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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

**PSYCHOTHERAPY AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS
AN EVALUATION OF THE ETHICAL THOUGHT OF A. E. TAYLOR AND
PAUL TILlich IN THE LIGHT OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ETHICS BY J. C. FLUGEL AND ERICH FROMM**

**A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVINITY SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

BY

SEWARD HILTNER

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

DECEMBER, 1952

PREFACE

My interest in the subject of this essay arises, so far as I can tell, out of five interrelated concerns and types of previous experience. The first is that, in the psychotherapy of pastoral care and counseling, some of the most perplexing and disturbing problems that have arisen have been, in one sense or another, ethical in character. Since a merely positivistic solution to these is no solution at all, and since traditional ethical thinking has not made allowance for the kind of experience that occurs in counseling, this compels the seeking for a new mode of answering these questions, and finally for a reconsideration of the basic principles or relationships undergirding Christian ethics.

Second, within the context of twelve years on the secretariat of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, I became impressed that the often creative and constructive attention which American Protestantism was at least attempting to pay to questions of social ethics was not matched by an equally serious and searching and critical concern for what we usually call "personal" or "psychological" ethics. I became administratively involved in some of these latter questions, for example, on the family, divorce, sex, alcohol, and the like. In my attempts to use clarity of Christian principle, along with subtlety of

application, to some of these areas, I found a very real welcome especially among American ministers, once initial obstacles had been understood and explained. This led me to believe that, on such questions, most protestants see the only alternatives as accepting the traditional for traditional reasons, or else ignoring the whole subject so far as possible. What I seemed to see was an uneasiness about this unstable method of dealing with the problem, and a desire for the same kind of realism in personal ethics which many others had lately introduced into social ethics.

Third, disbelieving in a "second world," and in any kind of revelation professing to be a special magic road to truth or good or right, it was clear to me that no consideration of ethics could be either adequate or complete which did not take seriously the methods and findings of science and philosophy. That such Christian thought, including ethical thought, was in retreat from both science and philosophy disturbed me. Although my special field of knowledge and interest was one type of science, not philosophy as a whole, it was clear that dealing even with one science in relation to ethics involved broader philosophical considerations as context. This aspect of the task gave me misgivings which only the actual performance has helped to alleviate.

Fourth, I was convinced that psychology, with all its scientific methods of seeking for truth, could not be classified exclusively as science or scientific, that in one of its manifestations or "personae" it might well be an independent branch of knowledge or department of a university but that in another aspect it was an approach to theological, and therefore to

Christian ethical, understanding. Without claiming any psychological procedures or methods not equally open to the university psychologist, I felt that psychology, seen in a theological perspective, could be in a new way an avenue to theological truth, and therefore to Christian ethical truth.

Finally, through years of association with members of all the "healing professions," I have come to believe that cooperation among us is essential, but that it can be properly oriented only if the issues involved in our theory and practice are understood on all sides. That issues will remain is undeniable. But if there is to be a universe of discourse at a level deeper than pragmatic politeness, those common interests which made a discussion "bridge" possible require far-reaching investigation. Of these, ethics seems to me the chief.

In the United States the terms "psychoanalysis" and "psychotherapy" have been spelled as one word, without a hyphen. British practice has generally hyphenated these words. I have followed American usage except in direct quotations of British materials.

Originally the Freudian terms "Ego," "Super-Ego," and "Id" were capitalized. Usage now varies, for example, Flugel uses lower-case letters. I have, however, capitalized these terms wherever they are used in the Freudian sense, especially to distinguish between the Freudian "Ego" and "ego" as used in other senses.

Although the first reference to each major book by Fromm, Taylor and Tillich will indicate the abbreviation by which these

books will thereafter be mentioned in the essay, I include these abbreviations below for the convenience of the reader.

EFF -- Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom

MFH -- Erich Fromm's Man for Himself

PAR -- Erich Fromm's Psychoanalysis and Religion

POC -- A. E. Taylor's The Problem of Conduct

FOAM -- A. E. Taylor's The Faith of a Moralist

RS -- Paul Tillich's The Religious Situation

IOH -- Paul Tillich's The Interpretation of History

PE -- Paul Tillich's The Protestant Era

ST -- Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology

For help in conceiving and planning the essay, I am most indebted to Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm for discussions with them on the issues involved, to Albert C. Outler for the suggestion of A. E. Taylor as an ethical thinker worthy of consideration for my purpose, to H. Richard Niebuhr for clarifying discussions on the nature of conscience, and to three colleagues and advisers on the Federated Theological Faculty for help on detailed planning, James Luther Adams, W. Barnett Blakemore, and Bernard M. Loomer.

