only a theory of how they are selected. Thus psychoanalysis has made a contribution, but an incomplete one, to our understanding.

These considerations about nature, the representational character of symbols, and human vitality are important for clearing away the misconceptions of the justification experience as a moralistic, conscious and wholly rational experience. Back in the Middle Ages, "The mind became aware of the relationship

¹Tillich, PE, p. 121.

²Ibid., p. 110.

³Ibid., p. xxiii.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Tillich, "The Religious Symbol," The Journal of Liberal Religion, II (1940), 17.

between itself and the pre-rational levels of the psyche, those levels through which fate determines thought."¹ Through Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, James, Freud, Jung and others these considerations have been brought back into modern thought.

Man is in the boundary situation. No moral striving will get him out of it. But he can face it and live within it, if he has faith, acquired through being reconciled, made righteous in the New Being, and restored to relationship with nature, with his fellow man, with things and symbols, and with the "prerational levels" of his own psychic being. If he becomes "justified," made righteous in this way, is he then the recipient of a new "morality" as of a new "faith"? This question is answered positively in principle by Tillich, but the meaning and full implications have still not been stated.

Facing Existence as Human Beings

With the fourth category of Tillich's thought bearing on ethics--finitude and realism, anxiety and courage, conscious and unconscious, the unconditional and the demonic--we may deal briefly. Finitude "describes the human situation as being threatened by non-being and, consequently, as a situation of basic anxiety, permanently overcome by venturing courage."² To be finite is

¹Tillich, PE, p. 11.

²Tillich, "The Nature of Man," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLII (1946). Tillich's newest and, at this writing, still unpublished volume, The Courage To Be, the Terry Lectures at Yale, to be issued by Yale University Press in the autumn of 1952, would have been very useful for penetrating Tillich's thought had it been available at the time this chapter was written. It contains a more comprehensive exposition of the concepts of anxiety and of courage than anything Tillich has previously written.

"the possibility of losing one's ontological structure and, with it, one's self."¹ It is an anxiety, not a despair; it is "to be threatened."²

Man uses many means to deny the reality of his finitude, including the search for salvation by moral striving. He resorts to idolatry, "the elevation of a preliminary concern to ultimacy," hence escaping the encounter with the ultimate concern.³ Theology seeks to expose idolatries, and to solve the anthropological question, "which is the problem of the finiteness of man."⁴ There is a subtle but widespread form of idolatry in the "metaphysical attitude of capitalist society," which is "the rejection of metaphysics."⁵ That is to say, the rejection of an interest in ontological questions is to permit something else to take the place of the ultimate questions, hence to be idolatrous. No matter how disguised "by means of epistemological discussions about the limits of knowledge," this is still idolatrous, still attempting to handle one's ontological anxiety by denying human finitude.

Tillich formerly used more than now the phrase "belief-ful realism" to describe our proper attitude toward human finitude. By this he meant a complete "acceptance of" the serious importance of our concrete situation in time and of the situation of time in general in the presence of eternity."⁶ Such an attitude negates romanticism and utopianism, which continue to hope for the conquest

¹Tillich, ST, I, 201. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 13.

⁴Tillich, "What is Wrong with the 'Dialectic' Theology?" The Journal of Religion, XV (1935), 141.

⁵Tillich, RS, p. 49. ⁶Ibid., p. 82.

of finitude, but it does not negate hope itself, the "belief" (of "belief-fuF"), in the face of the "realistic" (of "realism") acceptance of finitude.

In terms of the larger social context, Tillich has also used the term "historical realism" to describe our proper attitude. This contrasts with a realism which is either technological or mystical. Both these last have in common the misunderstanding of contemporaneity, the mystical that time does not matter, the technological that the future will take care of it.¹ Both try to deny finitude though in different ways. Historical realism does not.

This helps to explain Tillich's concern for history, and what he means in denying that the aim of history will be realized in history; for that would be a conquest, hence a denial, of finitude. He criticizes equally the Hegel who thought the "end of philosophy" was the "place of truth," the Marx who thought it the complete victory by the proletariat, and the psychoanalyst who may attribute it "to the completely analyzed personality."² Indeed, the criticism of anything finite which professes to be ultimate is so important that Tillich calls it "the Protestant principle." Adams says it is "the prophetic protest against every conditioned thing that makes an unconditional claim for itself."³ A Protestantism that forgets "Christianity is final only in so far as it has the power of criticizing and transforming each of its historical manifestations" is forgetting the Protestant principle.⁴

¹Tillich, PE, p. 72.

²Ibid., p. 13.

³Adams, op. cit., p. 289.

⁴Tillich, PE, p. xxii.

Tillich has made increasing use of the word "courage" to describe the attitude that accepts the fact of finitude and ontological anxiety. He describes it thus:

Courage accepts derivedness, contingency. The man who possesses this courage does not look beyond himself to that from which he comes, but he rests in himself. Courage ignores the causal dependence of everything finite. Without this courage no life would be possible . . . ¹

That we need is "the ultimate courage which conquers anxiety."²

Ontological anxiety, or what Tillich means by the simple term "anxiety," is equivalent to man's response upon full recognition of the fact of finitude. That is, anxiety is the subject pole to finitude as the object pole. Tillich notes that there is another form of anxiety, the "compulsory forms of anxiety," which psychotherapy can remove.³ But he has only recently elaborated the sense in which these are different other than that ontological anxiety is unremovable, being recognition of the "structure of finitude," while other forms are "compulsory," or as we would say, "compulsive."⁴

As Tillich sees the further problem of anxiety and courage, it is not so much a matter of elaborating their meaning as it is of how anxiety can be faced and how courage is possible. This leads back to the "theological circle," and in explicit terms still leaves the question partly unanswered in his published writings-- unless we take the experience of justification by faith, the

¹Tillich, ST, I, 197. ²Ibid., p. 273. ³Ibid., p. 191.

⁴This will appear in his new volume, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press), autumn, 1952. /It was not available at the time this text was written.

actualizing of freedom, the becoming a person, as answers. But these are on the same level as courage, i.e., how are any of them possible? For Tillich the answer to any question of this kind becomes ontological and structural, although within a structure that is largely viewed in process terms, more than through a study of concrete events that give rise to such things as courage. At such points Tillich becomes confessional and kerygmatic in his theology, instead of analyzing, for example, concrete experiences of psychotherapy in which courage begins to emerge. Tillich believes this can occur, but he is less interested in the detailed processes of how. Depth psychology "can help us to find the way into our depth, although it can not give the final help because it can not guide into the deepest ground of our being and of all being."¹ Hence his hesitation to explore any concrete that may be only particular, i.e., contain no universality, for to do so may lead to the confusion of the finite with the infinite. In the light of this, the statement that the "theologian as theologian is no expert in any matters of preliminary concern" could easily lead, however unintentionally, to the feeling that investment in anything finite may conflict with devotion to the infinite--and itself become a form of denial of human finitude.² Tillich's

¹Tillich, "Depth," op. cit., p. 320.

²Tillich, ST, I, 12. James Luther Adams has indicated in personal communication, that he believes Tillich's attention to socio-economic problems constitutes an answer to my criticism of Tillich as wary of investment in "preliminary concerns." It is certainly true that Tillich has given more detailed attention to socio-economic questions than to psychotherapeutic questions, and my text may, therefore, overstate my point. But what I am trying to suggest is a general tendency in Tillich to move rapidly

tendency, while acknowledging the directional value of psychotherapy, to move at once to its limitations in disclosing the ultimate concern, should be judged in the light of this possibility as well as its conscious intentionality. Tillich could help his argument by being more dialectical in relation to investment in preliminary concerns, even by the theologian.

