@article{Fast, author = {Fast, Irene}, title = {>They Go Too Far<: Reply to Review Essays by Lewes and O'Connor}, series = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 01 (1991), pp. 301-304.}, journal = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 01 (1991), pp. 301-304.}, language = {en} } @article{Fast, author = {Fast, Irene}, title = {>Yes, and …< - How Improvisation Is the Essence of Good Psychoanalytic Dialogue: Reply to Commentaries}, series = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 01 (1991), pp. 329-334.}, journal = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 01 (1991), pp. 329-334.}, language = {en} } @article{Fast, author = {Fast, Irene}, title = {Addiction as Mind - Body Bridge Commentary on Paper by Lisa Director}, series = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 02 (1992), pp. 389-409.}, journal = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 02 (1992), pp. 389-409.}, abstract = {Throughout his working life Freud rejected the dualism of mind and body, which suggests that we can study people's thoughts, feelings, and relationships without taking into account the bodily contexts in which people live their lives. In his conception of the bodily origins of mental functioning, however, children are seen to be oblivious to their environments for a significant period in their early lives (the first 18-24 months). This conception is increasingly found to be untenable: current perspectives and observations both within and outside psychoanalytic psychology suggest that infants interact with their environments from birth. This paper attempts a model for an interactive perspective on the bodily origins of the mind. It proposes that from the beginning of life infant experience occurs in interactions. Because the mental and physical aspects of infant's experience are initially not differentiated, these interactions are absolutely body-bound. That nondifferentiation also results directly in the primitive experience modes Freud described as the primary processes. Development occurs by integration and differentiation. It leads to the transition, at 18-24 months, that Freud ascribed to the child's turn to the external world and to the testing of reality, the beginning of psychic conflict, and the relegation to the unconscious of unacceptable ideas, which in his view accompany it.}, language = {en} } @article{Fast, author = {Fast, Irene}, title = {Child psychoanalysis, adult psychoanalysis, and developmental psychology Introduction to symposium on child analysis, part II}, series = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 04 (1994), pp. 051-068.}, journal = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 04 (1994), pp. 051-068.}, abstract = {Feelings of loss or abandonment, alternating idealization and disparagement of their wives, envy of their wives, and denial of limits imposed by their own sexual organization are regularly reported in explorations of men's disturbed reactions to their wives' pregnancies. In women this pattern of reactions, directed by them toward men, has long been understood to reflect little girls' responses to the recognition of their sex and gender limits. In men it has not been interpreted coordinately as a pattern of reactions to the recognition that the capacity to give birth cannot be theirs because they are male. Freud repeatedly raises this possibility, but he invariably rejects it as incompatible with children's early knowledge and beliefs. He seems implicitly to give it credence but he can find no way to integrate it into his profoundly phallocentric theory of sex and gender development. A differentiation model of gender development (Fast, 1984) suggests that penis envy and envy of women's childbearing capacities are the responses of girls and boys, respectively, to the recognition of their sex and gender limits. For men, the pregnancy of their wives is hypothesized to provide a powerful stimulus for the reemer-gence of sex difference issues. Support for this view is found in both clinical studies and explorations of men's reactions to their wives' pregnancies in nonclinical populations. Some of these investigations suggest, moreover, that this reemergence offers men opportunities to reengage issues of sex and gender limits and move toward increasingly subtle and sophisticated resolutions of them during the period of their approaching fatherhood.}, language = {en} } @article{Fast, author = {Fast, Irene}, title = {Dreams and the holistic nature of interpersonal psychoanalytic experience}, series = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 05 (1995), pp. 435-458.}, journal = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 05 (1995), pp. 435-458.}, abstract = {Following Hartmann's theoretical formulations, the self has been explored primarily as a body of self-representations coordinate to object representations the dynamic organizations of the mind (the id-egosuperego systems) have been seen as impersonal (nonself) functions.This paper attempts a conception of the id-ego-superego structures as self-functions in intimate relation to self-representations. Building on an integration of Piagetian and psychoanalytic object relations frameworks (event theory), it proposes that the earliest self-experience occurs in dynamic schemes of personally motivated interaction between self and nonself. These I-schemes lay the groundwork for both the dynamic and the representational aspects of the self: Their structure results in experience characteristic of the dynamic id and in their character as undifferentiated interactions provides the base for the development of self- and object representations. Development occurs by integration and differentiation in processes of conflict resolution. The paper traces these developments in outline as they lead to the transition in the dynamic self from id to ego organizations, and in the self-representations from part-selves and part-objects to a whole and individuated self in relation to whole objects.}, language = {en} } @article{Fast, author = {Fast, Irene}, title = {Projective identification Begone! Commentary on paper by Susan H. Sands}, series = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 09 (1999), pp. 633-661.}, journal = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 09 (1999), pp. 633-661.}, abstract = {Stoller proposes two fundamentally contradictory conceptions of core gender identity. This paper urges that we accept the first, a relational conception: Core gender identity develops in the context of unambiguous sex ascription at birth and the virtually infinite number of daily infant-parent interactions permeated by all the conscious and unconscious meanings the child's gender has for its parents. The implications of this conception are explored in four contexts. The first shows that a recent case of sex reassignment, purporting to demonstrate a neurological base for gender experience, does not do so. The second argues that children's core gender identities as >girls< or >boys< are as diverse as the meanings that their genders have had for their interaction partners (usually the parents). The third emphasizes the priority of infant-parent interactions in core gender identity development and in the gendered meanings that children's genitals have for them. The fourth argues for the rejection of the >disidentification< hypothesis rooted in Stoller's second and unsupported conception of core gender identity and in Mahler's conception of separation?individuation, which might usefully be replaced by Lyons-Ruth's conception of attachment-individuation.}, language = {en} } @article{Fast, author = {Fast, Irene}, title = {Protein or foreign body?. Reply to commentaries}, series = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 09 (1999), pp. 675-682.}, journal = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues Vol. 09 (1999), pp. 675-682.}, language = {en} }