Paul Tillich was generous enough to read not only the chapter on his ethical thought, but also the two introductory and the two concluding chapters of the essay. His comments, given to me orally, appear mainly in the notes, especially of the chapter concerning him. I am grateful to him for his time, his patience, and his understanding even on the points where neither he nor I are sure that I understand him.

Despite his being out of the United States at the time,

Erich Fromm was gracious enough to read and comment on the chapter concerning his ethical thought. Some of his comments have been included in the notes to that chapter. He was generous enough to say that he felt my treatment is "immensely fair," although he is far from agreeing with most of my critical comments.

When my three advisers agreed to read this dissertation, they were not aware that it would run to the present proportions. Consequently, they have even more thanks from me for plowing through so many words. Their comments have been very helpful in constructing the final manuscript, even though it took somewhat longer to shake these comments out of them than I had at first expected. Since I am an advocate of casuistry, I want to thank Bernard M. Loomer especially for his help and encouragement in thinking through the thesis of the dissertation, W. Barnett Blakemore for prompt reading as well as for some wise counsel on matters both large and small, and James Luther Adams for discerning and meticulous help in understanding Paul Tillich. However, I am still solely responsible for the views which emerge in the essay.

This essay should have been written in 1935. No doubt it would be better if it were written in 1965. But it is more searching now than it would have been even a few years ago.

Seward Hiltner



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is the general purpose of this essay to explore the significance of psychotherapy in relation to the bases or fundamentals of Christian ethics. The principal method that will be followed is to explore the psychological and ethical thought of J. C. Flugel and Erich Fromm, as representing psychotherapy, and to apply their findings critically to the ethical thinking of A. E. Taylor and Paul Tillich. There will also be critical and constructive comment on both the psychological and ethical aspects of the thought of all four men, and a constructive statement of my own position throughout the essay but gathered together systematically in the concluding chapter.

In this chapter we shall first consider certain aspects of the dilemma in which Christian ethics now finds itself, pointing to several almost self-evident facts which make its study difficult. In particular, we shall refer to the relation, or lack of it, between general ethical principles and the actualities of conduct, to the normative and descriptive aspects of ethics, and to the pervasive "left-wing" and "right-wing" tendencies in people which affect ethical discussion. We shall consider the current state of relations between Christian ethics (as theological ethics) and philosophical ethics in general. We shall

indicate the lacuna that currently exists on the "personal" or "psychological" aspects of Christian ethics. We shall explore briefly the Protestant attitude toward psychology and psychotherapy especially as the latter may bear upon ethics, the interest of psychology and psychotherapy in ethics, and the potential bridge function of ethics as relating theology to science and philosophy. We shall describe the methodology of the remainder of the essay, and present our reasons for following it.

Some Current Dilemmas in Christian Ethics

In some way or another, ethics deals with human conduct. Yet once human mind and reason give attention to its study, any system of ethical thought naturally tends to become identified with its most general principles. This means that the obvious differentiating factor among ethical systems is philosophical in character. At the same time, there are not necessarily corresponding differences in conduct, or thought about conduct, among people who hold widely divergent opinions on the general principles of ethical thought. Idealists, logical positivists, critical realists, or many of the others (regardless of how we select the "most general" principles) may all act in very much the same way.

In this form, the point is almost tautologous. But we mention it because it shows the constant temptation of ethics, Christian or otherwise, to make a general (universal, all-embracing of concrete instances) principle into an abstract one (selecting out only certain aspects of the concrete), or forgetting,

in the sophisticated refinements of thought, what it was with which the inquiry began.

Even the emergence of a new system, or new emphasis, has frequently been no effective harbinger of the kind of conduct which might result. The romantic trend in ethics, for example, rising up against eighteenth-century rationalism, led both to Kierkegaard and to Marx. And modern existential thought has led both to Sartre's atheistic Stoicism and to new depth in Protestant theology and ethics. The point is twofold: the categorization of an ethical system must, before its study is finished, include the study of actual conduct promoted by it; and we must observe closely whether the usual differentiating points in systems of ethical thought are actually differences from the point of view of ethics, or of something else.