But it is not alone finitude, creatureliness, limitation, and their subjective counterpart, anxiety, which cause man's difficulties. It is also evil and the demonic, the latter being both creative and destructive. As Adams indicates, to Tillich "A demon is something less than God which pretends to be God."¹ "The idea of the demonic is the mythical expression of a reality that was in the center of Luther's experience as it was in Paul's, namely, the structural, and therefore inescapable, power of evil."² The demonic is not to be understood as a principle of ontological character coordinate with a good principle. As idolatry is not bad in worshiping but in what it worships, so the demonic is not evil because it has no relation to good but because it has distorted the good. Evil itself "has no ontological, but only moral, foundation."³ Tillich denies any ontological dualism between good and

over "preliminary concerns" or detailed matters in the direction of general principles; and I confess that, even on socio-economic questions, Tillich still seems to me to do this. Adams rightly points out that Tillich has criticized Barth for suggesting that devotion to anything finite may conflict with devotion to the infinite. My point is not about Tillich's intention, but about whether a certain aversion to details and predilection for general principles (perhaps prematurely) may not unintentionally lead toward something similar.

¹Adams, op. cit., p. 304.

²Tillich, PE, p. xx.

³Ibid., p. 29.

evil also in pointing to the equal Scriptural condemnation of libertines and ascetics.¹

Evil, nevertheless, is "a perverse and powerful affirmation," Adams notes, and not a merely Neo-Platonic kind of negation.²

But the victory of Christianity lies precisely in the fact that it is "the radical denial of the demonic character of existence as such."³ Existence as such does not have demonic character; but the character and structure of evil which we actually find in existence are real, and can be conquered only by the "divine structure" or the "'Gestalt' of grace."⁴ Evil in Tillich's thought is closely related to the denial of finitude, and within the personality to "those acts and attitudes in which the finite creature keeps itself separated from the ground of being and resists God's reuniting love."⁵ Evil is sometimes referred to as "self-destructive," which is another way of affirming its reality while denying it ontological standing. But thus far in his writings, Tillich has not dealt systematically and dialectically with the problem of evil as such. With what is said above, we can, however, see his intention.

Tillich has been somewhat more concerned about discussing the divine structure, the unconditional, and God than the demonic structure, evil, or the devil, but he has written of the latter also. The "unconditional" is, as Adams notes, "a (negative)

¹I Tim. 1:19 and 4:2.

²Adams, op. cit., p. 304. ³Tillich, PE, p. 8.

⁴Ibid., p. xxi.

⁵Tillich, ST, I, 285.

philosophical symbol for the ultimate concern of man."¹ It is a "quality, not a being," nor being.² It "is not God,"³ but "characterizes" God or "Being as such" or "Good as such."⁴ It is a "quality which we experience in encountering reality, for instance, in the unconditional character of the voice of the conscience, the logical as well as the moral."⁵ It is "never a law or a promoter of a definite form of the spiritual or social life."⁶ It is the "depth-dimension" of the world.⁷ It is to be distinguished from God which "denotes ontic symbols which refer to the ontological structure of being."⁸

In philosophical terms, God is to be understood as being-as-such. Even though "The theologian cannot escape making God an object in the logical sense of the word,"⁹ we can not say that God exists since being-itself is "beyond essence and existence."¹⁰ "The idea of God must be the undoubted ground of all other ideas or else it is nothing."¹¹ A God who is said to exist is thereby denied; one "who seriously denies God, affirms him."¹² God concerns man ultimately, which is the same thing as saying that God is what man ultimately depends on.¹³ From the point of view of

¹Adams, op. cit., p. 299. The word "negative" has been inserted by Adams to make his meaning clearer.

²Tillich, PE, p. 32. ³Adams, op. cit., p. 301.

⁴Tillich, PE, p. 32. ⁵Ibid. ⁶Ibid., p. 51.

⁷Adams, op. cit., p. 302. ⁸Ibid., p. 301.

⁹Tillich, ST, I, 172. ¹⁰Ibid., p. 205.

¹¹Tillich, "The Religious Situation in Germany To-Day," Religion in Life, III (1934), 167.

¹²Tillich, PE, p. xv.

¹³Tillich, ST, I, 253.

ethics, Tillich's dealing with the moral arguments for God's existence is important.

They are valid insofar as they are ontological analyses (not arguments) in moral disguise, that is ontological analyses of the unconditional element in the moral imperative. The concept of the moral world order which often has been used in this connection tries to express the unconditional character of the moral command in the face of the processes of nature and history which seem to contradict it. It points to the foundation of the moral principles in the ground of being, in being-itself. But no "divine co-ordinator" can be derived in this way. The ontological basis of the moral principles and their unconditional character cannot be used for the establishment of a highest being. Bonum ipsum does not imply the existence of a highest being.¹

We may note that Tillich's final words are "highest being" rather than "highest good."

The sense in which God as being-itself is personal concerns Tillich. This symbol is "indispensable for living religion."² This is because "The depth of being cannot be symbolized by objects taken from a realm which is lower than the personal."³ It cannot, if it is the ultimate concern of a person, "be less than a person, although it can be and must be more than personality."⁴ What we should mean by the symbol of personal God is that God "is the ground of everything personal."⁵ And we should stress "the symbolic character of all concepts which are used to describe the divine act of self-revelation."⁶ In classical theology,

¹Ibid., p. 207.

²Tillich, "The Idea of the Personal God," The Union Review, II (1940), 10.

³Ibid.

⁴Tillich, ST, I, 156.

⁵Ibid., p. 245.

⁶Ibid., p. 156.

Tillich notes, the idea of God, "united personal with supra-personal traits."¹ But as God became "a person," he "ceased to be the supporting and transcending center of every personal life."² Hence, Tillich implies, his use of all the "trans" terms, in order to avoid such reductionism, although Adams properly notes that Tillich's conception of God can not "properly be called 'supernaturalist' or 'neosupernaturalist.'"³

Tillich's metaphor runs to "depth" rather than "height," although he uses both. The Protestant principle, and theonomy, "is a quality of all beings and objects, the quality of pointing beyond themselves and their finite existence to the infinite, inexhaustible, and unapproachable depth of their being and meaning."⁴ God is this ground, bringing the unconditional quality to existence, being as such, the divine structure beneath all that is personal. In a way, for Tillich, the problem of God is not a problem of God's nature any more than it is of his existence, but an anthropological problem of how and in what ways we encounter God or the unconditional quality that being reveals through existence. It is the problem of grace from the side of God, of faith from man's. As the "possession from below," demonic, "destroys the personal center through the invasion of 'darkness,'" grace "re-establishes it by elevating the creative power of the ground into the unity of a personal life."⁵

¹Tillich, PE, p. 63. ²Ibid.

³Adams, op. cit., p. 301.

⁴Tillich, PE, p. 163.

⁵Ibid., p. 134.

It is in part Tillich's feeling for the depth metaphors which made him open from his early professional days to some of the basic Freudian points about the "unconscious," as well as to the more philosophical conceptions of this in Nietzsche and others.

