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We consider an auction of slots to run trains through a railway network. In contrast to the classical setting for combinatorial auctions, there is not only competition for slots, but slots can mutually exclude each other, such that general conflict constraints on bids arise. This turns the winner determination problem associated with such an auction into a complex combinatorial optimization problem. It also raises a number of auction design questions, in particular, on incentive compatibilty. We propose a single-shot second price auction for railway slots, the Vickrey Track Auction (VTA). We show that this auction is incentive compatible, i.e., rational bidders are always motivated to bid their true valuation, and that it produces efficient allocations, even in the presence of constraints on allocations. These properties are, however, lost when rules on the submission of bids such as, e.g., lowest bids, are imposed. Our results carry over to generalized" Vickrey auctions with combinatorial constraints.
This paper provides a generic formulation for rolling stock planning
problems in the context of intercity passenger traffic. The main contributions
are a graph theoretical model and a Mixed-Integer-Programming
formulation that integrate all main requirements of the considered
Vehicle-Rotation-Planning problem (VRPP). We show that it is
possible to solve this model for real-world instances provided by our
industrial partner DB Fernverkehr AG using modern algorithms and
computers.
This paper provides a generic formulation for rolling stock planning problems in the context of intercity passenger traffic. The main contributions are a graph theoretical model and a Mixed-Integer-Programming formulation that integrate all main requirements of the considered Vehicle-Rotation-Planning problem (VRPP). We show that it is possible to solve this model for real-world instances provided by our industrial partner DB Fernverkehr AG using modern algorithms and computers.
Rolling stock optimization is a task that naturally arises by operating a railway system.
It could be seen with different level of details. From a strategic perspective to have a rough plan which types of fleets to be bought to a more operational perspective to decide which coaches have to be maintained first. This paper presents a new approach to deal with rolling stock optimisation in case of a (long term) strike.
Instead of constructing a completely new timetable for the strike period, we propose a mixed integer programming model that is able to choose appropriate trips from a given timetable to construct efficient tours of railway vehicles covering an optimized subset of trips, in terms of deadhead kilometers and importance of the trips. The decision which trip is preferred over the other is made by a simple evaluation method that is deduced from the network and trip defining data.
Rolling stock optimization is a task that naturally arises by operating a railway system. It could be seen with different level of details. From a strategic perspective to have a rough plan which types of fleets to be bought to a more operational perspective to decide which coaches have to be maintained first. This paper presents a new approach to deal with rolling stock optimisation in case of a (long term) strike. Instead of constructing a completely new timetable for the strike period, we propose a mixed integer programming model that is able to choose appropriate trips from a given timetable to construct efficient tours of railway vehicles covering an optimized subset of trips, in terms of deadhead kilometers and importance of the trips. The decision which trip is preferred over the other is made by a simple evaluation method that is deduced from the network and trip defining data.
We present an optimization model which is capable of routing and ordering trains on a microscopic level under a moving block regime. Based on a general timetabling definition (GTTP) that allows the plug in of arbitrarily detailed methods to compute running and headway times, we describe a layered graph approach using velocity expansion, and develop a mixed integer linear programming formulation. Finally, we present promising results for a German corridor scenario with mixed traffic, indicating that applying branch-and-cut to our model is able to solve reasonably sized instances with up to hundred trains to optimality.
We introduce the shortest path problem with crossing costs (SPPCC), a shortest path problem in a directed graph, in which the objective function is the sum of arc weights and crossing costs. The former are independently paid for each arc used by the path, the latter need to be paid every time the path intersects certain sets of arcs, which we call regions.
The SPPCC generalizes not only the classical shortest path problem but also variants such as the resource constrained shortest path problem and the minimum label path problem. We use the SPPCC to model the flight trajectory optimization problem with overflight costs.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the problem. In particular,
we identify efficient exact and approximation algorithms for the cases that are most relevant in practice.
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.