There is a corollary to this point which bears especially upon psychology. If two ethicists agree about conduct but differ in its underlying principles, it may well be that something blocks either or both from correct inference about what ethical principles are actually operating in their own life and experience. From the motivational pole, such blocks could be considered psychologically. Although this essay will not be argumentum ad hominem in this sense, the point does suggest one of the inherent relevancies of psychological to ethical study.

What has been said of ethics and ethical systems in general is also true within Christian ethics. While the differences in terms of general principle have been less wide than in western ethics as a whole, they have been considerable. To be

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ure, the sense of the gospel or kerygma has been a unifying factor; and besides, the merger within Christianity of the Greek and Hebrew traditions, however imperfectly achieved, has tended to prevent either tendency from triumphing completely at any time.

In addition, a large amount of the differences in actual conduct, and ideals for conduct, which exist among different Christian groups is much more cultural in origin than it is dependent upon the general Christian ethical principles. An illustration would appear if we contrasted northern European Protestant conduct with that of southern European Catholic behavior. This is not intended to assert irrelevancy of general principle to actual conduct, but rather to assert, in ideological fashion, that even Christian groups have tended to appeal implicitly to certain general principles that actually guide their behavior, while asserting explicitly that they appeal only to certain others, the two perhaps being quite different though not necessarily so. Somehow, this point should not be lost in the shuffle of general principles.

Another dilemma of ethics is the difficulty of dealing with the normative and the descriptive elements. The temptation to confuse them, and their respective functions, makes study precarious. Ethics is normative; it can never be merely descriptive, or it would be merely social or psychological science. Let its study must begin by being descriptive; otherwise, there is no depth or penetration. But if an ethical thinker, knowing ethics is inherently normative, starts off with normative considerations and eschews any study of the descriptive, then in effect he

excludes as "unethical" whatever seriously disagrees with him. It may well be "unethical" normatively speaking; but his understanding is not increased, for he does not see the "ethical," descriptively speaking, in the person or group he is examining.

In looking at the Soviet Union, for instance, we are inclined to believe that the Russians or Russian bureaucracy have no ethics. But descriptively speaking, the Russian state does have an ethics, for all our being opposed to it, even if that ethics be only that the end justifies the means if the leaders of the state can get away with something and believe that something strengthens the state. Or, in a personal illustration, we are inclined to believe that an exploitative homosexual person has no "ethics." What we mean is that he is not guided by the principles we believe should be normative. But we need to recognize that he is in fact guided by a principle which, in a descriptive sense, is ethical, however confused or wrong or neurotic or short-sighted we believe such a principle to be.

This point has important practical implications. Let us suppose that we can not, descriptively speaking, identify anything in the Russian hierarchy or the exploitative homosexual as "ethical" in character. In that case, we fail to take "ethical pathology" seriously, i.e., these other forms have no emotional kinship of any kind with ourselves. We are therefore unable to penetrate in any sense the frame of reference of the other person or group. And being emotionally unaware of what there is in his ethical principle which attracts him, we cut ourselves off from any opportunity to aid him in its alteration. Even in the most disturbed or removed psychotic patient, we distinguish between

the "intentionality" of his bizarre behavior and its merely obvious or superficial meaning. What he is trying to protect, e.g., the ego which has been battered down when it tried to face life, may well be something not fulfillable on those terms; but the ground of what he is attempting blindly to defend, e.g., not to commit psychic suicide, may be a positive intentionality. Until we can understand, with some empathy, the appeal of any ethical principle, whatever its actual nature, by so much do we fail to understand not only "moral pathology" but also the ground of any ethical principle in positive terms.

It has been especially difficult for Christian ethics to keep in mind that, although ethics is normative, its study begins in description. It has been assumed that description would lead only to rationalism or to positivism. In some respects the eighteenth century is especially instructive at this point. With all the differences in theory, the content of conduct in terms of ideal was a solid rock on which most serious thinkers rested, a fact without which the Kantian position might not have become so influential. The suspicion of mere description may be well founded in Christian ethics, as this suggests. Nevertheless, unless the risk is taken, and the positivistic and romantic shoals averted, even Christian ethics can lose relevance and profundity by becoming preoccupied with the normative prior to an adequate exploration of the descriptive.