It has become visible that man is largely dependent on unconscious, individual and collective forces of an ambiguous character, that his conscious decisions have roots in pre-conscious levels, that he is not free for good or evil, but dependent on universal structures of evil and good for which he is the battlefield. It is not only in theology but even more depth-psychology and sociology which have opened our eyes to this predicament of man.¹

At the beginning of the twentieth century there was a general attack on the Cartesian dualism which had become so dominant in the nineteenth century, in which all realms of knowledge dealing with man participated, but nowhere were "the weapons used against the idea of man as a static composite as strong and as deadly as those of medical psychology."² The intermediate sphere, the psyche, has been rapidly recovered chiefly due to "Freud's description of the role of the unconscious in mental diseases and neuroses."³

The unconscious is not good or bad, darkness or light, wholly the result of individual experiences or of a kind of collective inheritance in the sense of Jung. Tillich tends to lean toward the Jungian view of the unconscious as the uneasy repository

¹Tillich, "Vertical and Horizontal Thinking," op. cit., p. 101.

²Tillich, "The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations and Theoretical Questions," op. cit., p. 378.

³Ibid.

of the neglected aspects of our total being, especially of our "vitalities."

We must consider the unconscious and subconscious levels of our existence so that our whole being may be grasped and shattered and given a new direction. Otherwise these levels will remain in a state of religious atrophy. The personality will become intellectualistic and will lose touch with its own vital basis.¹

Unconscious forces, seen as neglected vitalities, "continuously break into our conscious center and direct it" just at those times when we consider ourselves "free" in the sense of well-organized with our conscious center in control of everything.² This may be for the good, for as Spirit, God "is as near to the creative darkness of the unconscious as he is to the critical light of cognitive reason."³

Such eruptions of the unconscious are "ecstatic," and the question arises "what is the relation between creative and destructive ecstasy."⁴ Tillich does attempt to answer the question, but says we should assume that there are "two ways of the invasion of consciousness by the unconscious: a creative, divine one, and a destructive, demonic one."⁵ He concludes again that the unconscious has a "dubious character."⁶

It seems to me that Tillich fails to give the proper understanding, if not the solution, of this problem by not being

¹Tillich, PE, p. 112.

²Ibid., p. 134.

³Tillich, ST, I, 250.

⁴Tillich, "The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations and Theoretical Questions," op. cit., p. 367.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

dialectical enough, Clearly the eruption of forces from the unconscious, if they are neglected aspects of one's being or so related, has some kind of relation to the Unconditional because of its ecstatic quality. But such eruptions are, plainly to the eye, a mixture of good and ill, creation and destruction. Indeed, as we have noted previously, it was not until Jung that the general aura of destructiveness was suggested to be other than a general characteristic of the unconscious. Tillich wants to preserve the relation of the unconscious to the unconditional. So he calls it ambiguous, and in recent writings refers to it as "mere potentiality,"¹ which is not "nothing," but may be "the most destructive power, if it conquers the mental unity of consciousness after having been repressed; the most creative power if it enters and widens the consciousness through union with the objective structures of reality."²

What Tillich neglects is partly the mode of eruption or invasion. To use a simple illustration, suppose the unconscious to be full of repressed hostility, growing originally out of parental treatment in which one could not express or admit hostile feelings at all. If these erupt in relationships which do not themselves have elements mitigating their destructive force, i.e., reconciling elements, then the power is destructive. That is, its intention in terms of recreating psychic unity is good, but its character is demonic because it is not expressed in

¹Tillich, ST, I, 179.

²Tillich, "The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations and Theoretical Questions," op. cit., p. 383.

a reconciling relationship which conserves the positive character of the intention while mitigating the negative power of the expressive mode. What happens in psychotherapy, for example, is that the hostility is dealt with symbolically. One does not shoot his parents; he "works over" symbolically his hostility which originally gained such force because of his relationship with them. He "assimilates" the unconscious material. There is still an eruption and it has an "ecstatic" character; but in psychotherapy it can be dealt with symbolically. If the hostility has gone too deep, and the structuralization of it is too rigid, protected by all the psychic means of defense, then there will be either no eruption but continued repression, or destructive eruption, or eruption that begins to have positive effects after initially negative ones (e.g., the withdrawn psychotic patient who, emerging from stupor, throws chairs for a few hours, then begins to regain a non-psychotic condition). Or else such people will not take psychotherapy or will reject it once begun.

Psychotherapy is our best laboratory for studying this problem, but it is obviously not the sole relationship in which such alternatives are presented or in which the problem may be studied. What seems to be generally true is that the mode of relatedness in which the eruption occurs determines whether the dominant strain will be positive or negative, recreative or demonic; that the more symbolically the eruption can occur, the less chance of its being demonic; and in all instances analysis demands the separation of the "intention" of the eruption from its effects. Such a theory would be more dialectical than

Tillich's, would maintain the relationship of the unconscious and its eruptive potentialities to the wholeness of one's being and to their ground--but would not merely leave the unconscious as "ambiguous." While avoiding any ontological dualism, which might be suggested by a merely "ambiguous" notion of the unconscious, it would not in the slightest deny the reality of the demonic structures which become embedded in the unconscious. A further consequence of the theory is that it brings the unconscious back into the realm of ethical theory, by suggesting how a dialectical method can find the criteria in concrete instances by which the "good" or "evil" of the unconscious may be, in some measure, evaluated. But this must be in process terms as is my theory. In part, Tillich's stopping the consideration at the point of "ambiguity" is because he has not moved it altogether from the perspective of substance to that of process.¹

¹I have left the discussion of the unconscious in Tillich in its original form, even though some comments about it from Tillich in oral communication qualify what has been said. The unconscious, Tillich indicated, is just as ambiguous as is the conscious. Nothing conscious is unambiguously good or evil; so, nothing unconscious is unambiguously good or evil. But the unconscious must have an unconscious intention for the good, which belief brings him, Tillich believes, not only to Jung's point but beyond it. Yet even the good or positive intentionality of the unconscious is ambiguous in some degree. A second point made by Tillich in this connection is that the theonomous, or the unconditional, if it breaks through at all, does so to the unconscious as well as to the conscious, i.e., the unconscious as well as the conscious is transformed by grace. I welcome these clarifying comments by Tillich, even though they still seem to me not to touch the main point I made in the text. This point is not the assertion of the ambiguity of the unconscious, with which I entirely agree, but the apparent lack of interest in examining the (detailed) contextual conditions under which the unconscious tends toward creation or destruction. It is of course possible that we may believe the same thing, but that I fail to understand Tillich on this point because of my different mode of approach to it.



Being and Value, Process and Substance

The fifth category of Tillich's thought which bears upon ethics is the relation of value to being, of process to substance. Tillich's most explicit statement of value and being is as follows.

Every real has different levels with more or less power of being. This (Platonic) doctrine has been challenged by Neo-Kantianism because it seems to confuse being and value. But we confront here just the question whether values must not have an ontological foundation and whether the understanding of being as power is not the way to give such a foundation to values and, at the same time, to give back to theoria the "existential" significance which it formerly had.¹

Tillich rejects the separation of value from being; but he implies that being is the more fundamental concept and is the "ground" of value. Or, ethics as the study of the good is less basic than whatever studies being, which is religious philosophy if also existential, and theology if within a religious tradition.²

It is of great importance to note the process elements in Tillich's thought about being and good, indeed, in his whole system. These are frequently misunderstood by those who, noting

¹Tillich, PE, p. 68.

²James Luther Adams, in personal communication, writes as follows concerning the relation of value to being in Tillich. "I would interpret Tillich to hold that although ethics is less basic than ontology, they are inextricable. When Tillich says that evil has a moral and not an ontological basis, he means only that being is not essentially evil or demonic--moral evil is the consequence of the distortion of freedom. This, for Tillich, is the implication of the Christian doctrine of creation and fall. To deny this implication would be to assert that creation is to be equated with the fall. Moreover, to return to the main assertion in question here, namely, that ethics is less basic than being, I would surmise that for Tillich 'true being' and the 'true good' . . . are to be considered as synonymous from the point of view of the significance of being, value and meaning for us. Tillich in his lectures speaks in the same breath of the unconditional of good and the unconditional of being."

his wide use of terms from German idealistic philosophy, assume that his is merely a substantive mode of thought. It is impossible, he says, "to speak of being without also speaking of becoming."¹ "Becoming is just as genuine in the structure of being as that which remains unchanged in the process of becoming."² Because of its inevitably existential element, theology finds it less difficult than philosophy to acknowledge the significance of process and becoming. "The nature of life is actualization, not actuality."³ And "Process philosophy is justified in its attempt to dissolve into processes everything which seems to be static."⁴ Substantive philosophy has "emphasized the rational structure of things but has neglected the creative process through which things and events come into being."⁵

However, process is a category which should be accompanied by substance, and not negate it, according to Tillich. For "becoming would be impossible if nothing were preserved in it as the measure of change."⁶ It would be absurd if process philosophy "tried to dissolve the structure of process into a process. This simply would mean that what we know as process has been superseded by something else, the nature of which is unknown at present. In the meantime, every philosophy of process has an explicit or implicit ontology which is aprioristic in character."⁷

The problem of substance is not avoided by philosophers of function or process, because questions about that which

¹Tillich, ST, I, 181.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 246.

⁴Ibid., p. 167.

⁵Ibid., p. 200.

⁶Ibid., p. 181.

⁷Ibid., 167.

has functions or about that which is in process cannot be silenced. The replacement of static notions by dynamic ones does not remove the question of that which makes change possible by not (relatively) changing itself. Substance as a category is effective in any encounter of mind and ¹ reality; it is present whenever one speaks of something.

This is to say that Tillich equates process with becoming and change, and substance with either the subject which retains continuity during change or the objective pole of the structure which maintains such continuity or the ground which is beneath both subject and object in their polar interdependence.

What Tillich wants to avoid, in spite of the strong process trends in his thought, is the positivistic, "nothing but" overtone in most process philosophy. So just as he speaks of the eternal as against the temporal, the unconditional as against the finite, and so on, thus running the risk of being considered a "supernaturalist" or an "idealist," so he uses substance as well as process to describe the character of being even though there is a risk of being considered thereby partly static in his thought. It would appear that he does not want a dialectical relationship between static and dynamic; what he wants is altogether dynamic. But the problem he is concerned with is that of continuity and change in the nature of being. This is not altogether the problem to which process philosophy addresses itself in its denial of substance, for it does not thereby intend to eliminate continuity.

¹Ibid., p. 197. In oral communication, Tillich indicated that he agrees with what I have said about the process elements in his thought. But my discussion, he indicated further, has a point of view like Charles Hartshorne; whereas Tillich himself, he says, is more like Henri Bergson and Max Scheler than like Alfred North Whitehead.

Where Tillich has erred factually is in not recognizing that process philosophy (in Whitehead at least) does not identify process with change as against continuity. Where he is penetrating is in exposing any merely positivistic overtones which do in fact overhang much process philosophy. This accounts for his statement, otherwise hard to understand, that "to speak of a 'becoming' God disrupts the balance between dynamics and form and subjects God to a process which has the character of a fate or which is completely open to the future and has the character of an absolute accident."¹

From the point of view of ethics, it is perhaps Tillich's doctrine of providence which offers the most immediate possibilities for his constructive solution of the relation of value to being. Providence or "directing creativity" has the function of driving "every creature toward such a fulfillment," that is, of his own being.² Providence is "not interference."³ It "is creation . . . the quality of inner directedness present in every situation."⁴ So providence leads by various means, including the love and the wrath of God, toward the emergence of the New Being.

The New Being is not something that simply takes the place of the Old Being. But it is a renewal of the Old which has been corrupted, distorted, split and almost destroyed. But not wholly destroyed. Salvation does not destroy creation; but it transforms the old creation into a new one.⁵

~~This is to say that it is providence or directing creativity which~~

¹Ibid., p. 247.

²Ibid., p. 264.

³Ibid., p. 267.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Tillich, "The New Being," unpublished sermon.

moves toward the New Being or the fulfillment of the true being, and this being is man's good. To find this being is his ultimate concern. Hence it is his ultimate value. Hence providence leads him to the ground of value at the same time and in the same process whereby he is led toward the ground of his being. This implication is not stated by Tillich, but it is present. And its explicit statement would seem to be important to give body to a concern which is much in Tillich's awareness, the tendency within Protestantism to move towards the "humanistic ideal" in view of the "vacuum" created by leaving "every religious realization questionable."¹ This is the same kind of problem as devotion to finite things in relation to devotion to God. A dialectical approach is surely necessary. But if followed, it leads toward a more coordinated or conjunctive relationship of value and being, and would thus help to solve the vacuum problem indicated above. It would not then be necessary to say that "Sainthood is not moral obedience but 'holy being,' a substance out of which moral and other consequences follow."² One could say instead that sainthood is neither Old Being nor the old moral, but New Being and the new or transformed moral or good. Had Tillich followed his early lead in The Religious Situation, in which ethics was to be considered as the "practical" coordinate of theoretical ontology, this is where he would have emerged.³ Perhaps in intention he actually does so.

¹Tillich, RS, p. 165.

²Tillich, PE, p. 109.

³Tillich, RS, p. 116.

Conscience

The sixth category of Tillich's thought bearing on ethics is conscience. His main point is that "conscience" or the "moral conscience" drives beyond itself toward the "transmoral conscience."¹

Historically speaking, Tillich notes that "The concept does not appear among the earlier Stoics nor in Aristotle or Plato."² The Greek philosophers were interested in "the objective ethical norms, not in the subjective reception of them."³ Yet the idea has emerged out of Graeco-Roman culture and does not exist in the same way in cultures not influenced by this one.⁴ Its original popular meaning was judging oneself, looking at oneself as a witness.⁵

The "judging conscience" or "bad conscience" is the "original phenomenon."⁶ The "good conscience" is only the absence of the bad, and the "warning conscience" is only its "anticipation."⁷ The judging, warning, demanding, accusing conscience may indeed call us to ourselves although its content is far from infallible; but in any event it does not provide the motive power for the transformation to the need for which bad "moral conscience" points. This is the main dilemma which Tillich sees, and he rightly associates it with Luther's view of the same

¹Tillich, PE, p. 149.

²Unpublished material on conscience, 1943.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Tillich, PE, p. 137.