A third dilemma of ethical study has recently had some illumination from psychological study; this refers to the tendencies toward what we shall call right- and left-wingishness

in ethical thought.¹ There tends to be a certain consistency, in disciplined ethical thinkers no less than other people, in attitudes on various aspects of ethics. Thus, if some one tends to the left on economics, the chances are strong that he will also be to the left on sex, on the social function of physicians, and so on.

The content of what is considered left or right is of course given by the culture for the most part. What struck the individual as left-wing in one year (e.g., old-fashioned theological liberalism) may next year or five years from now be considered right-wing, with the new content of the left-wing becoming something else (e.g., neo-orthodoxy). What is frequently overlooked is that the character or personality involved may remain the same, i.e., it is not a personality movement from right to left or left to right), but may attach itself to different contents as the culture revalues those (not without help from the individual).

Since this tendency is in ethical thinkers also, it means that this is one perspective, along with others, which needs to be kept in the background of our minds when studying any ethical system. It is being alert to a general set or readiness within the thinker being studied. As illustration, let us suppose that one thinker has been impressed by the harm which authoritarianisms of all kinds do in human life. If something, e.g., God, has often been seen in authoritarian context, then this thinker may find himself saying that the less said about God the better. If then this thinker is exposed to some deep-reaching and non-authoritarian

¹J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society: A Psycho-analytical Study (New York: International Universities Press, 1945), pp. 281-301.

concept of God, which is designed to eliminate authoritarianism from it, he may accept it. Before, he was a kind of atheist; now he is a kind of theist. But the actually operating leftishness (or anti-authoritarianism) remains fundamentally unchanged. To use an opposite illustration, we may think of the Nazi who reached for authority including a kind of God, who then became nihilistic about everything including God. Once he was a theist; then an atheist. But all along he was an extreme right-winger, reaching for unquestioned authority.

Some insight into this point is especially valuable in understanding current tendencies in Christian ethics in America. In its heyday, the social gospel and its ethics represented progressive leftishness. But if held today in exactly the same form as 1912, this view would, in the light of more recent events, be perhaps as much right- as left-wing. If we want to understand the ethical thought, for example, of Reinhold Niebuhr, we do well to recognize that he is just as "left," in our conception of the term, on ethics in the current situation as he was with different specific ideas in the twenties.

The Current Situation in Protestant Christian Ethics

Descriptively and broadly speaking, the following seems to be the situation today in Christian ethics. The Eastern churches, because of both their theological and cultural background, have tended to the right--without very close relationship between conduct, especially conduct on the broader social scene, and Christianity. This situation may change dynamically as

Soviet Communism makes them either conform in a new way, or rebel. The Roman Catholic Church continues with its legalism, which tends to recognize any small change in principle only long after it has been adopted in practice. The realism of Catholic social thought often makes it appear to be to the left while its philosophical ethics appears to the right. A proper understanding of the content of these terms would show this church to be consistently to the right of center, even though it is not a part of our essay's purpose to prove this point.

In Protestantism we have had more than a half-century of significant and creative social thought, the content of which goes right on functioning. But the big issue being discussed at the moment is: What are the ethical implications of the kerygma? There are many advocates of the position in which a sharp distinction is made between theological ethics, kerygmatically understood, and philosophical ethics. Significant work on social ethics still continues, especially in the United States. But comparatively little development is going on by Christian thinkers in philosophical ethics as related to Christian ethics. Those with more right-wing tendencies have tended to by-pass this in favor of re-discovery of the kerygmatic element; and those with more left-wing tendencies, especially the theistic naturalists, have been chiefly preoccupied with the nature of God and value.

Thus, the major current issues as usually seen are: What is the source of authority in Christian ethics, what is really distinctive about it, and what are the implications of this for the large-scale social context? These are important questions.

at in the light of our concern, we need to note two large areas of neglect: the solution of the theological-philosophical ethics problem by divorce, and the relative inattention to "psychological" or "personal" ethics or aspects of ethics. Another way to put this is that current Christian ethical thinking is trying to study its roots in the gospel, its distinctive character, and its obligation in the face of questions like war and race. But the psychological area in between remains critically unexamined, and the service of philosophy is too little being sought.