⁷Ibid.

problem. For Luther took Paul's doctrine of conscience (follow even an erring conscience not because it is right "but because disobedience to it means the loss of salvation"),¹ and derived a new concept of it "from the experience of justification through faith."² To Luther,

The wrath of God does not frighten us any longer; a joyful conscience arises as much above the moral realm as the desperate conscience was below the moral realm. "Justification by grace," in Luther's sense, means the creation of a "trans-moral" conscience. . . . In psychological terms this means; in so far as we look at ourselves, we must get a desperate conscience; in so far as we look at the power of a new creation beyond ourselves we can reach a joyful conscience.³

This led to the conception of freedom in relation to conscience in Protestantism, which Adams says was "an 'ecstatic' rather than a purely autonomous, humanistic freedom," in Tillich's view.⁴ This new doctrine of conscience of Luther, accepted in outline by Tillich, did not undermine what the Pauline doctrine mainly affirmed, "the unconditional moral responsibility of the individual person."⁵ But it did get beyond the oppressive spirit of demand with which even, and especially, the sensitive "moral conscience" was afflicted. The objective pole of the "moral conscience" is law. We can not ignore it or do away with it (here Tillich criticizes Luther); but law and the moral conscience, if alone, can break rather than make us, destroy rather than save us.

Properly understood, the "transmoral conscience" is good. "The good, transmoral conscience consists in the acceptance of the bad, moral conscience, which is unavoidable wherever decisions

¹Ibid., p. 139.

²Ibid., p. 145.

³Ibid., p.146.

⁴Adams, op. cit., p. 276.

⁵Tillich, PE, p. 139.

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are made and acts are performed."¹ Or "A conscience may be called 'transmoral' which judges not in obedience to a moral law but according to the participation in a reality which transcends the sphere of moral commands."²

The whole idea of the transmoral conscience is not without antinomian dangers.

The way from Luther's to Heidegger's idea of a transmoral conscience was a dangerous one. "Transmoral" can mean the re-establishment of morality from a point above morality, or it can mean the destruction of morality from a point below morality.³

An illustration of the second can certainly be found in some current secular existentialism, as well as in the history of some of the holy roller type of religious groups throughout Protestant history. Indeed, Tillich asks seriously whether the dangers outweigh the gains of the concept. But to dismiss it is impossible. In that case,

. . . religion as well as analytic psychotherapy would have to be dismissed also; for in both of them the moral conscience is transcendent--in religion by the acceptance of the divine grace which breaks through the realm of law and creates a joyful conscience; in depth psychology by the acceptance of one's own conflicts when looking at them and suffering under their ugliness without an attempt to suppress them and to hide them from one's self.⁴

The transmoral conscience is an inevitable concept because it

¹Ibid., p. 148.

²Ibid., p. 145.

³Ibid., p. 148. In oral communication, Tillich indicated that the transmoral conscience means one can be accepted in spite of being unacceptable, i.e., it has to do with forgiveness. The idea of the transmoral conscience, he noted further, perhaps makes the mistake of not distinguishing morals (which remain in the realm of law) from ethics (as theory of the good to be realized by man).

⁴Ibid., p. 149.

"drives beyond the sphere in which it is valid to the sphere from which it must receive its conditional validity."¹

But it must be understood that the reason for introducing the transmoral conscience is not the invalidity of the moral conscience. Various thinkers--Tillich cites Nietzsche, Hobbes, Helvetius, Bentham, Darwin, Freud--have on various grounds "denied any objective validity to the voice of conscience, according to their rejection of any universal natural (rational) law."² Tillich is inclined to commend the critical view of a thinker like Nietzsche who, he notes, called bad conscience a sickness in the same sense as pregnancy is a sickness.³ For the moral conscience may be valid; and yet, we might add, pregnancy may kill.

Tillich is well aware that too great emphasis on the transmoral conscience may lead not only to Heidegger, but as in Lutheranism, toward "the exclusive emphasis on the clean conscience through the forgiveness of sins" which thereby "overlooks uncleanness in the moral and psychic realms."⁴ But he is more afraid of "modern Protestantism, especially of the Anglo-Saxon type," which "created a cult of physical cleanness, with extreme emphasis on moral purity, but largely unaware of the infected soul with its 'unclean spirits.'"⁵ So the moral conscience is identified with the bad conscience for at least these reasons: (1) although its

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 147.

³Tillich, unpublished material on conscience, 1943.

⁴Tillich, "The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations and Theoretical Questions," op. cit., p. 370.

⁵Ibid.



deliverance may be valid, it can not help us change; (2) it makes demands of us and does not release us; (3) it tends to make us moralistic; (4) it preoccupies us so that we can not receive the saving revelation.

Our criticism of this position has been given, in principle, in the previous section on the general concepts of moral and transmoral. The concrete experiencing of what Tillich calls moral and transmoral conscience can not of course be disputed, nor the quality of feeling or of being which they evoke in us. Yet the entire argument proceeds on the assumption that nothing matters except this contrast, which brings the view close to the romantic. To put it another way, the problem of continuity is not considered in this context--in contrast, for example, to the question of process and substance. Nor is it considered in Tillich's discussion, though he would certainly admit the fact, that there are all forms and degrees of "demand" in the "moral conscience," and that the possibility of experiencing the "transmoral conscience" has some reference to these degrees. Fromm's distinction between the authoritarian and the humanistic conscience, all of the first and most of the second of which would belong under "moral conscience" in Tillich's terms, is not made.¹

¹James Luther Adams questions this statement. He writes, in personal communication, "Is not Tillich's typology of heteronomy, autonomy, and theonomy pertinent (and even analogous) here? And is not Tillich's conception of the transmoral to be understood in relation to his conception of theonomy (which does not abrogate autonomy but, as you say, fulfills it in continuity)?" I would hold that the distinctions are analogous but not the same. If Tillich used a term like "ethical conscience" to contrast with "moral conscience," he would be making Fromm's distinction. I am all for the distinctions which Tillich does make, criticize him only in suggesting that this additional distinction would also be useful.

Yet these differences are of emphatic importance in relation to each other, not alone in relation to what Tillich means by "trans-moral conscience."

The root problem is that Tillich associates the "moral" with the "moralistic," with the Old Man, with "moral striving," with the attempt to find the good for man outside the one context in which it may be found or revealed. Conscience as well as ethics, then, is a subsidiary matter; for if the right context be found, then it is more than "moral" because it is more than the old moral. There is a New Being, but is there a new moral or a new ethics? The prime point is not to let ethics threaten ontology, even if the ontology of ethics be dealt with summarily in the process.¹

Love

The seventh category of Tillich's thought bearing directly upon ethics is love. Although our sequence of points is not hierarchical, love has been placed near the end not to suggest the

¹James Luther Adams writes, in personal communication, "I would say, rather, that for Tillich the prime point is not to let ethics be threatened by law. The new moral will bear continuity, of course, with the structure of being and of non-demonic existence; indeed, the New Being bears continuity with the old creation as theonomy does with autonomy; but also it fulfills it in a unique, kairotic fashion, giving it new unity. Not ethics, but moralism, stands always as a threat to the New Being as it strives for unique expression in a new situation. Possibly this whole aspect of Tillich's outlook shows that he is allergic to essence-ethics. He prefers an existential, situational, contextual ethics which aims to prevent universalizing the law of a particular situation." With the exception of Adams' first sentence, I would accept this statement. And I would accept the first sentence as in line with Tillich's intention, even though in his writings the concern expressed is to prevent ontology from being threatened by law.

non-centrality of love in Christian ethics. It is a kind of sub-structure which can not be adequately defined in other terms, and is therefore not a good place to begin an exposition. Love is "basically not an emotional but an ontological power."¹ If so understood, but only so, "it is the principle on which all Protestant social ethics is based, uniting an eternal and a dynamic element, uniting power with justice and creativity with form."² But Tillich reminds us that he has "given no definition of love."³

This is impossible because there is no higher principle by which it could be defined. It is life itself in its actual unity. The forms and structures in which love embodies itself are the forms and structures in which life is possible, in which life overcomes its self-destructive forces. And this is the meaning of ethics: to express the ways in which love embodies itself and life is maintained and saved.⁴

Love in this sense "creates an ethics which is beyond the alternative of absolute and relative ethics."⁵ In the sense of agapé, it "offers a principle of ethics which maintains an eternal, unchangeable element but makes its realization dependent on continuous acts of a creative intuition."⁶

Tillich distinguishes four types of love: libido, philia, eros, and agapé. Roughly they mean desire, friendship, aspiration, and the ontological power which is the unity of being. The first three have their place, but become demonic when not under the criterion of agapé.⁷ They are even legitimate forms of "self-love" if under this criterion.⁸ "The distinction between

¹Tillich, PE, p. xxv. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 160.

⁴Ibid. ⁵Ibid., p. 156. ⁶Ibid., pp. 155-156.

⁷Tillich, ST, I, 282. ⁸Ibid.

these two contradictory forms of self-love is extremely important.¹ Tillich pays tribute to psychoanalysis for demonstrating the importance of the "erotic sphere" for all aspects of psychic life.² But he indicates that religion was always aware of this anyhow, and it was only the "conventions of bourgeois society" which have relegated the insight "to the limbo of forgotten truth."³

This discussion would seem to suggest that love, while not to be understood as a highest good, is the ground of all good, in the depth metaphor, as God is ground of being. To say that God is love would have meaning, for that which gives being its quality of unity instead of its being only "beings" is love. Love is then another word for asserting the unity of being or the unified ground of being and, by inference, the unity of good. It is qualitative general description of "good." But love is an "ontological power." This seems to mean that "being" to Tillich connotes the power or dynamic aspect of the unconditional; while "love" connotes its uniting or directional aspect. But to say this would be to confess that speaking of being is itself using a limited perspective. Here may well be, in any event, a trinitarian type of problem in the relation of being to good to love.

Confirmation of the trinitarian idea is given by Tillich's connecting of love with "kairos," the New Testament word for the fullness of time. When ethics emerges out of the "kairos," the unconditional has been in it, and the result is "ethics of love."⁴

This is because "love unites the ultimate criterion with the adaptation to the concrete situation."⁵ Being is like God the

¹Ibid.

²Tillich, RS, p. 32.

³Ibid.

⁴Tillich, PE, p. xxv.

⁵Ibid.

Father; love is like the Holy Spirit. Our question remains unanswered as to whether Good is like the Logos, or Jesus as the Christ.

Summary and Critique

In evaluating Tillich's thought as it bears upon ethics, we may note that both commendation and criticism has been given throughout the course of our discussion. Here it is necessary only to systematize those comments. Perhaps we should say first that our exposition has made it clear how creatively original is Tillich's thought; yet at the same time we can see better why the following list of his predecessors, which was once shown him with his approval, is valid: Parmenides-Plato-Paul-Augustine-Luther-Boehme-Kant-SCHELLING-Schleiermacher-Kierkegaard-Marx-Freud.

We will point first to the positive things about Tillich's thought as it bears on ethics, positive from our own point of view.

First, we may note Tillich's depth and his concern for depth, his system and concern for system as interrelationship, his penetration as not wasting time with peripheries, his dialectical method as searching for truth and yet always mediating, and his clear and repeated warning that all theological truth is symbolic including the renunciation of a second world behind this. In combination, these excellencies keep the existential and contemporaneous with the essential, make adequate place for the intellectual functions, provide a method of moving ahead in exploration, and combat superstition in all its forms.

Second, in commending Tillich for his breadth in identifying possible sources of data for his thought, we free ethics (as well as theology) from examining only some rigidly circumscribed area of experience for its data. Whether ethics is an aspect or type or quality or evaluation or activity of experience is not answered clearly in Tillich's thought; but that, whatever it is, it is related to all experience is clearly set forth.

Third, theology and therefore ethics as well can make no apologies for being anthropological; God is both being-itself and man's ultimate concern, and unless he were the second as well as the first, he would not be God for man. The "polar interdependence" and not merely the God-pole is the matter of theology and ethics.

Fourth, freedom is dealt with in terms of great penetration, accurately characterized as within human finitude but polar with "destiny," the dynamic total of limiting and potentially creative conditions which have accumulated at any life point. Freedom is concomitant with security, although Tillich is suspicious of the latter word. Freedom is taken out of the determinism-indeterminism context, and placed within the more adequate freedom-destiny polarity. These services are basic for ethics.

Fifth, since theology deals less with God as such than with man in relation to God or God in relation to man, Tillich devotes much more attention to the symbolic ways of expressing ~~the latter--theonomous, infinite, unconditional--and since this~~ is act received, it provides a better base for ethics than in a theological system whose proportionate dimensions were reversed.

Another merit of this fact is that all these are, anthropologically speaking, "motivating" concepts so far as man is concerned.

Sixth, Tillich is firmly convinced about the reality of the structures of evil and the demonic, without giving way to an ontological dualism on good and evil. His doctrine of evil has still not been systematically set forth; and as it stands at present, it is incomplete. But its direction is essential to ethics.

Seventh, it is important that Tillich has brought into articulation the psyche as an intermediate sphere between bodily and mental, and in particular that he has recognized the importance of the unconscious in psychic (therefore in religious and ethical) life. We have criticized his dropping the problem of the unconscious at the point of its ambiguity. But this does not gainsay the significance for ethics of admitting it to importance in psychic life and in his system of thought.

Eighth, perhaps nothing is so immediately and practically important for ethics about his thought as his continuous exposure of "moralism" in a multitude of its forms. Coming at the question from many different angles, he demonstrates the self-defeating character of "moral striving" of the Old Man, of "moral conscience," of changing act without changing person or being.

Ninth, his concept of knowledge in general, and of intuition in particular, is important for ethics. This is basically a point for concrete experience, as against the abstract but not the universal. We have direct, not merely inferential, experience of that which we essentially are and toward which we move or are

drawn, however unclear and indistinct our perception of the nature of this may be. The glass may be dark, but we see it directly rather than by the inference of mirrors, clear or otherwise.

Tenth, we have a constant emphasis on the dynamic, the becoming, the changing--as against the static, the merely contemplative, the non-involved or non-existential. If there is, as we believe, an improper identification of process and becoming in Tillich's thought, this does not negate the force of his contribution in the direction of movement and development, and away from the stationary and static.

Eleventh, unlike most ethical thinkers today, he makes a strong effort to deal adequately with the philosophical, the psychological and the social poles, and to show their inter-relationship. Even though we believe that the development of the psychological aspect in his thought suffers from lack of specificity, in direction and in principle he makes an important contribution.

Twelfth, he comes very close indeed to uniting in creative synthesis the ethical as well as religious insights of both the Greek and Hebrew traditions. As we noted near the beginning of this chapter, he would believe that he has done everything possible in this direction; which we still doubt. But if Hebrew thought was more empirical and Greek more rational, he has made a real unity of these elements. If theⁿ Greeks were ontologists (of an existential sort) and the Hebrews existentialists (of a providential sort), he has done the same for these qualities. If the Hebrews saw but unclearly and indistinctly beyond existence and

the Greeks sought to see clearly the saving realm of essence, he has redefined and unified these concerns.