A good illustration of the lack of critical study of "personal ethics" is in relation to the family. The discussions center on points like these: what God intends the family to be, how the family is threatened by current social forces, and how religion can strengthen family solidarity and the family can help religious education. There is little or nothing on points like the following: how the meaning of the family has changed from "inside," what are the distinctively Protestant implications for the family in our view of ethics, or what are the "family ethics" for the increasing millions who do not live in families. For instance, reflection suggests that Protestantism should not feel the same concern for merely "official solidarity" of the family, apart from inner considerations, as is felt by Roman Catholicism. If this inner factor is mentioned, it is often confused with a form of romanticism which has no backing from any basic form of Christian ethics.

Current Protestant thought tends to rest in an illusory security about personal ethics, a good illustration of which may

be seen in the reaction to the first volume of the Kinsey report on sex behavior in the United States.¹ The report itself is the presentation of statistical facts about external or objective sex behavior, wholly omitting considerations of motivation and the like. It contains some deficiencies due to the lack of philosophical orientation of the authors, and gets into interpretation even when it is not the authors' intention to do so. This helps in clouding the issue.

One thing made clear by the report is that the sex conduct of Protestants is very different from accepted principles, and that social class and status has much more to do with the determination of sex conduct, behavioristically considered, than do the principles. Another point suggested by this report, and documented at the level of motivation and personal history by other studies, is that much of the sex aberration that exists has resulted in part from our trying to pour every one into the same kind of mold. Protestantism ought certainly to ask: How can our convictions on these questions become more deeply operative in the lives of people? But it ought also to ask: How can we cease to be unintentional contributors to distortions like homosexuality? Not only is the latter type of question seldom asked, but there has been, for the most part, a public ignoring of this report by just those ethical thinkers whom we might expect to take it seriously. It is as if they said, "We have enough

¹ Alfred C. Kinsey, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. E. Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1948).

areas of conflict now; let's let sex take care of itself." Yet Protestantism's security on a question like this is, unlike the Roman Catholic, uneasy.

The Protestant Attitude Toward Psychotherapy

Our entire essay presupposes that there is a potential relevance of the psychological studies to Christian ethics. What is the general climate in Protestantism toward such an assumption? We may first recall that psychology, prior to the establishment of Wundt's laboratory at the end of the third quarter of the previous century, was a handmaid to philosophy, and was not prepared to make distinctive contributions to anything. But with the rise of experimental and then clinical psychology and psychiatry, and finally psychotherapy, the possibility of a contribution or conflict appeared. The first investigations were partial, considering the gross and easily examinable phenomena. Not until recent years did findings emerge which could be considered on the same level of thought as ethics.

The index of Protestantism's attitude toward this potential contribution may be seen in its attitude toward psychoanalysis in general. Almost unanimously, for thirty years or so the reaction was negative. And one of the points made most strongly against it was that it attacked the bases of moral conduct. Freud said that he was only trying to get the forces of instinct and of morality on the same level, where the conscious personality could decide about them, and that he was not attacking morals. But this had little effect. An analysis of inner "moral" processes

was usually considered to be as dangerous as a symbolic bringing to consciousness of instinctive forces. Far from believing that help might be forthcoming from this source, the usual theological reaction was to combat it. All of this was accentuated by the philosophical and ethical naiveté which Freud and the early psychoanalysts had.

With the generally Pelagian cast of American Protestant ethics up to the time of the early thirties, this was the sole possible reaction. But as the social, and then the theological, mood changed in the thirties, a more Augustinian attitude began to appear. This is much more congenial to considering the findings of psychoanalysis, since it is not dependent on a simple voluntarism in ethics. The strain of Pelagianism and simple voluntarism continues; but the more radical and left-wing tendencies of the present are Augustinian, more complex, and more open to the possible contributions of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy.

The Interest of Psychotherapy in Ethics

What of the interest of psychology and psychotherapy in ethics? We shall trace the development of such an interest in more detail in Chapter III. Here we make only some introductory comments. Psychology and psychotherapy have received their modern orientation in terms of science. The key events were the establishment of a psychological (not just a physiological) laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt, and the publication of Freud's first psychoanalytic writings in the early years of our century. The trend initiated by Wundt was not at first fruitful for per-

sonality since it sought to isolate factors which could be studied because of their relative clarity and simplicity. In recent years, however, the experimental method in psychology has begun to yield important fruit in regard to personality, bearing plainly on ethics in the work of experimentalists like O. H. Mowrer.¹

From the beginning, Freud's psychotherapeutic and clinical method turned up data about personality as such; but just because it did deal with very complex phenomena, its hypotheses (in attempts at clarification) tended to be extreme. In more recent years the experimental and clinical trends in psychology have begun to come back together, so that experimentalism is better able to deal with complexity, and psychotherapy is becoming better oriented within the framework of a more complex general psychology, less obsessed with its "exclusively scientific" character.