Finally, we have noted that Tillich, unlike most theologians including Taylor, has taken seriously some of the implications of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and depth psychology. While these contributions have been limited by lack of specificity, their direction is correct.

On the other side of the picture, we may restate briefly what seem to be the weaker points in Tillich's thought as it deals with or bears upon ethics. This task is made more difficult--although the results are more accurate--because the original version of this chapter was read both by Tillich and by James Luther Adams. Adams, in Tillich's sober judgment, knows more about what Tillich has written than Tillich does himself. The comments of both men have been valuable in questioning some of the points made in my original critique.

The first--and in several respects the central--point with which I criticize Tillich's ethics is his tendency to associate the moral with that which is untransformed, and to speak relatively little of moral or ethical categories when referring to the transformed, or the New Being. Tillich has made it clear, in discussions, that his intention is to refer to both, to demonstrate an ethics as well as an ontology of the New Being.¹ He has indicated further that he still supports the statement that ethics is to the practical sphere as ontology is

¹In oral communication.

to the theoretical. If I could feel that he had worked out the implications of these intentions, I could not hold this as a point of criticism. As to the degree to which Tillich has worked out the implications, Adams seems inclined to defend Tillich more than does Tillich himself. He writes as follows:

You stress too much Tillich's failure to give adequate description of the "new moral," for Tillich indicates with considerable specificity the direction of the new, particularly in his social, political, economic, and even sacramental constructions. He does this on the basis of a theory of dialectic which you have not explicated. Each major Gestalt in the historical process has contradictory elements that drive it through to its own dissolution and to the positing of a new Gestalt. What is specifically demanded, for Tillich, depends upon a constructive typology of characteristic aspects of the human situation, a typology by means of which he discriminates the ingredient elements in any historical situation which are subject to dialectical development. Thus Tillich constantly makes use of typologies such as myths of origin and myths of destiny . . . : sacramental, prophetic, and mystical; prophetic and rational criticism; autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy; natural, personal, and suprapersonal; the constructive typology of the history of religions (based on Schelling's typology). These dimensions of social existence enable Tillich to characterize the dominant and subdominant elements in successive historical Gestalten and also to indicate the directions in which the contemporary Gestalt is by fate destined to move. This whole methodology derives much from Hegel and Marx, but perhaps most from Troeltsch's dialectic joined to what Schelling calls "existential dialectic." The meaning of the new cannot be given significant abstract formulation which will serve for every situation; it must be determined in risking decision regarding the demand of the situation in the light of the unconditional and in the light of the transforming dynamism of love. This is the casuistry of a "compensating" ethic. Later, you yourself defend this view in the name of psychotherapeutic contextualism. From Tillich's point of view, any other sort of description of "the new moral" would be akairotic. Thus Tillich attempts to avoid anti-nomianism, demonic situational ethics . . . , relativism . . . , and legalism You may be intending to say here that Tillich has no sort of casuistry, no way of applying general rules to concrete cases. If this is what you are saying, then I am constrained to agree up to the point of saying that Tillich would call Roman Catholic casuistry simply the old morality. . . . On the other hand, Tillich would say that every situation presents certain kairotic possibilities. It is futile (for the ethicist) to offer akairotic counsels.

Consequently, Tillich in his ethical writing has moved in the direction of a casuistry by developing a conceptual apparatus (for dialectics) whereby he can determine the fateful aspects of the situation and then find the promising lines of the fulfillment of love. . . . The exposition of Tillich's conception of the moral and the transmoral requires a more complicated presentation than you have attempted; in short, it requires an exposition also of his conception of dialectic (both as a dialectic of ideas and as a historical existential dialectic) . . . If we use Tillich's language to describe his understanding of the problem of ethics in this context, we may say that ethics is always related to fate, conditioned somehow by it, recognizing it as the point at which "the new" must kairotically catch on to and release and give direction to potential power in both subject and object, fulfilling both in unpredictable ways.¹

Although I can not deny the thrust of Adams' argument, it still seems to me to beg the question of my basic criticism of Tillich's thought on ethics. I am asking Tillich to implement his declared intention by making general statements about the ethics of the New Being which demonstrate appropriate comparison and contrast with the morality of the old man. Adams seems to equate this request with a call for the law, for "abstract formulation" which violates the kairos. On the contrary, if we can speak at all of the kairos, and not solely of kairotic occasions, we are implying that we see, however, dimly, some general principle which is involved in all such occasions or events. Nor does there seem to be any doubt that there is a New Man, and not just new men, i.e., there is an ontology of the redeemed and the forgiven. I see no inherent reason why it should be resorting to akairotic abstraction to request a statement of the general principles involved in the ethics of the New Being, any more than it would be

¹In personal communication.

to ask for such principles about the ontology of the New Being. So far as I can tell, Tillich would not agree with Adams' defense of him at this point. I would concede to Adams that Tillich has come closer to stating the ethics of the New Being in relation to social and economic matters than in relation to psychological. But my point is that he has not presented us with a New Social Being or a New Economic Being, to say nothing of a New Psychological Being. Instead, he has told us the general principles of the New Being--having various aspects including social, psychological, and economic. If ethics is in any sense coordinate with ontology, it must contain comparable general principles. The aspects must be aspects or approaches, not categories. From my point of view, Tillich's task will not be accomplished until he has written to his own satisfaction the section on "The Christian," against the doing of which he admits to some continuing inhibition.

Second, in spite of the commendation we must give Tillich for his warnings against confusing the ultimate with "preliminary concerns," it still seems to me that he has not yet presented an adequate positive view of our relation to preliminary concerns. If we first look at this matter negatively--what Tillich does not want--we find ourselves reassured, i.e., Tillich is fully sensitive to all the dangers. Although inveighing most often against legalism in any and all forms, he is also clearly against antinomianism. He is aware that any contextualism may easily fall into a subjective relativism. And he is equally aware that a Barth, emphasizing the distance of God from man, may imply that all finiteness or matters of preliminary concern should be

eschewed. Tillich handles all these gross positions, and their many subtle variations, dialectically as he discusses our relation to ultimate and preliminary concerns.

Much as we may approve this course of thought, including the method by which each position is assayed and transcended, it still seems to me that we are left uneasy at the wrong points. In calling the preceding paragraph's content "negative," I have implied that Tillich neglects a "positive" statement. A better way to put the matter is this, that there tends in Tillich to be a tone of suspicion of all finite loyalties which do not point, more or less immediately, toward the ultimate concern. There is of course also suspicion of the persons like Barth who are so preoccupied with the ultimate concern that they neglect the preliminary, and of thinkers like those pragmatists who confuse the preliminary with the ultimate concern. But my question is: Is a tone of suspicion enough, even if it is applied to all possible errors? I do not believe this is a criticism of dialectical method, but rather of the way in which that method is applied.

The overtone which I always feel in reading Tillich is an impetus to draw back from some resting place, some finite loyalty or preliminary concern. That is, Tillich's impact is prophetic. But I would contend that the proper impact of the prophetic should be kairotic not continuous. To use a caricatured illustration, one could draw back from sleeping in such a way as to be unrefreshed for the labors of the day. That is, one could be so alert to the breaking through of the unconditional or the theonomous---

albeit recognizing that they break through only in concrete experience--that he would in fact be neglecting preliminary concerns necessary for finite creatures even though his own principles stood against this. The question is not Tillich's intention but his performance.