Until recently, neither psychology nor psychotherapy had a constructive interest in ethics. For a long time the experimental trends in psychology rested on "scientific" presuppositions, thus rendering ethics or any facsimile thereof wholly irrelevant. The fear that a concern for ethics might lead to a reinstatement of the pre-Wundtian situation, with psychology a handmaid of philosophy, was very strong, and in some measure still is so. The actually operating philosophy was a simple positivism.

In early psychotherapy the situation was quite different. There was no lack of interest in ethics, but of a negative kind. So many of the human ills that came to the attention of psycho-

¹O. Hobart Mowrer, Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics: Selected Papers (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1950).

analysts seemed to result from undue rigidity and strength of the moral forces that repressed or blocked off the instinctual life. Psychoanalysis at first thought it could merely bring these forces into consciousness and cure would result (a theory soon revised by Freud). There they could be handled openly though symbolically. As the analysts looked about them, in the light of what emerged from their patients, it was as if all the established institutions of society were conspiring in the interests of repression and hence to produce neurotic illnesses. Although they never developed either a Nietzschean or a Rousseauian theory of anti-institutional morality, they did place emphasis on the removal of restraints. Freud was not a primitivist. If civilization produced discontents, man still had to live in it.¹ But it would be easier to do so if current moralities, with their rigidity and their irrelevance to the realities of intrapsychic life, were reconsidered. This meant that psychoanalysis, unlike experimental psychology, had an interest in ethics from the beginning, of which, however, only the negative aspects were dealt with explicitly.

Yet there were more positive ethical implications in Freud's thought from the beginning. The general principle for which he was contending was that there is a criterion in the person of what is "good" for him, regardless of what any originally external authority has succeeded in teaching him which contradicts

¹ Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents, trans. Joan Riviere ("International Psycho-analytical Library No. 17"; London: The Hogarth Press, 1930).

analysts seemed to result from undue rigidity and strength of the moral forces that repressed or blocked off the instinctual life. Psychoanalysis at first thought it could merely bring these forces into consciousness and cure would result (a theory soon revised by Freud). There they could be handled openly though symbolically. As the analysts looked about them, in the light of what emerged from their patients, it was as if all the established institutions of society were conspiring in the interests of repression and hence to produce neurotic illnesses. Although they never developed either a Nietzschean or a Rousseauian theory of anti-institutional morality, they did place emphasis on the removal of restraints. Freud was not a primitivist. If civilization produced discontents, man still had to live in it.¹ But it would be easier to do so if current moralities, with their rigidity and their irrelevance to the realities of intrapsychic life, were reconsidered. This meant that psychoanalysis, unlike experimental psychology, had an interest in ethics from the beginning, of which, however, only the negative aspects were dealt with explicitly.

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this assumption.¹ If Freud's conception of this criterion was a too simple biologism, nevertheless he pointed out by implication that what is unhealthy (or wrong or bad) and therefore what is healthy (or right or good) should be evaluated by a criterion involving the inner dynamic structure of personality itself.

Although Freud and his followers were not anti-ethical in any basic sense, their concern with what seemed to be the negative, at the expense of exploring the positive, left the general public with that impression. Other movements in psychotherapy, all in fact strongly indebted to Freud, sometimes went out of their way to dissociate themselves from an anti-ethical view. But even they at first considered this merely as dealing with a bit of debris which had been deposited at their door, and not as the possible source of a feast. Thus they did not, any more than the analysts, work constructively in the ethical realm.

This was the situation until the 1940's, except on certain large-scale political and economic matters. It might be said that it was Hitler who changed the ethical thinking of psychotherapists toward the positive side. Psychoanalysis, which had been born and retained its greatest strength in Austria and Germany, almost completely left Europe. The advantages, and the ruth, of the humanistic and ultimately Jewish-Christian presuppositions underlying western civilization became existentially important in a way in which they had not been before. The rise

¹ Documentation for these statements about Freud is given in the extensive discussion of Chapter III, to which the comments supra are merely introductory.