Tillich has said he agrees that he does tend to jump over the particular to get at the universal as soon as possible.¹ Especially in relation to nature and to art, however, he points out that he has attempted to stay with the particular and avoid a premature movement toward the general or universal.² Even there, he indicates, his movement is always toward the universal.³ The question becomes: if our perception-readiness is continuously toward the universal, may we tend, however unintentionally, to pass too quickly over the concrete richness of experience and, therefore, in Tillich's own terms, lose the "theonomous" by our too great alertness for it?

The danger of Tillich's overtone seems to me illustrated if we ask the question: When we love another human being, what is it which we love? I had originally formulated Tillich's probable answer in this way--that we love another person because God or the unconditional is revealed through him. Adams believes it would be more accurate to Tillich's position to say that we love another person for his eternal destiny, where destiny is understood in Tillich's sense of limitation and creative possibility in polar relationship with freedom.⁴ No doubt this is

¹In oral communication.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴In personal communication.



more accurate. But the stubborn fact of experience seems to me that it is never love in the finite human sense unless it is wholly concrete, i.e., that loving a person for anything he represents is possible only if we first love him concretely. But if our perceptions are attuned to what he represents, as if we could rapidly skip over his concreteness, are we not, though unintentionally, tending to deny our finitude or the creative possibilities that can come to us only through it?

As a third critical comment, we have noted that Tillich tends to use little illustration or concrete material in his writing. On the basis of a clear and distinct idea approach, we could not object to this. But since Tillich does not believe in such an approach, he would of course agree that the connection between concrete and universal is not necessarily present in clarified form. The result of this situation is to leave some of his concepts and principles in more ambiguity than they no doubt have in his own mind. By analogy on this point, we could cite those psychotherapists who have reported only their conclusions about helping people, and contrast them with those who have presented concrete therapeutic reports and then demonstrated how their conclusions emerge from the concrete therapeutic experiences. The question is not whether both had concrete therapeutic experiences, but with what each reports on. It still seems to me that Tillich has reported comparatively little on the equivalent of concrete material, whether in relation to personal experience or to social and economic matters.

Fourth, Tillich has not delineated what we might call a

systematic moral pathology. By this I mean that Tillich has not elaborated a way of relating general principles to concrete cases, with movement in both directions, so that the gradations would form a relatively systematic moral pathology as an aspect of an ethical casuistry. Tillich has indicated to me that he agrees a hundred per cent on the need for this; so there is no question of his negating its significance.¹ But the question is not simply one of whether he believes this is the job of some one else rather than himself; it is, instead, whether one can present an adequate picture of ethics without a casuistry including a moral pathology. Tillich has devoted much attention to demonstrating how the original moral strivings are themselves pathological in relation to the actualization of man's freedom. But moral striving of one kind, or in one context, may set less barriers to the transformation into the New Man than others. Unless one explicates such matters, can he be wholly correct in rendering an apparently equally negative judgment on all moral striving?

To this criticism, Adams tends to reply that Tillich has come much closer to a casuistry, including a moral pathology, in relation to socio-economic questions than in relation to psychological matters.² With this I would agree. But for a rounded ethics, it would not be sufficient to do this for any number of areas unless the general principles were pursued which were

¹In oral communication.

²In personal communication.

relevant to all areas. As I understand Tillich, he does not contend that he has done this, but he agrees that it should be done.

We pointed out that Tillich noted the fact of "compulsory" or compulsive modes of feeling and behavior, as in certain forms of anxiety. But even though he acknowledges that there are forms and degrees of this, he has not considered them systematically. Tillich has indicated that he believes all human growth is in steps, or all development is by grades, and that an ethics which is not a gradualism is always to some extent false.¹ Yet he would hold, he says, that there are criteria of growth, and these criteria are absolutes. It is, he indicates, like the lightning showing up in the darkness.² The problem here is of continuity and leap.

While Fromm certainly errs in his one-sided picture of Luther, may it not be that Tillich errs too though less basically, precisely at the point where Fromm is right? Tillich points to Luther's inability to bring love and justice together, his too exclusive concentration on the conscious center, his social thought, and other points. But the transformed Luther as man is left untouched. Yet just at this point Fromm calls him an obsessive character. It is, Fromm notes, people who cling obsessively to images of themselves who have such compulsive doubt as Luther had. Luther's problem, therefore, Fromm would imply, is not just in the human situation but in Luther's character. Had he been less obsessive in the Old Man, he would have been

¹In oral communication.

²Ibid.

less extreme (at the very points Tillich criticizes) in the New. This kind of point Tillich simply does not discuss. The same is true of a distinction such as Fromm makes between the authoritarian and humanistic conscience. It may indeed be true that "mere psychotherapeutic psychology is not able to create by itself a new system of ethics," or indeed of philosophy or theology.¹ But the distinctions which therapeutic psychology considers basic would seem to deserve consideration in any ethics; and they can not be seriously considered if lumped together and merely contrasted with something else. There is a certain tendency in Tillich to violate the advice Shailer Mathews gave, not to spank the baby because it isn't a grandfather!

What we have said about Tillich's attitude in relation to concreteness applies to his view of psychotherapy. He is interested in it so far as that which can be immediately discerned has universal or general or existential significance. But in psychotherapy, perhaps above all other human pursuits, we learn to beware of assuming too quickly that what appears to us to be merely "particular," in Tillich's usage, is not "concrete" instead, with large capacity for pointing to the universal. This error has occurred in all forms and directions, and we are only now learning to correct it. Psychoanalysis had to move more and more away from the imposition of its system of thought on a patient, and more in the direction of exploring the meanings the patient brought out in the order in which he was prepared to

¹Tillich, PE, p. 158.

consider them. This is not a comment against the unity of the concrete and the universal, but one of humility against the assumption that we can rule out the particular as non-concrete, without exploration of it. It is holding with the direct, and suspending judgment as to its particularity or concreteness, which is methodologically essential in all psychotherapy.

Finally, there is the weakness in Tillich's merger of the Greek and Hebrew elements in the ethical tradition, despite his great contributions at this point. In principle, this is the same comment made in the preceding paragraphs although in a different context. If one possible characterization of the Hebrew position (response as against the Greek aspiration) is this, "One step enough for me--under God," then we may say that this attitude finds little counterpart in Tillich despite his personal humility. What he asks instead is, "Show me that the step leads to heaven and then it will be enough for me." In the Hebrew view, barring its legalistic entanglements, it is precisely the stepping into direct experience without certainty that is characteristic. And this seems to be the point where Tillich would prefer not to step. Suggest to him that there is universality in this event or thing, no matter how dimly it may be perceived, and he will take it seriously even existentially. But tell him it may well turn out, on examination, to have nothing, such, or nothing such for him, and he will turn away.

We would not be wholly unfair to say that Tillich has very little of the "scientist" in him, that he wants to know that what he is taking time to explore has value before he explores it.



But here his own dialectical method should warn him. It may indeed be constricting to see beyond the pursuit of "truths" to "Truth." But such a concern for Truth that keeps one from the processes of immersion in particularity, some of which may eventually be identified as concrete, may also be a distortion. Perhaps this, in Tillich, is just the philosopher's fallacy, with a Lutheran undertone. In any event, and without asking him to be a scientist or a psychoanalyst, it would seem to be the weak spot in his merger of the Greek and Hebrew traditions through the Christian synthesis, at least in relation to ethics.